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second Tīrthaôkara, Lord Neminātha, is 
installed in Old Jain Temple, Hastinapur, 
Uttar Pradesh. Conch shell (śaôkha) is the 
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vFkZ & vkidk rhFkZ] 'kklu lokZUroku~ gS vkSj xkS.k rFkk eq[; dh 
dYiuk dks lkFk esa fy, gq, gSA tks 'kklu&okD; èkeks± esa ikjLifjd 
vis{kk dk izfriknu ugha djrk] og loZ/eks± ls 'kwU; gSA vr% vkidk 
gh ;g 'kklurhFkZ loZ nq%[kksa dk vUr djus okyk gS] ;gh fujUr gS 
vkSj ;gh lc izkf.k;ksa ds vH;qn; dk dkj.k rFkk vkRek ds iw.kZ 
vH;qn; dk lkèkd ,slk loksZn;&rhFkZ gSA
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djds èkekZuqjkxh Jh fot; dqekj th us cgqr gh egÙoiw.kZ dk;Z fd;k gSA blls 
lEiw.kZ fo'o dks vkpk;Z leUrHknz ds vuqie opuksa dks le>us dk lkSHkkX; izkIr 
gksxkA os igys Hkh blh izdkj ds vusd mRÑ"V xzUFkksa dks 'kq¼rk ,oa lqUnjrk ds 
lkFk izdkf'kr dj pqds gSaA esjk mudks cgqr&cgqr eaxy vk'khokZn gSA
ĀptamīmāÚsā
CONT ENT S
eaxy vk'khokZn & vkpk;ZJh fo|kuUn th eqfujkt ----- (v)
PREFACE ----- (viii)
ACKNOWLEDGMENT ----- (xxi)
VIJAY K. JAIN – BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE ----- (xxiv)
Section 1 Verses 1 - 23 ----- 3
Section 2 Verses 24 - 36 ----- 47
Section 3 Verses 37 - 60 ----- 67
Section 4 Verses 61 - 72 ----- 103
Section 5 Verses 73 - 75 ----- 119
Section 6 Verses 76 - 78 ----- 125
Section 7 Verses 79 - 87 ----- 129
Section 8 Verses 88 - 91 ----- 139
Section 9 Verses 92 - 95 ----- 143
Section 10 Verses 96 - 114 ----- 149
GENERAL INDEX ----- 177
INDEX OF VERSES ----- 189
GUIDE TO TRANSLITERATION ----- 200
(vi)
Ā
cārya Samantabhadra was a great Digambara ascetic endowed 
with exceptional knowledge of the Jaina doctrine. He preached 
and propagated, far and wide, core principles of the doctrine by 
visiting many places in India. His literary and philosophical talents 
are not open to dispute; many inscriptions and works by subsequent 
Jaina Ācāryas have extolled his virtues as well as his works in 
superlative terms. A case in point is the assertion by Ācārya Jinasena 
1in Ādipurāõa :
ue% leUrHkæk; egrs dfoos/ls A
;}pksotzikrsu fu£HkUuk% dqerkæ;% AA 43 AA
I bow to Ācārya Samantrabhadra, the ultimate creator (Brahmā) 
among all poets, whose words are like a stroke of lightning which 
tears apart mountains of misconceptions.
dohuka xedkuka p okfnuka okfXeukefi A
;'k% lkeUrHkæh;a ew£èu pwMke.kh;rs AA 44 AA
Ācārya Samantrabhadra’s glory reigned supreme among all poets, 
scholars, disputants, and preachers; he was like a jewel on their 
heads.
Four exceptional qualities of Ācārya Samantabhadra have been 
mentioned: 1) poetic skill (kavitva) which made his compositions 
excellent in terms of profoundness of content and grandiosity of 
expression; 2) intellectual authority (gamakatva) because of which he 
was able to explore and expound deep meanings of profound religious 
texts; 3) debating skill (vāditva) which made him capable of reasoning 
out the most difficult philosophical disputes; and 4) charming 
P R E FA C E
Ācārya Samantabhadra –
the embodiment of right faith, knowledge, and conduct
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eloquence (vāgmitva) that engendered admiration for his truthfulness 
and straightforwardness even in the minds of his adversaries.
2Ācārya Narendrasena in SiddhāntasārasaÉgraha , a widely read 
Sanskrit text dealing with the seven substances (tattvas), avers that 
only the most fortunate human beings get access to the words of 
Ācārya Samantabhadra:
JheRleUrHkæL; nsoL;kfi opks¿u?ke~ A
izkf.kuka nqyZHka ;}Uekuq"kRoa rFkk iqu% AA 11 AA
Just as the attainment of human birth is difficult, it is extremely 
rare to get access to the incontrovertible words of the Most 
Learned Ācārya Samantrabhadra.
lqnqyZHkefi izkIra rRdeZiz'kekfng A
u ;s /eZjrk eksgk¼k grk gUr rs ujk% AA 12 AA
Only when the inauspicious (aśubha) karmas of a man get to 
quiescence is he able to come face-to-face with the holy words of 
Ācārya Samantrabhadra. Those who fail to adopt the path of piety 
even after exposure to his words can only be said to have been 
overwhelmed by delusion.
Ācārya Samantabhadra has not only been termed a brilliant 
grammarian, logician and philosopher, he has been recognized as an 
unmatched disputant and great preacher of the Jaina doctrine. Ācārya 
3Śubhacandra in JðānārõavaÍ  has likened the poetic compositions of 
Svāmi Samantabhadra to the bright rays of the sun.
4Ācārya Jinasena, author of Harivaôśapurāõa , has likened the 
expositions of Ācārya Samantabhadra to the words of Lord Mahāvīra:
thoflf¼fo/k;hg Ñr;qDR;uq'kklue~ A
op% leUrHkæL; ohjL;so fot`EHkrs AA 29 AA
The words of Ācārya Samantabhadra, the composer of Jīvasiddhi 
(ix)
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(discourse on the path to liberation) and Yuktyanuśāsana 
(discourse on the merits and demerits of different standpoints), 
carry the same glory as the words of Lord Mahāvīra.
5It is mentioned in Jaina literature  that Ācārya Samantabhadra 
once introduced himself to the king of Vārāõasī as:
vkpk;ksZ¿ga dfojgega okfnjkV~ if.Mrks¿ge~]
nSoKks¿ga fHk"kxgega ekfU=kdLrkfU=kdkss¿ge~ A
jktUuL;ka tyf/oy;kes[kyk;kfeyk;k&
ekKkfl¼% fdfefr cgquk fl¼lkjLorkss¿ge~ AA
O king ! I am a preceptor (ācārya), a poet (kavi), foremost among 
the interpreters of the sacred scriptures (vādī), a scholar (paõçita), 
an astrologer (jyotiÈī), a practitioner of medicine (vaidya), a reciter 
of spells (māntrika), and skilled in mystical incantations 
(tāntrika). Do I need say more? My utterances become inviolable 
commands (ājðāsiddha), and I have subjugated the goddess of 
learning Sarasvatī (sārasvatasiddha).
The personality of Ācārya Samantabhadra was a rare combination 
of the Three Jewels (ratnatraya) of Jainism – pristine faith, 
knowledge, and conduct – that are empirically considered essential to 
the attainment of liberation. He was one of the most impelling 
proponents of the Jaina doctrine of anekāntavāda – a philosophical 
system which maintains that reality has multifarious aspects and that 
a complete apprehension of it must necessarily take into account all 
these aspects. Non-appreciation of this doctrine has caused the other 
philosophical systems fall into the trap of one-sided, incomplete, and 
unsustainable dogmas that fail to explain the Truth. The words of 
Ācārya Samantabhadra are incontrovertible as these are guarded by 
the Jaina doctrine of conditional predications (syādvāda) – a system of 
scientific safeguards that aims at maintaining proper consistency in 
metaphysical thought.
(x)
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6Several Jaina scriptures  have mentioned that Ācārya 
Samantabhadra was destined to attain the highest and supreme 
status of a Tīrthaôkara (a ford-maker for the others to cross the ocean 
of worldly cycle of births and deaths – saÉsāra). Tīrthaôkara he 
will propagate Truth for the welfare of all living beings and will be 
Tīrthaôkara.
The time when Ācārya Samantabhadra flourished cannot be 
7ascertained with great precision. Jugalkishore Mukhtar , after due 
research and detailed analysis as presented in his Preface to 
Ratnakaraõçaka-śrāvakācāra, has arrived at the conclusion that 
Ācārya Samantabhadra must have lived after Ācārya Kundakunda 
and Ācārya Umāsvāmi but before Ācārya Pūjyapāda. Broadly, he has 
fixed Ācārya Samantabhadra’s time as the second or the third century, 
Vikram SaÚvata (VS). As Gregorian Year 2000 CE corresponds to Year 
2057 in the VS calendar, Ācārya Samantabhadra’s time can be fixed 
around the second century CE.
Ācārya Samantabhadra is known to have authored the following 
profound treatises:
As a 
worshipped by the lords of the devas and the men during the five most 
auspicious events (paðca kalyāõaka)* that must take place in the life 
of a 
*The five most auspicious events in the life of the 
Tīrthaôkara are:
1. garbha kalyāõaka: when the soul of the Tīrthaôkara enters the 
Mother’s womb.
2. janma kalyāõaka: on the birth of the Tīrthaôkara.
3. ī Èā kalyāõaka (or tapa-kalyāõaka): when the Tīrthaôkara 
renounces all worldly possessions and becomes an ascetic.
4. jðāna kalyāõaka: when the Tīrthaôkara attains omniscience 
(kevalajðāna).
5. mokÈa-kalyāõaka (or nirvāõa-kalyāõaka): when the Tīrthaôkara 
finally attains liberation (mokÈa or nirvāõa) and becomes a 
Siddha.
(paðca kalyāõaka) 
d k  
(xi)
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ĀptamīmāÚsā or Devāgamastotra
Ratnakaraõçaka-śrāvakācāra
Svayambhūstotra
Yuktyanuśāsana
Stutividyā or Jinaśataka or Jinastutiśataka or Jinaśatakālaôkāra
Jīvasiddhi
GandhahastimahābhāÈya
Uncertainty prevails about the existence of the last two treatises.
ĀptamīmāÚsā, known also as Devāgama or Devāgamastotra, is a 
treatise of 114 verses which discusses in a philosophical-cum-logical 
manner the Jaina view of Reality, starting with the concept of 
omniscience and the attributes of the Omniscient. Devotion to a deity 
without proper assessment and understanding of its praiseworthiness 
leads to naught in terms of utility. Blind faith based on traditional 
values and without the use of own power of discrimination leads to 
superstitions. Superstitions arise from ignorance and keep the 
worshipper overwhelmed with expectations and fear, just the opposite 
of the very purpose of adoration. Adoration is laudable only if it 
renders tranquility and equanimity to the mind of the worshipper. In 
the opening verse of ĀptamīmāÚsā, Ācārya Samantabhadra questions 
the validity of the attributes that are traditionally associated with a 
praiseworthy deity and goes on to establish, in Verse 6, the logic of 
accepting the Omniscient as the most trustworthy and praiseworthy 
Supreme Being:
You only are such an Omniscient, free from all defects, because 
your words are not in contradiction with either the reason or the 
scripture. The proof of non-contradiction of your words lies in the 
fact that your tenets (about liberation etc.) are unopposed to what 
has been established through the known sources of knowledge.
After having established that it was certainly possible to attain 
omniscience, and employing the doctrine of conditional predications 
(xi)
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(syādvāda), Ācārya Samantabhadra faults certain prevailing 
conceptions that were based on absolutism: existence (bhāvaikānta) 
and non-existence (abhāvaikānta), non-dualism (advaita-ekānta) and 
separateness (pÃthaktva-ekānta), and permanence (nityatva-ekānta) 
and momentariness (kÈaõika-ekānta). He asserts that the entity 
(dharmī) and its attribute (dharma) are neither absolutely dependent 
(āpekÈika) nor absolutely independent (anāpekÈika). Only an entity 
which has general (sāmānya – concerning the substance, dravya) and 
particular (viśeÈa – concerning the mode, paryāya) attributes can be 
the subject of knowledge. Substance without its modification and 
modification without its substance cannot be the subject of valid 
knowledge; only their combination can be the subject of knowledge. 
He goes on to clarify certain other burning issues and misconceptions. 
In Verse 91 he asserts that both fate and human-effort are jointly 
responsible for desirable and undesirable effects. The desirable and 
undesirable effects that one begets without premeditation should be 
understood due primarily to one’s fate (daiva). The desirable and 
undesirable effects that one begets in consequence of premeditation 
should be understood due primarily to one’s human-effort (pauruÈa). 
In Verse 95 the Ācārya asserts that our auspicious (viśudhi) or 
inauspicious (saÚkleśa) kinds of dispositions cause the influx of 
meritorious (puõya) or demeritorious (pāpa) karmas. In Verse 98 we 
are told that bondage (bandha) is caused due to ignorance (ajðāna) 
accompanied by delusion (moha), and bondage is not caused due to 
ignorance (ajðāna) not accompanied by delusion (moha). Highlighting 
the indispensability of syādvāda, in Verse 105, it is asserted that 
syādvāda, the doctrine of conditional predications, and kevalajðāna, 
omniscience, are both illuminators of the substances of reality. The 
difference between the two is that while kevalajðāna illumines 
directly, syādvāda illumines indirectly. 
Three profound commentaries in Sanskrit on ĀptamīmāÚsā are 
available: AÈÇaśatī (known also as ĀptamīmāÚsābhaÈya) of Ācārya 
Akalaôkadeva comprising 800 verses, AÈÇasahsrī (known also as 
(xi)
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ĀptamīmāÚsālaôkāra or Devāgamālaôkāra) of Ācārya Vidyānanda 
comprising 8000 verses, and a comparatively brief treatise 
ĀptamīmāÚsāvÃtti (known also as DevāgamavÃtti) of Ācārya 
Vasunandi.
Ratnakaraõçaka-śrāvakācāra is a celebrated and perhaps the 
earliest Digambara work on the conduct required of a Jaina 
householder (śrāvaka) for the acquisition and safekeeping of the 
Three Jewels (ratnatraya) comprising right faith, right knowledge and 
right conduct.
Svayambhūstotra is a fine composition in Sanskrit dedicated to the 
adoration of the Twenty-four Tīrthaôkara, the Most Worshipful 
Supreme Beings. Through its 143 verses Svayambhūstotra not only 
enriches reader’s devotion, knowledge, and conduct but also frees his 
mind from blind faith and superstitions. Rid of ignorance and 
established firmly in the right faith, the reader’s mind experiences 
ineffable tranquility and equanimity.
Yuktyanuśāsana, comprising 64 verses, evaluates in a logical 
manner the beliefs that lead to the attainment of the state of Supreme 
Bliss as against those that lead to the continuous wandering in the 
three worlds.
Stutividyā (Jinaśataka), as the name suggests, is the adoration of 
the Supreme Beings (Tīrthaôkara). Ācārya Samantabhadra has 
skillfully used highly ornamental language in this work; for instance, 
the first half of the line of a verse becomes its second half by using the 
same letters in reverse order*. Notwithstanding the floridity of 
language, each of the 116 verses of the treatise carries profound 
* Verse 10 reads as under:
Hkklrs foHkqrk¿Lrksuk uk Lrksrk Hkqfo rs lHkk% A
;k% fJrk% Lrqr xhR;k uq uqR;k xhrLrqrk% fJ;k AA
In both lines, the latter half is the reverse arrangement of letters used 
in the first half.
(xiv)
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meaning; when assimilated properly it leads to the destruction of 
inimical karmas.
There is a story that finds mention in several Jaina texts about the 
hardship that Ācārya Samantabhadra had to endure while he was an 
ascetic. Although there are variations in some elements of the story, 
the essential gist is as follows:
Svāmi Samantabhadra, in his early stage of asceticism, was 
attacked with a disease known as bhasmaka which refers, in 
Āyurveda, to the condition of insatiable hunger or appetite. The 
stomach has digestive power or “fire” (jaÇharāgni) that drives all 
digestion and when it becomes very strong, food digests very quickly 
and produces hunger and desire for more food. As food gets digested 
very quickly, the throat remains dry and a burning sensation prevails. 
According to Āyurveda, air (vāta), bile (pitta) and phlegm (kapha) are 
essential elements in human body and a distortion in their balance 
gives rise to health problems. When kapha becomes weak and vāta and 
pitta become strong, any food eaten gets immediately reduced to ashes 
(bhasma). The complications include jaundice, anemia, yellow skin, 
diarrhoea, urine anomalies, colic, unconsciousness, hemorrhage, 
hyperacidity and burning pain. The body progressively gets emaciated 
and weak. The only way to cure the disease is to eat in profuse quantity 
rich and stodgy food.
It is impossible for a Jaina (Digambara) saint to eat more than 
once a day or in excess of his customary intake which is less than the 
fill. Not deviating in the least from such restrictions, Svāmi 
Samantabhadra tried to endure the affliction through strong resolve. 
Finding the disease intractable, he ultimately thought of embracing 
passionless death by resorting to the vow of sallekhanā, as allowed in 
Jainism. Svāmi Samantabhadra approached his Preceptor to get his 
approval for the proposed vow of sallekhanā. The Preceptor, an 
accomplished visionary, foresaw that Svāmi Samantabhadra had 
many more years still left in his life, and that he was destined to be a 
(xv)
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great exponent of Jainism. He, therefore, forbade Svāmi 
Samantabhadra from undertaking the vow of sallekhanā and asked 
him to free himself from the symbols and restrictions of Jaina 
sainthood till the time his disease got cured.
Svāmi Samantabhadra made obeisance to his Preceptor and, with 
a heavy heart, took leave of him. Discarding nakedness and smearing 
his body with ash, he adopted the exterior of a Hindu saint. He started 
taking food that would cure him of his disease. He reached the town of 
Kāôcī, ruled by Śivakoti, a staunch follower of Lord Śiva. Śivako i had 
built a Śiva temple in Kāôcī where large amount of food was being 
offered daily to the deity (Śivaliôga). Saint Samantabhadra told the 
king that he had the power to make the deity consume food being 
offered. The king accepted the offer. Closing the doors of the temple, 
Saint Samantabhadra ate the heap of food offering. When the doors 
were opened, everyone was highly impressed with the so-called divine 
feat of the saint. This continued for a few days.
As the disease of Saint Samantabhadra got mitigated with the 
passage of time, he was no longer able to eat all food being offered to 
Lord Śiva. The king became suspicious of the purported divine power 
of the saint and ordered his actions to be watched, keeping the doors of 
the temple open. Saint Samantabhadra grasped the gravity of the 
situation and took it as an external calamity (upasagra) befalling him. 
Vowing not to take any food until the end of the calamity and 
discarding all attachment to his body, he started the adoration of the 
Twenty-four Tīrthaôkara.
As Saint Samantabhadra reached the adoration of the eighth 
Tīrthaôkara, Lord Candraprabha, and as he gazed at the idol of the 
reigning deity (Śivaliôga), due to some divine intervention, it burst, 
revealing a beautiful and magnificent image of Lord Candraprabha, to 
the wonder and astonishment of all present. Saint Samantabhadra 
finished the adoration of the remaining sixteen Tīrthaôkara. This 
miracle led King Śivako i and his younger brother Śivāyana fall at his 
feet. After completing the adoration of the Twenty-four Tīrthaôkara, 
Ç
Ç
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Saint Samantabhadra gave his blessings to the two brothers. This 
story portrays the environment in which the composition of the most 
sacred text Svayambhūstotra took place.
As Saint Samantabhadra got cured of his disease, he reinitiated 
himself into the order of holy Jaina asceticism. King Śivako i and his 
brother Śivāyana, highly impressed with the Jaina doctrine and the 
power of true adoration, left their worldly pursuits and became Ācārya 
Samantabhadra’s disciples.
I make obeisance humble at the worshipful feet of Ācārya 
Samantabhadra who had unmatched intellect to discern the right 
from the wrong and illumined, through profound compositions, the 
right path that leads to Supreme Bliss.
Ç
Fifty-two years ago, in 1963, Ācārya Vidyānanda (b. 1925) took to the 
arduous path of Digambara asceticism (muni). “I do not belong to 
others nor do others belong to me; there is nothing that is mine here.” 
Thus determined and conquering his senses he took to the excellent 
form in which he was born (renouncing all clothes, naked). A feather-
whisk (picchī) – the implement of compassion, a water-pot 
(kamaõçalu) – the implement of purity, and the Scripture (śāstra) – 
the implement of knowledge, became his only material companions.
Abandoning all attachment and aversion, and having grasped the 
reality of the substances (tattvas), including the soul and the non-soul, 
Ācārya Vidyānanda is ever engaged in the realization of the supreme 
status of the Self. This is the only path available to the bhavya* souls 
striving to attain liberation. His pious figure, turned golden by the fire 
of austerities (tapas) and rid of all encumbrances, external and 
Ācārya Vidyānanda –
the worthy Supreme Being to meditate on
(xvi)
* endowed with inherent capacity to attain liberation
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internal, personifies and propagates the teachings of Lord Jina.
8Ācārya Nemicandra has asserted in DravyasÉgraha  that the 
Chief Preceptor (Ācārya) is worthy of meditation:
nal.k.kk.kigk.ks ohfj;pkfjÙkojrok;kjs A
vIia ija p tqatb lks vk;fjvks eq.kh >svks AA52AA
Those who themselves practise the five-fold observances in regard 
to faith (darśanācāra), knowledge (jðānācāra), power (vīryācāra), 
conduct (cāritrācāra), and austerities (tapācāra), and guide 
disciples to follow these observances, are the Chief Preceptors 
(Ācāryas), worthy of meditation.
Believing that the pure Self is the only object belonging to the Self 
and all other objects, including the karmic matter (dravyakarma and 
nokarma), are alien is the observance in regard to faith (darśanācāra). 
Reckoning that the pure Self has no delusion, is distinct from 
attachment and aversion, knowledge itself, and sticking to this notion 
always is the observance in regard to knowledge (jðānācāra). Being 
free from attachment etc. is right conduct. Getting always engrossed 
in the pure Self, free from all corrupting dispositions, is the observance 
in regard to conduct (cāritrācāra). Performance of penances with due 
control of the senses constitutes the observance in regard to 
austerities (tapācāra). Carrying out the above mentioned four 
observances with full vigour and intensity, without digression and 
concealment of true strength, constitutes the observance in regard to 
power (vīryācāra).
9Ācārya Pūjyapāda has expounded in IÈÇopadeśa :
bPNR;sdkUrlaokla futZua tfurknj% A
futdk;Zo'kkfRdf×pnqDRok foLejfr æqre~ AA40AA
The Yogī longs for solitude and distances himself from interaction 
with men. If due to some reason he has to communicate with them, 
he soon puts it out of his mind.
(xvii)
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Ācārya Pūjyapāda goes on to explain:
ij% ijLrrks nq%[kekReSokRek rr% lq[ke~ A
vr ,o egkRekuLrfÂfeÙka Ñrks|ek% AA45AA
An alien object is always alien and is the cause of suffering; the soul 
is always own and is the cause of happiness. All great sages, 
therefore, have exerted themselves only for the sake of the soul.
Ācārya Vidyānanda has established himself firmly in own nature. 
Engaged incessantly in Self-realization, he has no time or inclination 
to interact with the external environment. External objects generally 
remain unnoticed by him as he pays no attention to these. His 
interaction with the people is minimal and without passions. For the 
few people he has to interact with occasionally, he engenders no lasting 
emotions of attachment or aversion.
A Yogī of few words, he chooses words that are sweet, positive and 
helpful. As soon as his interaction with the outside world is over, he 
presents himself again to the service of the pure Self.
I repeatedly salute Ācārya Vidyānanda, the light to guide me on the 
path that leads to true happiness, here and hereafter, by prostrating in 
front of him with great devotion.
I meditate on his virtues in order to wash away impurities – 
attachment, aversion and delusion – of my wavering mind, and to 
reach that stage of spiritual excellence where the faults and 
obstructions associated with my soul are destroyed.
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Ācārya Samantabhadra’s
ĀptamīmāÚsā
(Devāgamastotra)
Deep Reflection On The Omniscient Lord
vkpk;Z leUrHkæ fojfpr
vkIrehekalk
(nsokxeLrks=k)
¬ ue% fl¼sH;%
Jain, Vijay K. (Ed.) (2011), “Āchārya Umāsvāmi’s
Tattvārthsūtra – with Hindi and English Translation”, p. 146.
Attendance of the heavenly beings, movement in the sky, waving 
of the flywhisks (c mara) and other symbols of majesty are 
found even in jugglers; it is not owing to these that thou art great 
[supreme preacher (guru), worthy of adoration (stutya) and 
Omniscient (sarvajða or āpta)].
ā
nsokxeuHkks;kupkejkfnfoHkwr;% A
ek;kfo"ofi n`';Urs ukrLRoefl uks egku~ AA1AA
lkekU;kFkZ & gs Hkxou~ ! nsoksa dk vkxeu] vkdk'k esa xeu vkSj pkej vkfn 
foHkwfr;k¡ tks vki esa ik;h tkrh gSa] bu dkj.kksa ls vki gekjs Lrqfr djus 
;ksX; & xq#] LrqR;] vkIr & ugha gSaA ;s foHkwfr;k¡ rks ek;koh iq#"kksa esa Hkh ns[kh 
tkrh gSaA
Insignia like the attendance of heavenly beings do not make you 
great:
izFke ifjPNsn
Section 1
The aforesaid symbols of majesty do not establish 
greatness; these are found in jugglers too who do not possess 
real greatness and, therefore, not worthy of our adoration. If it 
be said that the symbols of majesty are artificial in case of 
jugglers but real in your case then on what basis can we 
distinguish between the real and the counterfeit? On the basis 
of the scripture? The others too have their own scripture 
which, according to them, is a valid source of knowledge.
3
The superior excellence of your body etc. – both internal and 
external – which though is real and divine can be found even in 
celestial beings who are swayed by impurities like attachment. 
Therefore, this too does not make thou great.
vè;kRea cfgjI;s"k foxzgkfnegksn;% A
fnO;% lR;ks fnokSdLLoI;fLr jkxkfneRlq l% AA2AA
lkekU;kFkZ & vki esa 'kjhj vkfn dk tks vUrjax vkSj cfgjax vfr'k; ik;k 
tkrk gS og ;|fi fnO; vkSj lR; gS] fdUrq jkxkfn;qDr LoxZ ds nsoksa esa Hkh 
mDr izdkj dk vfr'k; ik;k tkrk gSA vr% mDr vfr'k; ds dkj.k Hkh vki 
esjs LrqR; ugha gks ldrs gSaA
Bodily and other distinctions do not make you great:
The Arhat, the World Teacher or ‘Jina’, is free from eighteen 
imperfections, and possessed of forty-six distinctive attributes. 
The divine attributes and splendours of the Arhat are 
described thus in the Scripture:
The Arhat is free from these eighteen imperfections:
1. janma – (re)birth;
2. żarā – old-age;
3. tÃÈā – thirst;
4. kÈudhā – hunger;
5. vismaya – astonishment;
6. arati – displeasure;
7. kheda – regret;
8. roga – sickness;
9. śoka – grief;
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*10. mada – pride ;
11. moha – delusion;
**12. bhaya – fear ;
13. nidrā – sleep;
14. cintā – anxiety;
15. sveda – perspiration;
16. rāga – attachment;
17. dveÈa – aversion; and
18. maraõa – death.
Forty-six divine attributes of the Arhat comprise four 
infinitudes (ananta catuÈÇaya), thirty-four miraculous 
happenings (atiśaya), and eight splendours (prātihārya).
The four infinitudes (ananta catuÈÇaya) comprise:
1. ananta jðāna – infinite knowledge;
2. ananta darśana – infinite perception;
3. ananta sukha – infinite bliss; and
4. ananta vīrya – infinite energy.
Of the thirty-four miraculous happenings (atiśaya), ten 
appear naturally at the time of birth, ten on attainment of 
infinite knowledge (kevalajðāna), and the remaining fourteen 
are fashioned by the celestial devas.
*  Pride is of eight kinds: pride of knowledge (jðāna mada), veneration 
(pūjā mada), lineage (kula mada), caste (jāti mada), strength (bala 
mada), accomplishments (Ãddhi mada), austerities (tapa mada), 
and beauty (śarīra mada).
** Fear is of seven kinds: fear relating to this life (ihaloka bhaya), of 
the life beyond (paraloka bhaya), of death (maraõa bhaya), of pain 
and suffering (vedanā bhaya), of being without protection (atrāõa 
bhaya), of divulgence of one’s deeds (agupti bhaya), and of the 
unexpected (ākasmika bhaya).
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The eight splendours (prātihārya) are:
1. aśoka vÃkÈa – the Ashoka tree;
2. siÉhāsana – bejeweled throne;
3. chatra – three-tier canopy;
4. bhāmaõçala – halo of unmatched luminance;
5. divya dhvani – divine voice of the Lord without
lip movement;
6. puÈpa-varÈā – shower of fragrant flowers;
7. cāmara – waving of sixty-four majestic flywhisks; and
8. dundubhi – dulcet sound of kettle-drums and other 
musical instruments.
Jain, Vijay K. (2014), “Ācārya Pujyapāda’s IÈÇopadeśa –
The Golden Discourse”, p. 2-4.
The aforesaid symbols of establish 
real greatness; these symbols can be found in celestial beings 
too who are swayed by passions like anger, pride, deceitfulness 
and greed. It may be claimed that your symbols of superior 
excellence appear on the destruction of the four inimical 
(ghātiyā) karmas – deluding (mohanīya), knowledge-obscuring 
(jðānāvarõīya), perception-obscuring (darśanāvarõīya), and 
obstructive (antarāya) – but it is not so in the case of the 
celestial beings. What is the basis of this assertion? Scripture? 
Let us wait till we are able to establish which scripture among 
many is a valid source of knowledge.
superior excellence fail to 
6
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There are mutual contradictions in the teachings of the 
founders of different sects; this should not have happened if all 
of them were trustworthy. It is clear, therefore, that only one of 
them, at most, could be worthy of our trust.
rhFkZÑRle;kuka p ijLijfojks/r% A
losZ"kkekIrrk ukfLr df'pnso Hkosn~xq#% AA3AA
lkekU;kFkZ & (
ds dkj.k lc rhFk±djksa esa vkIrRo dk gksuk laHko ugha gSA mu rhFk±dj dgs 
tkus okyksa esa ls dksbZ ,d gh gekjk LrqR; (vkIr) gks ldrk gSA
lqxrkfnd) rhFk±djksa ds vkxeksa esa ijLij fojks/ ik;s tkus 
The fact that you are a sect-founder does not make you great:
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In some individuals extensive destruction of imperfections and 
their causes is seen; there must be a case where a particular 
individual, owing to his supremacy, attains complete destruction 
of imperfections and their causes. It is akin to the complete 
removal of external and internal impurities (of a substance like 
gold ore) on the availability of appropriate means.
nks"kkoj.k;ksgkZfu£u%'ks"kk¿LR;fr'kk;ukr~ A
Dofp|Fkk LogsrqH;ks cfgjUreZy{k;% AA4AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
(nks"kksa ds dkj.kksa) dh lkfr'k; gkfu ns[kus esa vkrh gSA nks"kksa vkSj vkoj.kksa 
dh iw.kZ gkfu mlh izdkj laHko gS ftl izdkj [kku ls fudys gq, lqo.kZ esa 
ey&fojks/h dkj.kksa ds }kjk dhV vkfn cfgjax ey vkSj dkfyek vkfn 
vUrjax ey nksuksa izdkj ds eyksa dk vR;Ur uk'k fd;k tk ldrk gSA
fdlh iq#"k&fo'ks"k esa nks"kksa (jkx&}s"kkfnd) vkSj vkoj.kksa 
It is possible for someone to attain complete destruction of 
imperfections:
Imperfections (called do a), like attachment, aversion and 
passions, are dispositions of the soul (bhāvakarma) and these 
are due to the prior envelopment of the soul (called āvaraõa) by 
material karmas (dravyakarma), like knowledge-obscuring 
karmas. There is cause and effect relationship between the 
material karmas (āvaraõa) and the imperfections (doÈa). Due 
to appropriate exertion, extensive destruction of imperfections 
and their causes is possible in some individuals.
Ācārya Nemicandra’s DravyasaÉgraha:
tgdkys.k ros.k ; HkqÙkjla dEeiqXxya ts.k A
Hkkos.k lMfn .ks;k rLlM.ka psfn f.kTtjk nqfogk AA36AA
È
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Dispositions of the soul to get rid of the karmic matter 
already bound with it, either when it falls off by itself on 
fruition, or when it is annihilated through asceticism 
(tapas), constitute the subjective shedding of karmas 
(bhāva nirjarā). The actual dissociation of the karmic 
matter from the soul is the objective shedding of karmas 
(dravya nirjarā). Thus nirjarā should be known of two 
kinds.
Jain, Vijay K. (2012),
“Ācārya Nemichandra’s DravyasaÉgraha”, p. 129.
Ācārya Kundakunda’s Pańcāstikāya-Sāra:
laojtksxs¯g tqnks ros¯g tks fpênò s cgqfogs¯g A
dEek.ka f.kTtj.ka cgqxk.ka dq.kfn lks f.k;na AA144AA
That mighty personality which after closing the springs of 
karmas, good and evil, and equipped with the faculty of 
pure thought, controls its life according to manifold forms 
of tapas, will undoubtedly be able to rid itself of karmas 
manifold.
Chakravarti Nayanar, A. (2009),
“Ācārya Kundakunda’s Pańcāstikāya-Sāra”, p. 118.
On the destruction of inimical karmas, called the ghātiyā 
karmas, it is possible for a person to attain unhindered, infinite 
and pure knowledge, i.e., omniscience. A single substance is 
endowed with infinite modifications and there are infinite 
classes of substances. To know one substance fully is to know 
the whole range of the object of knowledge and that is possible 
only in omniscience.
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Objects that are minute (like atoms), past (like Lord Rama), and 
distant (like Mount Meru), being the objects of inference 
(anumeya – and, therefore, also objects of knowledge – prameya), 
must be perceivable directly by someone; like the fire on the hill 
is an object of inference for a distant person but is perceived 
directly by the one who is in its proximity. The one who perceives 
directly the objects of knowledge that are minute, past, and 
distant is the Omniscient (sarvajða); this way the existence of 
the Omniscient is truly and firmly established.
lw{ekUrfjrnwjkFkkZ% izR;{kk% dL;fp|Fkk A
vuqes;Rorks¿XU;kfnfjfr loZKlafLFkfr% AA5AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
vUrfjr&inkFkZ (dky&foizÑ"V jke vkfnd) rFkk nwjorhZ (ns'k&foizÑ"V 
es# vkfnd) fdlh dks izR;{k vo'; gksrs gSa D;ksafd mudks ge vuqeku ls 
tkurs gSaA tks Hkh inkFkZ vuqeku ls tkus tkrs gSa dksbZ u dksbZ mudks izR;{k ls 
tkurk gSA ioZr esa vfXu dks nwjorhZ iq#"k vuqeku ls tkurk gS fdUrq ioZr ij 
jgus okyk iq#"k mlh dks izR;{k ls tkurk gSA bl izdkj lw{e] vUrfjr rFkk 
nwjorhZ leLr inkFkks± dks tkuus okys loZK dh flf¼ gksrh gSA
lw{e&inkFkZ (LoHkko&foizÑ"V ijek.kq vkfnd)] 
The attainment of omniscience is established:
Ācārya Kundakunda’s Pravacanasāra:
tfn iPPD[ketkna iTtk;a iybna p .kk.kLl A
.k gofn ok ra .kk.ka fnOoa fr fg ds i:osafr AA1&39AA
If that omniscience would not directly visualize the future 
and past modifications (of an object of knowledge), who 
then would call that knowledge divine and supernatural?
10
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vRFka vD[kf.kofnna bZgkiqOos¯g ts fotk.kafr A
rs¯l ijksD[kHkwna .kknqelDda fr i..kÙka AA1&40AA
It is declared that for those who (are accustomed to) know 
the objects of knowledge by means of discrimination and 
1other stages (of perception ) it is impossible to know the 
objects, past and future, that are not within the range of 
the senses.
Upadhye, A.N. (1935),
“Śrī Kundakundācārya’s Pravacanasāra”, p. 52-53.
Sensory knowledge ascertains, in stages, the nature of an 
object through the use of the senses. The past and the future 
modes of the object remain beyond the scope of such knowledge 
as these do not reach the senses. Besides, minute objects like 
the atoms, distant objects like the heaven and Mount Meru, 
and non-material objects like the soul, virtue and vice, also 
remain beyond the scope of sensory knowledge. Only the gross 
objects like the pot and the board are known by the senses and, 
therefore, sensory knowledge is indirect, inadequate, and fit to 
be discarded. Those possessing sensory knowledge, to 
whatever degree, cannot be called the Omniscient (sarvaj a).
Things which are minute and remote in space or time are 
directly perceived by the Arhat, since these are cognizable, just 
as the objects of our perception that are well ascertained. The 
reason assigned here is not fallacious because these are made 
the subject of the minor premise.
In AÈÇasahasrī, Ācārya Vidyānanda employs anumeya and 
ð
1. Sensory knowledge, being not immediate, has four sequential stages: 
outlinear grasp or apprehension – avagraha; discrimination or 
speculation – īhā; judgement – avāya; and retention of the 
judgement – dhāraõā. Such stages are not present when 
omniscience is functioning.
1
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prameya as synonymous terms; all objects of inference 
(anumeya) are objects of knowledge (prameya). It follows that 
the minute, past, and distant objects are perceived directly 
(pratyakÈa) by the Arhat, because these are anumeya.
Only omniscience (kevalajðāna) – the self-born, perfect, 
pure, and non-sequential super-sensuous knowledge – 
embraces the knowledge of all objects and their infinite modes, 
making its possessor the Omniscient (sarvajða).
12
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You only are such an Omniscient, free from all defects, because 
your words are not in contradiction with either the reason or the 
scripture. The proof of non-contradiction of your words lies in 
the fact that your tenets (about liberation etc.) are unopposed to 
what has been established through the known sources of 
knowledge*.
l Roesokfl funksZ"kks ;qfDr'kkL=kkfojksf/okd~ A
vfojks/ks ;fn"Va rs izfl¼su u ckè;rs AA6AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
fd;k x;k gS og vki gh gSaA vkids funksZ"k gksus dk izek.k ;g gS fd vkids 
opu ;qfDr vkSj vkxe ls vfojks/h gSaA vkidk tks b"V (eks{kkfn rÙo&:i 
vfHker) gS og izfl¼ ls (izek.k vFkok ij&izfl¼ ,dkUr ls) ckf/r 
ugha gSA (bl dkj.k ls vkids opu ;qfDr vkSj vkxe ls vfojks/h gSaA)
gs Hkxou~ ! iwoZ esa ftls funksZ"k & ohrjkx rFkk loZK & fl¼ 
You (Lord Jina) are such an Omniscient:
In the first three verses Samantabhadra spells out 
certain qualities belonging to the Arhat, which are also found 
in jugglers, celestial beings, and the founders of sects. These 
Ācārya 
13
Verse 6
* dharm , the entity or abode of the s dhya (that which is to be proved), 
is known through:
1) pramāõa prasiddha, i.e., that which is known by pramāõa – ‘This 
hill is full of fire because it is full of smoke’;
2) vikalpa prasiddha, i.e., that which is taken for granted being 
utterly distinct – ‘The horns of a hare are non-existent’; and
3) pramāõa-vikalpa prasiddha, i.e., that which partakes of the 
nature of pramāõa and vikalpa both – ‘Man is the master of his 
destiny because he has the power to control his actions’.
ī ā
qualities cannot establish the omniscience of the Arhat.
In the next two verses the Ācārya establishes that it is 
possible for someone to attain complete destruction of 
imperfections which cause obstruction to infinite knowledge. 
And as the soul attains omniscience, it is able to perceive things 
which are minute, past and distant.
Omniscience is attained through the destruction of 
imperfections, i.e., the deluding (mohanīya), knowledge-
covering (jðānāvarõīya), perception-obscuring (darśan-
āvarõīya) and obstructive (antarāya) classes of karmas. 
Omniscience images, as it were in a mirror, all substances and 
their infinite modes, extending through the past, the present, 
and the future.
Being a possessor of omniscience – perfect knowledge and 
perception of unimaginable splendour and magnificence – the 
Arhat comprehends all objects of knowledge in their entirety, 
from all possible angles. His exposition of Reality is for the 
benefit of all living beings and non-controvertible by any 
known sources of knowledge. His words are the Holy 
Scripture.
Ācārya Samantabhadra’s Ratnakaraôçaka Śrāvakācāra:
vkIrksiKeuqYya?;en`‘s‘fojks/de~ A
rÙoksins'kÑRlko± 'kkL=ka dkiFk?kêuð e~ AA9AA
That alone is true scripture which is the word of the 
Omniscient, inviolable, not opposed to the two kinds of 
valid knowledge – direct (pratyakÈa) and indirect (parokÈa) 
– reveals the true nature of reality, universally helpful to 
living beings, and potent enough to destroy all forms of 
falsehood.
14
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Those who are unfamiliar with your nectar-like doctrine and 
adopt absolutist (ek nta) views are the victims of conceit as they 
erroneously claim themselves to be Omniscient and trust-
worthy. What they seek to establish is contradicted by the direct 
(pratyakÈa) sources of knowledge.
ā
RoUerke`rckákuka loZFkSdkUrokfnuke~ A
vkIrkfHkekunX/kuka Los"Va n`"Vsu ckè;rs AA7AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
izfrikfnr oLrq&rÙo & dk Lokn ugha fy;k gS] tks loZFkk ,dkUroknh gSa] 
vkSj tks ^ ge vkIr gSa* bl izdkj ds vfHkeku ls nX/ gSa] mudk tks b"V rÙo 
gS mlesa izR;{k izek.k ls ck/k vkrh gSA
ftUgksaus vkids er&:ih ve`r & vusdkUr 'kklu }kjk 
The absolutist view is in contradiction with the sources of valid 
knowledge:
Ācārya Samantabhadra’s Svayambhūstotra:
,dkUrn`f"Vizfr"ksf/ RkÙoa izek.kfl¼a rnrRLoHkkoe~ A
Ro;k iz.khra lqfo/s Lo/kEuk uSrRlekyh<ina RonU;S% AA
(9-1-41)
O Lord Suvidhinātha ! With the light of your omniscience 
you had promulgated the nature of reality in a manner 
which contradicts the absolutistic point of view, well-
founded, and incorporates the principle of predication 
involving both the affirmation and the negation, 
depending on the point of view. Others have not been able 
to view the nature of reality in such light.
Jain, Vijay K. (2015),
“Ācārya Samantabhadra’s Svayambhūstotra”, p. 58.
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O Lord ! Those saturated with prejudice to their own absolutist 
views (such as describing a substance absolutely permanent or 
absolutely transient) harm themselves as well as others. Such 
absolutist, standalone and non-equivocal views fail to establish 
the existence of virtuous ( ubha) and wicked (a ubha) activities 
(karma) and consequently of things like rebirth (acquisition of 
another abode after death – paraloka).
ś ś
dq'kykdq'kya deZ ijyksd'p u Dofpr~ A
,dkUrxzgjDrs"kq ukFk LoijoSfj"kq AA8AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
dks Lohdkjrs gSa ,sls ,dkUr&:i xzg ds jax esa jaxs (o'khHkwr) yksx vius Hkh 
'k=kq gSa vkSj nwljs ds Hkh 'k=kq gSaA muds ;gk¡ 'kqHk&deZ ,oa v'kqHk&deZ rFkk 
ijyksd vkfn dqN Hkh ugha curk gSA
gs Hkxou~ ! tks oLrq ds vuUr /eks± esa ls fdlh ,d gh /eZ 
In the absolutist view, division of activities into virtuous and 
wicked is unsustainable:
Ācārya Samantabhadra’s Svayambhūstotra:
; ,o fuR;{kf.kdkn;ks u;k feFkks¿uis{kk% Loijiz.kkf'ku% A
r ,o rÙoa foeyL; rs equs% ijLijs{kk% Loijksidkfj.k% AA
(13-1-61)
O Unblemished Lord Vimalanātha ! Those who hold the 
one-sided, standalone points of view such as describing a 
substance absolutely permanent (nitya) or transient 
(kÈaõika), harm themselves and others, but, as you had 
proclaimed, when the assertions are understood to have 
been made only from certain standpoints, these reveal the 
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true nature of substances, and, therefore, benefit self as 
well as others.
Jain, Vijay K. (2015),
“Ācārya Samantabhadra’s Svayambhūstotra”, p. 86.
Śrī MalliÈeõa Surī’s Syādvāda-Maôjarī highlights the faults 
associated with the absolutist (ekānta) doctrine:
uSdkUrokns lq[knq%[kHkksxkS u iq.;ikis u p cUèkeks{kkS A
nquhZfroknO;lukfluSoa ijS£oyqIra txnI;'ks"ke~ AA27AA
With the non-equivocal doctrine there are not experiences 
of pleasure and pain; not merit and sin, also not bondage 
and liberation. By the sword of the vice of contentions of 
bad reasoning the promulgators of such a doctrine abolish 
the world without residue.
With the non-equivocal (ekānta) doctrine, expressions of 
pleasure and pain, merit and sin, and bondage and liberation 
do not fit. A soul which is non-equivocally eternal the two 
experiences of pleasure and pain are not appropriate, for the 
mark of the eternal is ‘having a single permanent form without 
loss and without origination’. If the eternal soul, having 
experienced pleasure, feels pain through the force of the 
apparatus of its karma, then, due to the difference in its own 
nature, non-eternalness follows; there is the consequence of 
loss of its having a single permanent form. The same is to be 
said of it when, having experienced pain, it enjoys pleasure.
Furthermore, experience of pleasure and pain are to be 
brought about by merit (to be obtained by good karma) and sin 
(to be obtained by evil karma), and the bringing about of them 
is the practical efficacy. That on the part of eternal isolated is 
not appropriate, either successively or not successively. 
Bondage is the mutual interlacing of the self in its several 
infinitesimal parts (pradeśa) with atoms of karma, like a mass 
17
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of metal and fire. Liberation is waning of all karma. In the non-
equivocally eternal these two also would not be. For bondage is 
a particular conjunction, and is defined as “the meeting of 
things which had not met”; non-meeting, belonging to a prior 
time is one state, and meeting, belonging to a later time, is 
another. Thus in the case of these two also the fault of 
difference of state is hard to get over. And how the self, having 
one-formness, has impromptu conjunction with bondage? And 
before conjunction with bondage, why was it not liberated? 
Moreover, by that bondage, does it experience alteration, or 
not? If it experiences, it is non-eternal. If it does not experience 
alteration, because of the fruitlessness of the bondage, it would 
be simply eternally liberated.
In case of non-appropriateness of bondage there is also 
non-appropriateness of liberation; because the word 
‘liberation’ is a synonym for the cleaving apart of bonds.
Likewise also, in the doctrine of non-equivocal non-eternal 
there is no appropriateness of pleasure and pain etc. What is 
non-eternal has the attribute of absolute annihilation; and if 
the soul is such, since the performer of the action of acquiring 
merit has perished without continuance, to whom does the 
experience of the pleasure which is the fruit thereof belong? 
Likewise, upon the total destruction also of the performer of 
action for acquiring sin, to whom does the consciousness of 
pain belong?
Excerpted, with modifications, from:
Thomas, F.W. (1968),
“The Flower-Spray of the Quodammodo Doctrine –
Śrī MalliÈeõa Surī’s Syādvāda-Maôjarī”, p. 149-151
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If it be accepted that the objects of knowledge have ‘absolute 
existence’ character, their ‘non-existence’ 
(abhāva) character is denied. And then (by denying the four 
aspects of their non-existence) each object will pervade in every 
other object, will become without a beginning, without an end, 
and devoid of the form of its own.
(bhāvaikānta) 
HkkoSdkUrs inkFkkZukeHkkokukeiÉokr~ A
lokZRedeuk|UreLo:ierkode~ AA9AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
lr~&:i gh gS & ,slk HkkoSdkUr ekuus ij vHkko inkFkks± (izkd~&vHkko 
vkfn) dk yksi Bgjrk gS vkSj bu pkj izdkj ds oLrq /eks± dk yksi djus ls 
oLrq&rÙo lc&:i (lokZRed)] vukfn] vuUr vkSj vLo:i gks tkrk gS 
tks vkidk er ugha gSA
inkFkks± ds Hkko (vfLrRo) dk ,dkUr & inkFkZ loZFkk 
Fault in considering objects of knowledge as having ‘absolute 
existence’ (bh vaik nta) character:ā ā
Affirmation is the aspect of existence ; negation of non-
existence (abhāva). The abhāva or non-existence of a 
substance – object of knowledge (artha) – is of four kinds:
1. Prior (antecedent) non-existence (prāgabhāva): The 
non-existence of the effect (the jar) in the cause (the lump-
of-clay) previous to its production is the prior (antecedent) 
non-existence. It is expressed in the knowledge ‘a thing will 
be’.
Due to prior (antecedent) non-existence (prāgabhāva) the 
effect comes into existence. The lump-of-clay signifies the 
prior non-existence (prāgabhāva) of the pitcher which is 
(bhāva)
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formed on the lump-of- cessation to exist.
Non-existence of ‘pitcher’ before it is made is the 
prāgabhāva of the pitcher. The clay that was transformed 
into pitcher did not possess the attribute ‘pitcher’ before 
the pitcher was made.
All substances will become ‘without beginning (defect – 
anādi)’ if prior (antecedent) non-existence (prāgabhāva) is 
not accepted.
The absence of which, as a rule, accompanies the 
completion of an activity (e.g., making of a jar) is the prior 
non-existence (prāgabhāva).
2. Posterior (emergent) non-existence (pradhvaÚsābhāva): 
The non-existence of the jar, consequent to its destruction 
by a pestle is the posterior (emergent) non-existence. 
Due to posterior (emergent) non-existence (pradh-
vaÚsābhāva) the effect comes to an end. The collection of 
pitcher-pieces signifies the posterior non-existence (pradh-
vaÚsābhāva) of the pitcher which is necessarily destroyed 
on the rise of the pitcher pieces.
Non-existence of ‘pitcher’ after it is broken is pradh-
vaÚsābhāva of the pitcher. The collection of pitcher-pieces 
no more possess the attribute ‘pitcher’ after  the pitcher 
has been broken.
All substances will become ‘without end (defect – ananta)’ 
if posterior (emergent) non-existence (pradhvaÚsābhāva) 
is not accepted.
The absence of which, as a rule, accompanies the 
destruction of an activity (e.g., destruction of a jar) is the 
posterior (emergent) non-existence (pradhvaÚsābhāva).
3. Reciprocal non-existence (anyonyābhāva or itare-
tarābhāva): Reciprocal non-existence is expressed in the 
clay’s 
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consciousness ‘this is not that’. 
Reciprocal non-existence implies the non-pervasion of the 
nature of a thing in the nature of another thing; for 
instance the non-pervasion of the nature of a pitcher in the 
nature of a pillar. There is reciprocal non-existence of a 
pitcher in a pillar, as these exist.
Reciprocal non-existence focuses on the present, i.e., on the 
present form of substances. The jar and the board are 
mutually non-existent in each other but the possibility of 
conversion of one into the other cannot be ruled out. It is 
possible that after a jar gets destroyed and takes the form of 
clay, the clay then gets transformed into a board at some 
point of time.
All substances will become ‘pervading in everything or all-
pervading (defect – sarv tmaka)’ if reciprocal non-
existence (anyonyābhāva or itaretarābhāva) is not 
accepted.
There is no rule which suggests that either the presence or 
absence of reciprocal non-existence (anyonyābhāva or 
itaretarābhāva) will bring about the accomplishment or 
destruction of an activity. There is reciprocal non-existence 
(anyonyābhāva or itaretarābhāva) in water and fire but 
there is no rule that in the absence of water there is fire and 
in the presence of water there is destruction of fire.
4. Absolute non-existence (atyantābhāva): Absolute non-
existence is the non-existence of something in a substrate 
through the three times (past, present and future). Thus 
there is absolute non-existence of colour in air.
Absolute non-existence (atyantābhāva) denies the 
existence, in all the three times, of an attribute of a 
substance in another substance – for instance the animate 
nature of the soul (jīva) cannot be found in the non-soul 
ā
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( ī
non-soul a soul.
There is absolute non-existence (atyantābhāva) between 
the soul (jīva) and the matter (pudgala); these two can 
never become one in the three times. Soul is existent with 
respect to its own characteristic of consciousness but 
exhibits absolute non-existence (atyantābhāva) with 
respect to the inanimate nature of matter. All six 
substances (dravya) exhibit absolute non-existence 
(atyantābhāva) with respect to each other; for example, 
there is absolute non-existence (atyantābhāva) between 
matter (pudgala) and medium of motion (dharma), and 
between space (ākāśa) and the substance of time (kāla). 
These substances may mingle like milk and water, give 
room to others, but still retain their individual identity.
While the time-frame of reciprocal non-existence 
(anyonyābhāva or itaretarābhāva) is the present, that of 
absolute non-existence (atyantābhāva) is the past, present 
and future.
All substances will become ‘devoid of the form of their own 
(defect - asvarūpa)’ if absolute non-existence (atyan-
tābhāva) is not accepted. 
aj va); never ever can the soul become a non-soul and the 
2
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If prior (antecedent) non-existence is not 
accepted, a produced entity (for example, a jar or a word) will 
become ‘without beginning’ (an di). If posterior (emergent) 
non-existence (pradhvaÚsābhāva) is not accepted, a produced 
entity will become ‘without end’ (ananta).
(prāgabhāva) 
ā
dk;ZæO;eukfn L;kr~ izkxHkkoL; fuÉos A
izèoalL; p /eZL; izP;os¿uUrrka oztsr~ AA10AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
vukfn & mRifÙk&foghu & gks tkrk gS vkSj ;fn izèoalkHkko dk yksi fd;k 
tk, rks og dk;Z&:i nzO; vuUr & fouk'k&foghu & gks tkrk gSA
izkxHkko dk ;fn yksi fd;k tk, rks ?kV vkfn dk;Z&:i nzO; 
Fault in non-acceptance of prior (antecedent) non-existence 
(prāgabhāva) and posterior (emergent) non-existence 
(pradhvaÚsābhāva):
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If reciprocal non-existence is 
not accepted, the substance under consideration will become 
‘pervading in everything or all-pervading’ (sarv tmaka). If 
absolute non-existence (atyantābhāva) is not accepted, the 
substance will become ‘devoid of the form of its own’ (asvarūpa) 
and distinction between different substances (e.g., the animate 
soul and the inanimate matter) will not be maintained.
(anyonyābhāva or itaretarābhāva) 
ā
lokZReda rnsda L;knU;kiksgO;frØes A
vU;=k leok;s u O;ifn';sr loZFkk AA11AA
lkekU;kFkZ & ;fn 
O;frØe fd;k tk, vFkkZr~ vU;ksU;kHkko ds u ekuus ij fdlh dk tks ,d 
b"V rÙo gS og vHksn:i lokZRed gks tk,xkA rFkk vR;UrkHkko ds u ekuus 
ij ,d æO; dk nwljs æO; esa leok;&lEcU/ (rknkRE;) LohÑr gksrk gSA 
,slk gksus ij fdlh Hkh b"V rÙo dk loZFkk Hksn:i ls dksbZ O;ins'k (dFku) 
& tSls ;g psru gS] vkSj ;g vpsru gS & ugha gks ldsxkA
vU;kiksg & vU;ksU;kHkko vFkok brjsrjkHkko & dk 
Fault in non-acceptance of reciprocal non-existence 
(anyonyābhāva or itaretarābhāva) and absolute non-existence 
(atyantābhāva):
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If it be accepted that the objects of knowledge have ‘absolute 
non-existence’ (abh vaik nata) character and their ‘existence’ 
(bhāva) character is denied, cognition (bodha) and sentence 
(vākya) can no longer remain the sources of valid knowledge 
(pramāõa). And in the absence of the sources of valid knowledge 
(pramāõa), how can the proposed thesis (‘absolute non-
existence’ character of an object of knowledge) be established, 
and that of the rivals repudiated?
ā ā
vHkkoSdkUri{ks¿fi HkkokiÉookfnuke~ A
cks/okD;a izek.ka u dsu lk/unw"k.ke~ AA12AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
dgus okys & vHkkoSdkUrokfn;ksa ds er esa Hkh b"V rÙo dh flf¼ ugha gks 
ldrh gS D;ksafd ogk¡ u cks/ (Kku) dk vfLrRo gS vkSj u okD; (vkxe) 
dk vkSj blfy, izek.k Hkh ugha curk gSA izek.k ds vHkko esa Loer dh 
flf¼ rFkk ijer dk [k.Mu fdl izdkj laHko gS\
Hkko dks ugha ekuus okys & lHkh inkFkks± dks loZFkk vlr~&:i 
Fault in considering objects of knowledge as having ‘absolute 
non-existence’ (abh vaik nta) character – nyav da:ā ā śū ā
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Those who are hostile to the doctrine of conditional predications 
(sy dv da) can also not maintain that the two attributes – viz. 
‘absolute existence’ (bhāvaikānata) and ‘absolute non- 
existence’ (abhāvaikānata) – describe but one and the same 
phenomenon (i.e., endorsing both one-sided, independent 
standpoints – ubhayaikānta), for such a position will be self-
contradictory. And if they maintain that the phenomena are 
absolutely indescribable (avācyataikānta) then for them even to 
utter the words ‘the phenomenon is indescribable’ is not tenable 
as it is irrational.
ā ā
fojks/kUuksHk;SdkRE;a L;k}knU;k;fof}"kke~ A
vokP;rSdkUrs¿I;qfDrukZokP;fefr ;qT;rs AA13AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
vHkko nksuksa dk fujis{k vfLrRo ugha cu ldrk gS D;ksafd nksuksa ds loZFkk 
,dkRE; ekuus esa fojks/&nks"k vkrk gSA vokP;rk (voDrO;rk) ,dkUr Hkh 
ugha cu ldrk gS D;kasfd vokP;rSdkUr esa ^ ;g vokP; gS* ,sls okD; dk 
iz;ksx djus ls og okP; gks tkrk gSA
tks L;k}kn&U;k; ls }s"k j[kus okys gSa muds ;gk¡ Hkko vkSj 
Fault in accepting both, ‘absolute existence’ ( ) and 
‘absolute non-existence’ (abhāvaikānta), without mutual 
dependence:
bhāvaikānta
26
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O Lord ! In your reckoning, the object of knowledge is in a way 
existing (sat); in a way non-existing (asat); in a way both existing 
and non-existing (sat as well as asat – ubhaya); and in a way 
indescribable (avaktavya) [further, as a corollary, in a way 
existing (sat) and indescribable (avaktavya); in a way non-
existing (asat) and indescribable (avaktavya); and in a way 
existing (sat), non-existing (asat), and indescribable 
(avaktavya)]. These assertions are made in accordance with the 
speaker’s choice of the particular state or mode of the object – 
naya.
dFkf×pr~ rs lnsos"Va dFkf×pnlnso rr~ A
rFkksHk;eokP;a p u;;ksxkUu loZFkk AA14AA
lkekU;kFkZ & gs ohj ftu ! 
gh gS] dFkf×pr~ vlr~&:i gh gSA blh izdkj vis{kkHksn ls og oLrq&rÙo 
dFkf×pr~ mHk;&:i vkSj dFkf×pr~ voDrO;&:i gh gSA (dFkf×pr~ lr~ 
vkSj voDrO;&:i] dFkf×pr~ vlr~ vkSj voDrO;&:i rFkk dFkf×pr~ 
lr~] vlr~ vkSj voDrO;&:i gh gSA) u; dh vis{kk ls oLrq&rÙo lr~ 
vkfn :i gS] loZFkk ughaA
vkids 'kklu esa oLrq&rÙo dFkf×pr~ lr~&:i 
Flawless depiction of reality through the ‘seven-nuance system’ 
(saptabha g ):ô ī
A thing or object of knowledge has infinite characters (i.e., it is 
anek nt tmaka); each character can be analyzed and grasped 
individually. Each individual character is called a naya. A naya 
thus reveals only a part of the totality, and should not be 
mistaken for the whole. A synthesis of different viewpoints is 
ā ā
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achieved by the doctrine of conditional predications 
(sy dv da) wherein every viewpoint is able to retain its 
relative importance. Syādvāda consists in seven vocal 
statements adorned by the qualifying clause ‘in a way’ – syāt.
When in regard to a single entity – soul etc. – an enquiry is 
made relating to its attribute – existence etc. – with all-round 
examination, there is a possibility of seven statements, 
1adorned with the term ‘quodammodo’  or ‘in a way’ (syāt). 
This is called the ‘seven-nuance system’ (saptabhaôgī). It 
embraces the seven limbs (saptabhaôga) of assertion, the one-
sided but relative method of comprehension (naya), and also 
the acceptance and rejection of the assertion.
Syādvāda, which literally signifies assertion of 
possibilities, seeks to ascertain the meaning of things from all 
possible standpoints. Its chief merit is the anekānta, or many-
sided view of logic. This, it would be seen at once, is most 
necessary in order to acquire full knowledge about anything.
Things are neither existent nor non-existent absolutely. 
Two seemingly contrary statements may be found to be both 
true if we take the trouble of finding out the two points of view 
from which the statements are made. For example, a man may 
be a father with reference to his son, and he may be a son with 
reference to his father. Now it is a fact that he can be a son and a 
father at one and the same time. A thing may be said to be 
existent in a way and to be non-existent in another way, and so 
forth. Syādvāda examines things from seven points of view, 
hence the doctrine is also called saptabhaôgī naya (sevenfold 
method of relative comprehension). It is stated as follows:
ā ā
1. The Latin word quodammodo has many meanings, mainly: ‘in a 
certain way’, and ‘in a certain measure’.
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1. L;kn~ vfLr ,o (
In a way it simply is; this is the first ‘nuance’, with the 
notion of affirmation.
2. L;kn~ ukfLr ,o (syād-nāsti-eva)
In a way it simply is not; this is the second ‘nuance’, with 
the notion of negation.
3. L;kn~ voDrO; ,o (syād-avaktavya-eva)
In a way it is simply indescribable; this is the third 
‘nuance’, with the notion of simultaneous affirmation and 
negation.
4. L;kn~ vfLr ukfLr ,o (syād-asti-nāsti-eva)
In a way it simply is, in a way it simply is not; this is the 
fourth ‘nuance’, with the notion of successive affirmation 
and negation.
5. L;kn~ vfLr voDrO; ,o (syād-asti-avaktavya-eva)
In a way it simply is, in a way it is simply indescribable; this 
is the fifth ‘nuance’, with the notion of affirmation and the 
notion of simultaneous affirmation and negation.
6. L;kn~ ukfLr voDrO; ,o (syād-nāsti-avaktavya-eva)
In a way it simply is not, in a way it is simply indescribable; 
this is the sixth ‘nuance’, with the notion of negation and 
the notion of simultaneous affirmation and negation.
7.  L;kn~ vfLr ukfLr voDrO; ,o (syād-asti-nāsti-avaktavya-eva)
In a way it simply is, in a way it simply is not, in a way it is 
simply indescribable; this is the seventh ‘nuance’, with the 
successive notions of affirmation and negation, and the 
notion of simultaneous affirmation and negation.
syād-asti-eva)
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The primary modes of predication are three – sy d-asti, 
syād-nāsti and syād-avaktavya; the other four are obtained by 
combining these three.
The phrase ‘in a way’ (syāt) declares the standpoint of 
expression – affirmation with regard to own substance 
(dravya), place (kÈetra), time (kāla), and being (bhāva), and 
negation with regard to other substance (dravya), place 
(kÈetra), time (kāla), and being (bhāva). Thus, for a ‘jar’, in 
regard to substance (dravya) – earthen, it simply is; wooden, it 
simply is not. In regard to place (kÈetra) – room, it simply is; 
terrace, it simply is not. In regard to time (kāla) – summer, it 
simply is; winter, it simply is not. In regard to being (bhāva) – 
brown, it simply is; white, it simply is not. And the word 
‘simply’ has been inserted for the purpose of excluding a sense 
not approved by the ‘nuance’; for avoidance of a meaning not 
intended. The phrase ‘in a way’ is used to declare that the ‘jar’ 
exists in regard to its own substance etc. and not also in regard 
to other substance etc. Even where the phrase is not employed, 
the meaning is conceived by knowers of it in all cases from the 
sense; just as the word eva, having the purpose of cutting off 
the non-application.
The seven modes of predication may be obtained in the case 
of pairs of opposite attributes like eternal and non-eternal, one 
and many, and universal and particular. These pairs of 
opposites can very well be predicated of every attribute of 
reality. In the case of contradictory propositions, we have two 
opposite aspects of reality, both valid, serving as the basis of the 
propositions. Hence there is neither doubt nor confusion; each 
assertion is definite and clear.
To the existence of an entity non-existence is 
indispensable; and to its non-existence the former. And the 
primariness and secondariness of the two depends on the 
standpoint or intent.
ā
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When a single entity is designated by the two attributes, 
existence and non-existence, applied simultaneously as 
primary, from the impossibility of such a word, the entity is 
indescribable. The pair of qualities, existence and non-
existence, cannot be stated together, as one thing, by the term 
‘existent’ because that is incompetent for the expression of 
non-existence. Similarly, the term ‘non-existent’ cannot be 
used because that is incompetent for the expression of 
existence. Nor can a single conventional term express that 
since it can cause presentation of things only in succession. 
From lack of all forms of expression the entity is indescribable, 
but it stands out – overpowered by simultaneous existence and 
non-existence, both applied as primary. It is not in every way 
indescribable because of the consequence that it would then be 
undenotable even by the word ‘indescribable’. It only refers to 
the impossibility of finding an idea which could include both, 
the thesis and the antithesis, at the same time.
The remaining three are easily understood.
That the complex nature of a real object or dravya is amenable 
to description by the seven and only seven propositions is made 
clear by Ācārya Kundakunda in Pańcāstikāya-Sāra:
fl; vfRFk .kfRFk mg;a vOoÙkOoa iq.kks ; rfÙkn;a A
nOoa [kq lÙkHkaxa vknslols.k laHkofn AA14AA
According as dravya is viewed from different aspects of 
reasoning it may be described by the following proposi-
tions: 1) in a way it is; 2) in a way it is not; 3) in a way it is 
both (is and is not); 4) in a way it is indescribable; 5) in a 
way it is and is indescribable; 6) in a way it is not and is 
indescribable; and 7) in a way it is and is not and is inde-
scribable.
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O Lord ! Who will not agree that the objects of knowledge exhibit 
the quality of existence (sat) with regard to their own-
quaternion (svacatuÈÇaya) [own-substance (svadravya), own-
place (svakÈetra), own-time (svakāla), and own-being 
(svabhāva)], and the quality of non-existence (asat) with regard 
to other-quaternion (paracatuÈÇaya) [other-substance 
(paradravya), other-place (parakÈetra), other-time (parakāla), 
and other-being (parabhāva)]? Without such a method of 
analysis of reality, no object of interest can be systematically 
established.
lnso lo± dks usPNsr~ Lo:ikfnprq"V;kr~ A
vlnso foi;kZlkÂ psÂ O;ofr"Brs AA15AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
dh vis{kk ls lc inkFkks± dks lr~&:Ik rFkk ij:ikfn prq"V; & ijæO;] 
ij{ks=k] ijdky rFkk ijHkko & dh vis{kk ls vlr~&:Ik dkSu ugha vaxhdkj 
djsxk\ oLrq&rÙo ds fo"k; esa ;gh O;oLFkk gS_ ,slk u ekuus ij fdlh Hkh 
rÙo dh O;oLFkk ugha cu ldrh gSA
Lo:ikfn prq"V; & LoæO;] Lo{ks=k] Lodky rFkk LoHkko & 
The first two standpoints of  – affirmation and 
negation:
saptabhaôgī
The positive predicate refers to the object’s own-quaternion 
(svacatu aya) and the negative predicate refers to other-
quaternion (paracatuÈÇaya). Consider this: ‘as per the 
scripture, consciousness (upayoga) is the own-being 
(svabhāva) of the soul (jīva).’ The positive predicate will be: 
‘the soul is existent (sat) with regard to consciousness 
(upayoga) which is its own-being (svabhāva).’ The negative 
ÈÇ
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predicate will be: ‘the soul is non-existent (asat) with regard to 
non-consciousness (anupayoga) which is its other-being 
(parabhāva).’
As another illustration, the world is eternal with regard to 
its substance (dravya); it is non-eternal with regard to the 
forms (paryāya) of substances that are seen one day and gone 
the next.
If the object be considered existent (sat) with regard to its 
other-quaternion too, the difference between an animate 
object (jīva - soul) and an inanimate object (ajīva - non-soul, 
matter) will vanish. If the object be considered non-existent 
(asat) with regard to its own-quaternion too, everything will 
become null and void (śūnya).
3
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An object can exhibit, in a way, the dual character of existence as 
well as non-existence (sat and asat – ubhaya) when asserted 
successively in regard to the elements of the quaternion; the 
same character (existence as well as non-existence), when 
asserted simultaneously, leads to a proposition that is 
indescribable (avaktavya) due to the limitation of our 
expression. The remaining three forms of assertion [existing 
(sat) and indescribable (avaktavya); non-existing (asat) and 
indescribable (avaktavya); and existing (sat), non-existing 
(asat), and indescribable (avaktavya)] arise from their own 
causes depending on the particular state or mode of the object – 
naya.
Øek£ir};kn~ }Sra lgkokP;e'kfDrr% A
voDrO;ksÙkjk% 'ks"kkL=k;ks HkÄk% Losgrqr% AA16AAõ
lkekU;kFkZ & 
ls mHk;kRed (}Sr) gS rFkk Lo&ij&prq"V; dh vis{kk ls ;qxir~ foo{kk 
gksus ls dFku dh vlkeF;Z ds dkj.k voDrO; gSA blh izdkj lr~] vlr~ 
rFkk mHk; ds lkFk voDrO; dks fy, gq, tks 'ks"k rhu Hkax gSa os Hkh 
vius&vius dkj.kksa ds vuqlkj lq?kfVr gSaA
oLrq&rÙo Lo&ij&prq"V; dh vis{kk ls Øe ls foo{kk gksus 
Successive affirmation and negation (ubhaya), simultaneous 
affirmation and negation (avaktavya), and the remaining three 
limbs of saptabhaôgī:
When the object is seen successively from the two points of 
view – substance (dravya) and form (pary ya) – there is simple 
summing up only of the results. We can assert, without fear of 
contradiction, that soul is both eternal and non-eternal. It is 
ā
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eternal from the substance (dravya) point of view and non-
eternal from the form (paryāya) point of view.
When we think of the object from both the substance 
(dravya) and the form (paryāya) points of view simultaneously, 
it presents existence as well as non-existence at once, and as 
there is no word in our language except indescribability that 
can represent the idea that arises in the mind at that time, we 
express this by the word ‘indescribable’ (avaktavya).
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Existence (astitva), being a qualifying attribute (vi e a a) of an 
entity (dharmī), has invariable togetherness (avinābhāva) with 
its opposite, non-existence (nāstitva). It is like presence-in-
homologue (sādharmya), a qualifying attribute (viśeÈaõa) of the 
middle term (hetu), will have invariable togetherness 
(avinābhāva) with its opposite, absence-in-heterologue 
(vaidharmya), used to highlight distinction (vyatireka).
ś È õ
vfLrRoa izfr"ksè;sukfoukHkkO;sd/£ef.k A
fo'ks"k.kRokr~ lk/E;± ;Fkk Hksnfoo{k;k AA17AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
(fo/s;) dk ukfLrRo /eZ (izfr"ksè;) ds lkFk vfoukHkko lEcU/ gS] tSls 
fd gsrq iz;ksx esa lkèkE;Z (vUo;&gsrq) Hksn foo{kk ls oS/E;Z 
(O;frjsd&gsrq) ds lkFk vfoukHkko lEcU/ fy, jgrk gSA
,d gh oLrq (/ehZ) ds fo'ks"k.k gksus ds dkj.k vfLrRo /eZ 
Existence has invariable togetherness (avin bh va) with non-
existence:
ā ā
The middle term (hetu) has both – the association (anvaya) and 
the distinction (vyatireka) – with the major term (sādhya). 
Association (anvaya) establishes the homogeneousness 
(sādharmya), and distinction (vyatireka) the hetero-
geneousness (vaidharmya) with the major term (sādhya).
Association (anvaya) establishes the logical connection 
(vyāpti) by positivity: “The hill is full of fire (major term) 
because it is full of smoke (middle term), as a kitchen,” – the 
presence of the major term (sādhya) is attended by the 
presence of the middle term (hetu or sādhana) – presence-in-
homologue (sādharmya).
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Distinction (vyatireka) establishes the logical connection 
by contrariety: “The hill has no smoke (major term) because it 
has no fire (middle term), as a lake,” – the absence of the major 
term (sādhya) is attended by the absence of the middle term 
(hetu or sādhana) – absence-in-heterologue (vaidharmya).
Homogeneousness (sādharmya) and heterogeneousness 
(vaidharmya) are relative to each other and always go together. 
The middle term (hetu) is qualified by both – homogeneousness 
(sādharmya) and heterogeneousness (vaidharmya).
Smoke has invariable togetherness (avinābhāva) with fire: 
smoke means existence of fire, and there is no smoke without 
fire. Fire, on the other hand, has no invariable togetherness 
(avinābhāva) with smoke as there can be fire without smoke. It 
cannot be said that fire must have smoke, and that without 
smoke there is no fire.
But existence and non-existence have mutual (ubhaya) 
invariable togetherness (avinābhāva); non-existence is always 
accompanied by existence and existence is always accompanied 
by non-existence. This is because existence and non-existence, 
both, are qualifying attributes (viśeÈaõa) of the same 
substratum, i.e., the entity (dharmī).
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Non-existence (n stitva), being a qualifying attribute 
of the entity (dharmī), has invariable togetherness (avinābhāva) 
with its opposite, existence (astitva). It is like absence-in-
heterologue (vaidharmya), a qualifying attribute (viśeÈaõa) of 
the middle term (hetu), will have invariable togetherness 
(avinābhāva) with its opposite, presence-in-homologue 
(sādharmya), used to highlight association (anvaya).
ā (viśeÈaõa) 
ukfLrRoa izfr"ksè;sukfoukHkkO;sd/£ef.k A
fo'ks"k.kRok}S/E;± ;Fkk¿Hksnfoo{k;k AA18AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
izfr"ksè; vfLrRo /eZ ds lkFk vfoukHkko lEcU/ fy, jgrk gS] tSls fd gsrq 
iz;ksx esa oS/E;Z (O;frjsd&gsrq) vHksn foo{kk ls lkèkE;Z (vUo;&gsrq) ds 
lkFk vfoukHkko lEcU/ fy, jgrk gSA
,d gh oLrq (/ehZ) esa fo'ks"k.k gksus ls ukfLrRo /eZ vius 
Non-existence has invariable togetherness with 
existence:
(avinābhāva) 
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The entity qualified ( ya), being expressible by word, must 
possess the characters existence (astitiva or vidheya – 
affirmative) as well as non-existence (nāstitva or pratiÈedhya – 
negative). This is akin to the fact that depending on what is to be 
proved of the major term (sādhya), a reason can be a legitimate 
middle term (hetu) and also not a legitimate middle term (ahetu).
viśeÈ
fo/s;izfr"ksè;kRek fo'ks";% 'kCnxkspj% A
lkè;/eksZ ;Fkk gsrqjgsrq'pkI;is{k;k AA19AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
D;ksafd og 'kCn dk fo"k; gksrk gSA tSls fd lkè; dk /eZ vis{kk Hksn ls 
gsrq&:i (lk/u) Hkh gksrk gS vkSj vgsrq&:i (vlk/u) Hkh gksrk gSA
fo'ks"; (/ehZ ;k i{k) fo/s;&:i vkSj izfr"ksè;&:i gksrk gS 
An entity, expressible by word, possesses both the characters – 
existence and non-existence:
When the hill is full of fire, smoke is a hetu, able to establish the 
particular attribute of the sādhya. But when the hill is full of 
snow, smoke is an ahetu, unable to establish the particular 
attribute of the sādhya. Thus, smoke has both the attributes – 
hetu and ahetu – depending on the attribute of the major term 
(sādhya) under consideration.
In the same way, an entity, expressible by word, possesses 
both the characters – existence and non-existence – depending 
on the point of view. Existence is from one point of view 
(substance – dravya), and non-existence from another point of 
view (mode – paryāya). Existence and non-existence are the 
qualifying attributes (viśeÈaõa) of the entity qualified (viśeÈya).
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The remaining nuances of – simultaneous 
affirmation and negation (indescribability); affirmation and 
indescribability; negation and indescribability; and affirmation, 
negation and indescribability – should also be understood in 
respect of appropriate state or mode of the object (naya). O Lord 
of the Sages ! There are no contradictions in your doctrine [of 
non-absolutism (anekāntavāda)].
saptabhaôgī 
'ks"kHkÄk'p usrO;k ;FkksDru;;ksxr% Aõ
u p df'pf}jks/ks¿fLr equhUæ ro 'kklus AA20AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
dFkf×pr~ lr~ vkSj voDrO;] dFkf×pr~ vlr~ vkSj voDrO;] rFkk 
dFkf×pr~ lr~] vlr~ vkSj voDrO; & dks Hkh yxk ysuk pkfg,A gs equhUæ !  
(oLrq&rÙo vusdkUrkRed gksus ds dkj.k) vkids 'kklu esa fdlh izdkj 
dk fojks/ ugha gSA
;FkksDr u; ds vuqlkj 'ks"k Hkaxksa & dFkf×pr~ voDrO;] 
The remaining nuances (limbs) of also fit 
appropriately in the naya scheme:
saptabhaôgī 
It has been established that existence is not contradictory to 
non-existence and existence as well as non-existence are 
possible in a single entity. In the same manner, indescribability 
also, consisting of simultaneous affirmation and negation, has 
no mutual contradiction. The whole seven-nuance view, a 
combination of the triad of nuances defined as existence, non-
existence, and indescribability, has no contradictions 
whatsoever when viewed in light of the doctrine of non-
absolutism (anek ntav da).
How is the association of these seemingly contradictory 
ā ā
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attributes – existence and non-existence, one and many, 
eternal and non-eternal, universality and particularity, etc. – 
possible in a single entity? This is possible when the statement 
is conditioned by differences of conditions – delimitants or 
part-aspects. Non-existence in existent things is not 
contradictory when conditioned by differences of conditions. 
In the same way, existence and indescribability are not 
contradictory. Existence does not occur with avoidance of non-
existence, nor does non-existence occur with avoidance of 
existence. Contradiction would be if existence and non-
existence were to be with one (same) condition. Existence has 
one condition, and non-existence another. Existence is with 
respect to own form and non-existence with respect to the form 
of another.
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An object (artha) which is either absolutely existent (
– sat, vidhi) or absolutely non-existent (negation – asat, niÈedha) 
is incapable of performing activity (artha-kriyā); only with the 
relative presence of both, existence and non-existence, it 
becomes capable of performing activity. It is not possible for an 
absolutely existent or absolutely non-existent object to perform 
activity even on the availability of appropriate extrinsic and 
intrinsic causes.
affirmation 
,oa fof/fu"ks/kH;keuofLFkreFkZÑr~ A
usfr psUu ;Fkk dk;± cfgjUr#ikf/fHk% AA21AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
ugha gS & vFkkZr~ mHk;&:i tks oLrq gS (loZFkk vfLrRo&:i ;k loZFkk 
ukfLrRo&:i ls fu/kZfjr ugha gS) & ogh vFkZ&fØ;k dks djus okyh gksrh 
gS] vU;Fkk ughaA ,slk u ekuus ij cfgjax vkSj vUrjax dkj.kksa ls tks dk;Z dk 
fu"iUu gksuk ekuk x;k gS og ugha curkA
bl izdkj fof/ vkSj fu"ks/ ds }kjk tks oLrq (vFkZ) vofLFkr 
Relative existence of both, affirmation and negation, make it 
possible for an object to perform activity:
The activity of an object is called the artha-kriy . The loss of its 
previous form and emergence of the new form, together, is 
called the pariõāma. The artha-kriyā is possible only in objects 
which exhibit both, the general (sāmānya – dravya) as well as 
particular (viśeÈa – paryāya), attributes. It cannot exist only in 
dravya or only in paryāya. An object must have both, the 
general as well as the particular attributes; without dravya 
there is no paryāya and without paryāya there is no dravya. 
Without any of these two, the object becomes a non-object 
(avastu) and hence not a subject of valid knowledge (pramāõa).
ā
42
ĀptamīmāÚsā
Each individual attribute (dharma) of an entity (dharm ), 
having innumerable attributes, carries with it a particular 
meaning. When one attribute is treated as the primary 
attribute, the other attributes stay in the background as the 
secondary attributes.
ī
/esZ /esZ¿U; ,okFkksZ /£e.kks¿uUr/eZ.k% A
vfÄRos¿U;rekUrL; 'ks"kkUrkuka rnÄrk AA22AAõ õ
lkekU;kFkZ & 
fy, gq, gksrk gSA vkSj mu /eks± esa ls ,d /eZ ds iz/ku gksus ij 'ks"k /eks± dh 
izrhfr ml le; xkS.k&:i ls gksrh gSA
vuUr&/eZ okys /ehZ dk izR;sd /eZ ,d fHkUu gh iz;kstu dks 
Each attribute of the entity is different from the other; the point 
of view determines the primary or secondary nature of the 
attribute:
Objects possess innumerable attributes and may be conceived 
from as many points of view; i.e., objects truly are subject to all-
sided knowledge (possible only in omniscience). What is not 
composed of innumerable attributes, in the sphere of the three 
times, is also not existent, like a sky-flower. To comprehend the 
object from one particular standpoint is the scope of naya (the 
one-sided method of comprehension). Naya comprehends one 
specific attribute of the object but pramāõa comprehends the 
object in its fullness. Pramāõa does not make a distinction 
between substance and its attributes but it grasps the object in 
its entirety. But naya looks at the object from a particular point 
of view and gives emphasis to a particular aspect of the object.
Both pramāõa and naya are forms of knowledge; pramāõa 
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is sakalade a – comprehensive and absolute, and naya is 
vikaladeśa – partial and relative. A naya looks at the object 
from a particular point of view and presents the picture of it in 
relation to that view; the awareness of other aspects is in the 
background and not ignored.
A naya is neither pramāõa nor apramāõa (not pramāõa). It 
is a part of pramāõa. A drop of water of the ocean cannot be 
considered the ocean nor the non-ocean; it is a part of the 
ocean. Similarly, a soldier is neither an army, nor a non-army; 
but a part of the army. The same argument goes with naya. A 
naya is a partial presentation of the nature of the object, while 
pramāõa is comprehensive in its presentation. A naya does 
neither give false knowledge nor does it deny the existence of 
other aspects of knowledge. There are as many naya as there 
are points of view.
ś
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Those proficient in the scheme of the naya (viewing an object 
from a particular point of view) should apply the seven-nuance-
system (saptabhaôgī) to other dual attributes like one (eka) and 
many (aneka).
,dkusdfodYiknkoqÙkj=kkfi ;kst;sr~ A
izfØ;ka HkfÄuhesuka u;SuZ;fo'kkjn% AA23AAõ
lkekU;kFkZ & tks u;&fuiq.k (
izfØ;k dks vkxs Hkh ,d&vusd vkfn /eZ&;qxyksa esa u; ds vuqlkj ;kstuk 
djuk pkfg,A
u;&fo'kkjn) gSa mudks bl lkr Hkax okyh 
The seven-nuance system ( should also be applied in 
case of other duals like one and many:
saptabhaôgī) 
Objects of knowledge exhibit the quality of one (eka) as well as 
the quality of many (aneka). Oneness (ekatva), being a 
qualifying attribute (viśeÈaõa) of an entity (dharmī), has 
invariable togetherness (avinābhāva) with manyness 
(anekatva). Manyness (anekatva), being a qualifying attribute 
(viśeÈaõa) of the entity (dharmī), has invariable togetherness 
(avinābhāva) with oneness (ekatva). An object can exhibit, in a 
way, the dual character of oneness (ekatva) as well as manyness 
(anekatva) when asserted successively in regard to the 
elements of the quaternion; the same character (oneness as 
well as manyness), when asserted simultaneously, leads to a 
proposition that is indescribable (avaktavya) due to the 
limitation of our expression. The remaining three forms of 
assertion [oneness (ekatva) and indescribable; manyness 
(anekatva) and indescribable; and oneness (ekatva), manyness 
(anekatva), and indescribable)] arise from their own causes 
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depending on the particular state or mode of the object – naya.
The naya scheme, applied to a pitcher: the pitcher is, in a 
way, one (as a substance), and also, in a way, many (as modes). 
The substance of clay runs through all its modes but the modes 
keep on changing due to origination and destruction.
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The doctrine of absolute non-dualism (advaita-ek nta) suffers 
from contradiction as it denies the duality of factors-of-action 
(kāraka) and action (kriyā), as ascertained directly by cognition; 
it is not possible for an object to get produced out of itself.
ā
v}SrSdkUri{ks¿fi n`"Vks Hksnks fo#è;rs A
dkjdk.kka fØ;k;kÜp uSda LoLekr~ iztk;rs AA24AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
fl¼ (Li"V fn[kkbZ nsus okyk lR;) gS og fojks/ dks izkIr gksrk gSA D;ksafd 
tks Hkh dksbZ ,d loZFkk vdsyk (vlgk;) gS og Lo;a vius ls mRiUu ugha 
gks ldrk gSA
v}SrSdkUr i{k esa dkjdksa vkSj fØ;kvksa dk Hksn tks izR;{k 
Fault in the doctrine of absolute non-dualism (advaita-ek nta):ā
f}rh; ifjPNsn
Section 2
In this verse we come to the Advaita-Ved nta doctrine which 
holds that Brahma, often described as ‘Existence-Thought-
Bliss’ (sat-cid- nanda) is the sole reality, the world being a 
product of illusion (māyā) or ignorance (avidyā). All different 
things are manifestations of Brahma; only the one eternally 
undivided Brahma exists. The doctrine justifies an ultimate 
non-reality of the world of things (vastu-prapa ca) found in the 
triple universe as being appearance (pratibhāsa) through the 
power of illusion (māyā) or ignorance (avidyā).
Factors-of-action (kāraka) comprise the doer (kartā), the 
ā
ā
ô
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activity (karma) and the instrument (kara a) etc. Action 
(kriyā) consists in changes that are termed as coming and 
going, motion and stillness, origination and destruction, eating 
and drinking, contraction and expansion etc.
Duality between the factors-of-action (kāraka) and the 
action (kriyā) is seen in everyday experience. This universally 
observable cognition goes against the doctrine of absolute non-
dualism (advaita-ekānta).
Without the instrumentality of the factors-of-action 
(kāraka) and the action (kriyā), it is also not possible to account 
for the production of an absolutely non-dualistic object; it can 
certainly not get produced by itself.
If illusion (māyā) is something ‘existent’, distinct from 
Self-Brahma, then reality is established as dual, setting an axe 
at the root of the Advaita doctrine. If illusion (māyā) is 
something ‘non-existent’ but capable of producing effects, 
there is contradiction within own statement, as in the phrase ‘a 
barren mother’. A woman who gives birth to a child is a mother 
and barren is the opposite thereof; if mother, how barren?
Ācārya AmÃtcandra’s commentary on Ācārya Kundakunda’s 
1Pravacanasāra , explains the sixfold factors-of-action 
(kāraka) from the empirical as well as the transcendental 
points of view: 
Factors-of-action (kāraka) are of six kinds: 1) the doer 
(kartā), 2) the activity (karma), 3) the instrument (kara a), 4) 
the bestowal (saÚpradāna), 5) the dislodgement (apādāna), 
and the substratum (adhikaraõa). Each of these is of two 
kinds: empirical sixfold factors-of-action (vyavahāra 
ÈaÇkāraka) and transcendental sixfold factors-of-action 
õ
õ
1. See ia- euksgjyky (fo- la- 1969)] JheRdqUndqUnkpk;Zfojfpr% 
izopulkj%] vè;k; 1] xkFkk 16] i`"B 21&22-
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(ni caya ). When the accomplishment of work is 
through external instrumental causes (nimitta kāraõa) it is 
the empirical sixfold factors-of-action (vyavahāra È ā ) 
and when the accomplishment of work is for the self, in the self, 
through the self as the material cause (upādāna kāraõa), it is 
the transcendental sixfold factors-of-action (niścaya 
ÈaÇkāraka). The empirical sixfold factors-of-action (vyavahāra 
ÈaÇkāraka) is based on what is called as upacāra asadbhūta 
naya and, therefore, untrue; the transcendental sixfold 
factors-of-action (niścaya ÈaÇkāraka) is based on the self and, 
therefore, true. Since every substance (dravya) is independent 
and is not a cause of either the creation or the destruction of 
other substances, the empirical sixfold factors-of-action 
(vyavahāra ÈaÇkāraka) is untrue. And since the transcendental 
sixfold factors-of-action (niścaya ÈaÇkāraka) accomplishes the 
work of the self, in the self, through the self, it is true.
An illustration of the empirical sixfold factors-of-action 
(vyavahāra ÈaÇkāraka) can be as under: the independent 
performer of the activity, the potter, is the doer (kartā); the 
work that is being performed, the making of the pot, is the 
activity (karma); the tool used for the performance of the 
action – the wheel – is the instrument (karaõa); the end-use of 
the work performed – the storage vessel – is the bestowal 
(saÚpradāna); the change of mode from one state to the other, 
from clay to pot, is the dislodgement (apādāna); and the 
bedrock of activity, the clay, is the substratum (adhikaraõa). In 
this case, the doer (kartā), the activity (karma), the instrument 
(karaõa), the bestowal (saÚpradāna), the dislodgement 
(apādāna), and the substratum (adhikaraõa) are different 
entities and, therefore, the empirical sixfold factors-of-action 
(vyavahāra ÈaÇkāraka) is established only from empirical point 
of view and not true.
The transcendental sixfold factors-of-action (niścaya 
ś ÈaÇkāraka
 atk raka
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ÈaÇkāraka) 
established in its Pure Self (through uddhopayoga) attains 
omniscience (kevalajðāna) without the help of or reliance on 
any outside agency (such a soul is appropriately termed self-
dependent or svayambhū). Intrinsically possessed of infinite 
knowledge and energy, the soul, depending on self, performs 
the activity of attaining its infinite knowledge-character and, 
therefore, the soul is the doer (kartā). The soul’s concentration 
on its own knowledge-character is the activity; the soul, 
therefore, is the activity (karma). Through its own knowledge-
character the soul attains omniscience and, therefore, the soul 
is the instrument (karaõa). The soul engrossed in pure 
consciousness imparts pure consciousness to self; the soul, 
therefore, is the bestowal (saÚpradāna). As the soul gets 
established in its pure nature at the same time destruction of 
impure subsidential knowledge etc. takes place and, therefore, 
the soul is the dislodgement (apādāna). The attributes of 
infinite knowledge and energy are manifested in the soul itself; 
the soul, therefore, is the substratum (adhikaraõa). This way, 
from the transcendental point of view, the soul itself, without 
the help of others, is the sixfold factors-of-action (niścaya 
ÈaÇkāraka) in the attainment of omniscience through pure 
concentration (śuddhopayoga).
takes place in the self and, therefore, true. The soul 
ś
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(If this doctrine of absolute non-dualism be 
accepted –) There will be no duality of activities (karma) – 
virtuous (śubha) and wicked (aśubha), of fruits of activities 
(phala) – merit (puõya) and demerit (pāpa), of abodes of 
existence (loka) – this world (ihaloka) and the other world 
(paraloka), of knowledge (vidyā) and ignorance (avidyā), and of 
bondage (bandha) and liberation (mokÈa).
(advaita-ekānta) 
deZ}Sra iQy}Sra yksd}Sra p uks Hkosr~ A
fo|k¿fo|k};a u L;kn~ cU/eks{k};a rFkk AA25AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
iq.;&:i vkSj iki&:i iQy] yksd&}Sr & bgyksd vkSj ijyksd ugha curs 
gSaA blh rjg fo|k vkSj vfo|k dk }Sr rFkk cU/ vkSj eks{k dk }Sr Hkh fl¼ 
ugha gksrs gSaA
v}Sr ,dkUr esa deZ&}Sr & 'kqHk vkSj v'kqHk deZ] iQy&}Sr & 
Absolute non-dualism cannot explain dualities like virtuous and 
wicked activities, and their fruits like merit and demerit:
The duals which are mentioned in the above verse negate the 
doctrine of absolute non-dualism.
The doctrine of non-dualism itself expounds 
dualism as in the two statements, ‘All this is the primeval 
Person’, and ‘All this surely in truth is Brahman’. So, even the 
scripture does not establish non-dualism.
Non acceptance of one component of any of these duals 
entails the negation of the other component too since one 
cannot exist without the other. An entity defined as a non-dual 
Person in the doctrine is not within the range of 
demonstration.
(advaita) 
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If we undertake to establish this doctrine of absolute non-
dualism (advaita-ekānta) with the help of the middle term 
[also called reason (sādhana) or mark (li ga)], there is bound to 
be duality because the middle term (hetu) will have a predicate – 
the major term (sādhya or liôgī). If it be established without the 
help of the middle term (hetu) by mere speech, in that case, can 
the contrary view (absolute dualism) too not be established by 
mere speech?
(hetu) 
ô
gsrksj}Srflf¼'psn~ }Sra L;k¼srqlkè;;ks% A
gsrquk psf}uk flf¼}SZra okÄ~ek=krks u fde~ AA26AA
lkekU;kFkZ & ;fn dgk tk, fd 
gsrq (lk/u) vkSj lkè; ds ln~Hkko ls }Sr dh flf¼ dk izlax vkrk gSA vkSj 
;fn gsrq ds fcuk v}Sr dh flf¼ dh tkrh gS rks D;k opuek=k ls }Sr dh Hkh 
flf¼ ugha gks ldsxh\
v}Sr dh flf¼ gsrq ds }kjk dh tkrh gS rks 
There is obvious contradiction if non-dualism is established with 
the help of a middle term (hetu):
The minor term, locus or abode (pak a) is that with which the 
reason or middle term (hetu) is connected, and whose 
connection with the major term (sādhya) is to be proved. The 
minor term (pakÈa) is related to the major term (sādhya) 
through their common relation to the middle term (hetu). In a 
proposition (pratijðā) the subject is the minor term (pakÈa), 
and the predicate the major term (sādhya or liôgī).
In an inference for the sake of others, the minor term 
(pakÈa), etc., must be explicitly set forth. The following is an 
inference for the sake of others:
1. This hill (minor term) is full of fire (major term). – 
È
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pratijðā 
be proved.
2. Because it is full of smoke (middle term). – hetu : 
statement of reason.
3. Whatever is full of smoke is full of fire, as a kitchen. – 
dÃÈÇānta or udāharaõa : statement of a general rule 
supported by an example.
4. So is this hill full of smoke. upanaya : application of 
the rule to this case.
5. Therefore the hill is full of fire. nigamana : 
conclusion.
The hetu or the reason consists in the statement of the 
mark or the sign (liôga) which being present in the subject or 
the minor term (pakÈa) suggests that the latter possesses a 
certain property predicated of it. It is the assertion of the 
middle term (hetu) by which the relation or not of the minor 
term (pakÈa) to the major term (sādhya) is known. While the 
pratijðā is a proposition of two terms, the hetu is a one-term 
proposition.
There is inseparable connection (vyāpti) between the major 
term (sādhya) and the middle term (hetu). In other words, 
there is inseparable presence of one thing in another, e.g., no 
smoke without fire. Absolute non-dualism loses its essential 
characteristic the instant a middle term is employed to 
establish it as there is inseparable connection between the 
major term (sādhya) and the middle term (hetu). If from the 
middle term (hetu) there should be establishment of non-
duality, there would be duality of the middle and major terms. 
If non-duality is established without the middle term why not 
establish it by mere speech? And, if established by mere speech, 
without the middle term, there is no problem in establishing its 
opposite too, i.e., dualism, likewise.
: proposition; statement of that which is to 
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As there can be no non-reason (ahetu) without the presence of a 
middle term or reason (hetu), similarly there can be no non-
dualism (advaita) without the presence of dualism (dvaita). The 
denial of a word-denoted-entity (saÚjðī) is nowhere seen 
without the real existence of the thing that is used for denial.
v}Sra u fouk }Srkngsrqfjo gsrquk A
lafKu% izfr"ks/ks u izfr"ksè;kn`rs Dofpr~ AA27AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
}Sr ds fcuk v}Sr ugha gks ldrk gSA dgha Hkh laKh (ukeokys) dk izfr"ks/ 
(fu"ks/) izfr"ksè; ds fcuk ugha curk gSA
ftl izdkj ls gsrq ds fcuk vgsrq ugha gksrk gS mlh izdkj ls 
Non-dualism is inseparably connected (avin bh v ) with dualism:ā ā ī
The existence of a reason (hetu) is necessarily accompanied by 
the existence of a non-reason (ahetu). Smoke is a reason (hetu) 
for establishing the existence of fire but a non-reason (ahetu) 
for establishing the existence of water. Also, for establishing 
the existence of fire, smoke is a reason (hetu) and water is a 
non-reason (ahetu).
The word dualism (dvaita), which is countered or denied by 
non-dualism (advaita), must have real connotation to be able 
to fit the task. Even when we express non-existence with the 
phrase ‘sky-flower’ it clearly connotes the existence of the 
entity ‘flower’.
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If one maintains that objects are possessed of the character 
‘absolute separateness’ (p thaktva-ek nta) – declaring every 
object as absolutely different from all other – the question arises 
as to whether, in light of the character of absolute separateness, 
the substance and its qualities are considered non-separate or 
separate. If these be held as non-separate then the character of 
absolute separateness gets repudiated. If these be held as 
separate then too the character of absolute separateness cannot 
be maintained since such so-called ‘separate’ qualities are seen 
to reside in many objects making them ‘non-separate’.
Ã ā
i`FkDRoSdkUri{ks¿fi i`FkDRokni`Fkd~ rq rkS A
i`FkDRos u i`FkDRoa L;knusdLFkks álkS xq.k% AA28AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
ekuuk) iz'u mBrk gS fd D;k ^ æO;* vkSj ^ xq.k* i`Fkd~ gSa vFkok vi`Fkd~A 
;fn vi`Fkd~ gSa rks i`FkDRo dk ,dkUr gh ugha jgkA vkSj ;fn i`Fkd~ gSa rks Hkh 
i`FkDRo uke dk xq.k ugha curk gS D;ksafd ^xq.k* ,d gksrs gq, Hkh vusd 
inkFkks± esa fLFkr ekuk x;k gS vkSj rc i`Fkd~Hkwr inkFkZ ,d nwljs ls vi`Fkd~ 
gks tk;saxsA
i`FkDRoSdkUr i{k esa (oLrq&rÙo dks ,d nwljs ls loZFkk fHkUu 
The doctrine of ‘absolute separateness’ is faulted:
5
Verse 28
If the reality of oneness (ekatva) – different units of a substance 
forming a composite – is absolutely denied (and thus subscribing 
to the doctrine of absolute separateness) then authentic 
phenomena like series of successive events (santāna), aggregate 
of qualities in a single object (samudāya), similarity between two 
objects (sādharmya), and birth following death or trans-
migration (pretyabhāva), would become untenable.
larku% leqnk;'p lk/E;± p fujadq'k% A
izsR;Hkko'p rRlo± u L;knsdRofuÉos AA29AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
tks lUrku] leqnk;] lk/E;Z vkSj izsR;Hkko fujadqq'k gSa (fuckZ/&:i ls ekus 
tkrs gSa) mu lc dk Hkh vHkko gks tk;sxkA
,dRo ds vHkko esa (;fn ,dRo dk loZFkk yksi fd;k tk,) 
If oneness (ekatva) is denied absolutely, phenomena like series of 
successive events (santāna) become untenable:
The Buddhists do not accept oneness (ekatva) – they subscribe 
to the doctrine of momentariness (kÈaõikatva) – but believe in 
the four phenomena mentioned in the verse.
The term ‘series of successive events’ (santãna) is used by 
the Buddhist maintainers of momentariness to account for the 
continuity constituting the substance. However, just as the 
tree has no existence without the root, the above mentioned 
four phenomena cannot exist without accepting the reality of 
oneness (ekatva).
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If the knowledge or cognition (j na) be considered absolutely 
different, even in terms of its nature of ‘being’ (sat), from the 
object of knowledge (jðeya) then both, the knowledge (jðāna) 
and the object of knowledge (jðeya) turn out to be ‘non-beings’ 
(asat); the knowledge (jðāna) becomes a ‘non-being’ being 
different from the object of knowledge (jðeya) which is accepted 
to be a ‘being’ (sat), and without the instrument of knowledge 
(jðāna) the object of knowledge (jðeya) too becomes a ‘non-being’ 
(asat). O Lord ! In the absence of knowledge (jðāna) how can the 
existence of any external or internal objects of knowledge (jðeya) 
be proved by those opposed to your views?
ðā
lnkReuk p fHkUua psTKkua Ks;kn~ f}/k¿I;lr~ A
KkukHkkos dFka Ks;a cfgjUr'p rs f}"kke~ AA30AA
lkekU;kFkZ & (loZFkk 
lr~&Lo:i dh vis{kk ls Hkh Ks; ls i`Fkd~ ekuk tk, rks Kku vkSj Ks; nksuksa 
vlr~ gks tk;saxs vFkkZr~ nksuksa dk gh vHkko Bgjrk gSA gs Hkxou~ ! vkils }s"k 
djus okyksa ds ;gk¡ Kku ds vlr~ gksus ij (Kku ds vHkko esa) cfgjax vkSj 
vUrjax fdlh Hkh Ks; dk vfLrRo dSls cu ldrk gS\
i`FkDRoSdkUr dks ekudj &) ;fn Kku dks 
Fault in considering the knowledge (j na) as absolutely different 
from the object of knowledge (jðeya):
ðā
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In the doctrine of others, words can describe only the general 
(s m nya) attributes of a substance and not the specific 
attributes. [In the absence of the specific (viÈeśa) attributes, the 
general (sāmānya) attributes too become nonentity; therefore, 
words, which can describe only the nonentity, too become 
nonentity.] Upon accepting the general (sāmānya) attributes as 
nonentity, all words become false.
ā ā (viśeÈa) 
lkekU;kFkkZ fxjks¿U;s"kka fo'ks"kks ukfHkyI;rs A
lkekU;kHkkorLrs"kka e`"kSo ldyk fxj% AA31AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
(mudh ekU;rkuqlkj) 'kCnksa ds }kjk fo'ks"k dk dFku ugha curk gSA fo'ks"k 
ds vHkko esa lkekU; dk Hkh vfLrRo ugha curk gS vkSj lkekU; ds feF;k 
gksus ls lkekU;&izfriknd leLr opu vlR; gh Bgjrs gSaA
dqN yksxksa ds er esa 'kCn lkekU; dk dFku djrs gSa D;ksafd 
Fault in considering words as capable of describing only the 
general (s m nya) attributes of a substance:ā ā
Just as the two mutually supportive causes, the substantial 
cause (upādāna kartā) and the instrumental cause (nimitta 
kartā), result in the accomplishment of the desired objective, in 
the same way, two kinds of attributes in a substance – general 
(sāmānya) and specific (viśeÈa) – ascertain its particular 
characteristic (naya) depending on what is kept as the primary 
consideration for the moment while keeping the other 
attributes in the background, not negating their existence in 
any way.
All objects have two kinds of qualities – the general 
(sāmānya), and the specific (viśeÈa). The general qualities 
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express the genus (jāti) or the general attributes, and the 
specific qualities describe the constantly changing conditions 
or modes. In a hundred pitchers, the general quality is their 
jar-ness, and the specific quality is their individual size, shape 
or mark.
Dravya refers to a general rule or conformity. That which 
has the dravya as the object is the general standpoint 
(dravyārthika naya). Paryāya means particular, an exception 
or exclusion. That which has the paryāya as the object is the 
standpoint of modifications (paryāyārthika naya). Whatever 
condition or form a substance takes, that condition or form is 
called a mode. Modes partake of the nature of substance, and 
are not found without the substance.
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(Upon realization of the flaws of the two views individually –) 
The enemies of your doctrine of sy dv da can also not maintain 
that the two views – viz. ‘absolute non-dualism’ (advaita-ekānta) 
and ‘absolute separateness’ (pÃthaktva-ekānta) – describe one 
and the same phenomenon; it is impossible since the two views 
are self-contradictory (like ‘the child of a barren woman’). If 
(upon realization of the flaw of this position) they proclaim that 
the phenomenon is absolutely indescribable (avācyataikānta) 
then, having described reality as ‘indescribable’, it becomes 
describable and their stand gets refuted (only a non-reality can 
be said to be indescribable). (Syādvāda characterizes a 
phenomenon as ‘indescribable’ only in the sense of 
inexpressibility of the state of simultaneous affirmation and 
denial of the proposition; the phenomenon is a reality but due to 
the limitation of the language it cannot be expressed.)
ā ā
fojks/kUuksHk;SdkRE;a L;k}knU;k;fof}"kke~ A
vokP;rSdkUrs¿I;qfDrukZokP;fefr ;qT;rs AA32AA
lkekU;kFkZ & (v}Sr&,dkUr vkSj i`FkDRo&,dkUr nksuksa esa vyx&vyx 
nks"k ns[kdj) tks L;k}kn&U;k; ls }s"k j[kus okys gSa muds ;gk¡ v}Sr vkSj 
i`FkDRo nksuksa dk mHk;SdkRE; (,dkUr) ugha cu ldrk gS D;ksafd nksuksa ds 
loZFkk ,dkRE; ekuus esa fojks/&nks"k vkrk gSA vokP;rk (voDrO;rk) 
,dkUr Hkh ugha cu ldrk gS D;kasfd vokP;rSdkUr esa ^ ;g vokP; gS* ,sls 
okD; dk iz;ksx djus ls og okP; gks tkrk gSA
Fault in accepting both, absolute ‘non-dualism’ (advaita-ek nta) 
and absolute ‘separateness’ (pÃthaktva-ekānta), without mutual 
dependence:
ā
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Considered independent of each other, the two views of 
separateness ( ) and non-dualism or oneness (ekatva) 
become fictitious or non-reality. [Separateness (pÃthaktva) 
becomes a non-reality without it being considered in relation to 
non-dualism (ekatva), and non-dualism becomes a non-reality 
without it being considered in relation to separateness 
(pÃthaktva)]. In fact, an object is characterized by oneness as well 
as separateness just as a single reason (sādhana, hetu) is 
characterized by one as well as many attributes.
pÃthaktva
vuis{ks i`FkDRoSD;s áoLrq };gsrqr% A
rnsoSD;a i`FkDRoa p LoHksnS% lk/ua ;Fkk AA33AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
(i`FkDRo voLrq gS ,dRo&fujis{k gksus ij_ ,dRo voLrq gS 
i`FkDRo&fujis{k gksus ij)A ,dRo vkSj i`FkDRo lkis{k&:i esa fojks/ ds u 
gksus ls mlh izdkj oLrq&rÙo dks izkIr gSa tSls fd lk/u (gsrq) ,d gksus ij 
Hkh vius Hksnksa ds }kjk vusd Hkh gSA
ijLij fujis{k i`FkDRo vkSj ,dRo nksuksa gsrq}; ls voLrq gSa 
With mutual dependence, separateness ( ) and non-
dualism or oneness (ekatva), become reality:
pÃthaktva
The reason or middle term (s dhana, hetu) is defined as that 
which cannot exist except in connection with that which is to 
be proved, the major term (sādhya). Thus, it has invariable 
togetherness (avinābhāva) with the major term (sādhya). But 
it has other attributes too. Consider this: “This hill (minor 
term, locus or abode – pakÈa) is full of fire (major term – 
sādhya) because it is full of smoke (middle term or reason – 
sādhana or hetu), as in the kitchen (homogeneous example – 
ā
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s pak a)”. Here smoke (hetu) exists in relation to the hill – 
pakÈa-dharmatva – and it also exists in relation to the kitchen – 
sapakÈa-sattva. Consider another example where the absence 
of the major term (sādhya) is established by the absence of the 
middle term (hetu): “This hill (minor term, locus or abode – 
pakÈa) has no fire (major term – sādhya) because it has no 
smoke (middle term or reason – sādhana or hetu), as in the lake 
(heterogeneous example – vipakÈa)”. Here smoke (hetu) does 
not exist in relation to the lake (vipakÈa-vyāvÃtti).
According to Buddhist logicians, the true hetu should possess 
the following three characteristics:
i) it should be present in the pakÈa,
ii) it should also exist in the sapakÈa, and
iii) it should not be found in the vipakÈa.
The pakÈa has already been explained to mean the sādhya 
and its abode, the dharmī; but sapakÈa is the place where the 
sādhana and sādhya are known to abide in some already 
familiar instance, while vipakÈa embraces all other places 
where the very possibility of the existence of the sādhya is 
counter-indicated.
Illustration:
This hill (pakÈa) is full of fire, because it is full of smoke;
Whatever is full of smoke is full of fire, as a kitchen 
(sapakÈa);
Whatever is not full of fire is also not full of smoke, as a 
pond (vipakÈa).
Excerpted from:
Jain, Champat Rai (1916),
“Nyāya – The Science of Thought”, p. 50.
a È
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With reference to the attribute of universal character of ‘being 
or existence’ (sat, astitva) all substances exhibit oneness or unity 
while with reference to their specific root-substance etc. 
[substance (dravya), place (kÈetra), time (kāla) and 
manifestation (bhāva)] these exhibit separateness or 
distinction; this is just as a specific reason (sādhana, hetu) is one 
when it is employed in entirety and many when its divisions are 
emphasized by the speaker.
lRlkekU;kÙkq loSZD;a i`FkXæO;kfnHksnr% A
HksnkHksnfoo{kk;kelk/kj.kgsrqor~ AA34AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
,d gSa vkSj nzO; vkfn ds Hksn ls vusd (i`Fkd~) gSaA tSls vlk/kj.k gsrq Hksn 
dh foo{kk ls vusd&:i vkSj vHksn dh foo{kk ls ,d&:i gksrk gS] mlh 
izdkj lc inkFkks± esa Hksn dh foo{kk ls i`FkDRo vkSj vHksn dh foo{kk ls 
,dRo lq?kfVr gSA
lr~&vfLrRo esa lekurk gksus dh vis{kk ls lc thokfn inkFkZ 
Flawless establishment of separateness as well as 
non-dualism or oneness (ekatva) in an entity:
(pÃthaktva) 
Reason (s dhana, hetu) is one but 
inference (anumāna) it can be used in two ways: as an agent 
(kāraka – that from which a thing is made, like clay from which 
a pitcher is made), or as a source of knowledge (jðāpaka – that 
which makes a thing known, like smoke leading to the 
knowledge of fire). Reason (hetu) can also be classified as 
exhibiting pakÈa-dharmatva, sapakÈa-sattva or vipakÈa-
vyāvÃtti depending on the intention of the speaker (see 
explanatory note – Verse 33).
ā when employed in an 
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The object of knowledge possesses infinite attributes and the 
speaker expresses a distinguishing attribute while choosing not 
to express other attributes; he does not speak of an attribute 
that is non-existent (like kharavi a - the ‘horns of a hare’, or 
gaganakusuma – the ‘sky-flower’).
Èāõ
foo{kk pkfoo{kk p fo'ks";s¿uUr/£ef.k A
lrks fo'ks"k.kL;k=k uklrLrSLrn£FkfHk% AA35AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
esa fo|eku (lr~) fo'ks"k.k dh gh foo{kk vkSj vfoo{kk djrs gSa] vfo|eku 
(vlr~) dh ughaA ml fo'ks"k.k dk vFkhZ foo{kk djrk gS vkSj vuFkhZ 
vfoo{kkA loZFkk vlr~ rks x/s ds lhax ([kjfo"kk.k) ;k xxudqlqe ds 
leku vFkZ&fØ;k ls 'kwU;] voLrq gksrk gSA
foo{kk vkSj vfoo{kk djus okys O;fDr vuUr /eZ okyh oLrq 
Only the ‘existent’ (sat) forms the subject of expression or
no-expression:
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Being objects of valid knowledge (pram a) both, unity (abheda, 
ekatva, advaita) and diversity (bheda, pÃthaktva), in a single 
substance are real, and not imaginary. Depending on the 
speaker’s intention, these become primary or secondary, 
without there being any conflict in their coexistence in the same 
substance.
āõ
izek.kxkspjkS lUrkS HksnkHksnkS u lao`rh A
rkosd=kk¿fo#¼kS rs xq.keq[;foo{k;k AA36AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
v}Sr) nksuksa izek.k ds fo"k; gksus ls okLrfod (ijekFkZHkwr) gSa] lao`fr ds 
fo"k; (dkYifud vFkok mipkjek=k) ughaA ;s nksuksa xkS.k vkSj iz/ku dh 
foo{kk dks fy, ,d gh oLrq esa vfojks/ :Ik ls jgrs gSaA
gs Hkxou~ ! vkids er esa Hksn (i`FkDRo) vkSj vHksn (,dRo] 
Both can 
coexist in a single substance:
unity (abheda, ekatva) and diversity (bheda, pÃthaktva) 
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If the objects of knowledge are supposed to be absolutely 
permanent (nityatva-ek nta) then there cannot be any 
modifications in them; when already there is the absence of the 
agent (kāraka) for a modification how can one have the 
possibility of a valid source of knowledge (pramāõa) and its fruit 
(pramāõa-phala i.e., correct notion – pramiti)?
ā
fuR;RoSdkUri{ks¿fi fofØ;k uksii|rs A
izkxso dkjdkHkko% Do izek.ka Do rRiQye~ AA37AA
lkekU;kFkZ & (;fn ;g ekuk tk, fd inkFkZ loZFkk fuR; gS rks &) 
fuR;RoSdkUr i{k esa fofØ;k dh mRifÙk ugha gks ldrh gSA tc igys gh 
dkjd dk vHkko gS (voLFkk u cnys rks dkjdksa dk ln~Hkko curk gh ugha 
gS) rc izek.k vkSj izek.k dk iQy (izfefr) ;s nksuksa dgk¡ cu ldrs gSa\
Fault in accepting the objects of knowledge as absolutely 
permanent (nityatva-ek nta):ā
r`rh; ifjPNsn
Section 3
Only an object which has general (s m nya – dravya) as well as 
particular (viśeÈa – paryāya) attributes can be the subject of 
knowledge. The general (dravya) without its modification 
(paryāya) and modification (paryāya) without its general 
(dravya) cannot be the subject of valid knowledge; only their 
combination can be the subject of valid knowledge. 
The conception of pramā or valid knowledge implies three 
ā ā
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necessary factors, namely the subject of knowledge (pram t ), 
the object of knowledge (prameya) and the method of 
knowledge (pramāõa).
The subject (pramātā) and the object (prameya) are strictly 
correlative factors involved in all knowledge. They are 
distinguishable, no doubt, as the knower and the known, but 
not separable in any act of knowledge. 
All true knowledge must be connected with some method of 
knowledge. In Western philosophy it is customary to analyze 
the knowledge-relation into the three factors of subject, object 
and process of knowledge. These correspond respectively to 
pramātā, prameya and pramā in Indian philosophy.
What is the fruit of pramāõa – pramāõa-phala or pramiti? 
The aim of pramāõa is to make the object of knowledge clear. It 
is to illuminate the object. Most importantly, pramāõa removes 
ignorance and enables one to make distinction between what is 
true and what is false and between what needs to be accepted 
and what needs to be discarded. The Omniscient, however, who 
enjoys infinite knowledge and bliss, has complete detachment 
for the worldly objects of knowledge.
ā ā
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[It is held (by the S khya system) that although unmanifest 
(avyakta) causes (k ra a) – source of knowledge and 
agent (kāraka) – are absolutely permanent but the manifest 
(vyakta) effects (kārya) – like the Great or Intellect (Mahat or 
Buddhi) and its consequence the I-ness or Ego (AhaÚkāra) – are 
non-permanent and, therefore, transformation is possible –] It is 
held that just as sense-organs reveal an object, manifest (vyakta) 
objects are revealed by the source of knowledge (pramāõa) and 
the agent (kāraka). But when both, the source of knowledge 
(pramāõa) and the agent (kāraka), considered absolutely 
permanent, are employed to make a non-manifest (avyakta) into 
a manifest (vyakta), what kind of modification could be 
predicated? O Lord ! There is no possibility of any modification 
taking place outside your doctrine of manifold points of view.
Note: In absolute permanence, manifestation of any kind is not 
possible; there must be some change of mode to warrant 
manifestation.
āÚ
ā õ (pramāõa) 
izek.kdkjdSO;ZDra O;Dra psfnfUæ;kFkZor~ A
rs p fuR;s fodk;± ¯d lk/ksLrs 'kklukn~cfg% AA38AA
lkekU;kFkZ & (lka[;er okfn;ksa ds er esa &) 
vfHkO;Dr gksrk gS mlh izdkj ;fn izek.k vkSj dkjdksa ds }kjk vO;Dr dks 
O;Dr gqvk cryk;k tkrk gS] vkSj tc izek.k vkSj dkjd nksuksa fuR; ekus x, 
gSa rc muds }kjk fofØ;k dSls cu ldrh gS\ vkids vusdkUr 'kklu ls 
ckgj (fuR;Ro ds ,dkUr 'kklu esa) dksbZ Hkh fofØ;k ughsa gks ldrh gSA
tSls fd bfUnz;ksa ds }kjk vFkZ 
No modification is possible if the source of knowledge (pram a) 
and the agent (kāraka) are considered absolutely permanent:
āõ
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The main tenets of the 
1. Dualism of (a) entirely inactive Spirit (PuruÈa) or 
Intelligence (Cit) and (b) a material, non-intelligent 
nature (PrakÃti) of triple constitution, from which 
emerges, and into which is dissolved, the entire universe 
of things experienced.
2. An evolution of PrakÃti in the presence of Spirit by 
stages of which the first is an instrument of determinate 
awareness (Buddhi, Reason), and the second a 
simultaneous origination of Egoity (AhaÚkāra, principle 
of individuality) and of Sense-faculties. Thence come the 
essences of the Five Elements and through their 
composition the gross material elements and the general 
physical universe.
3. An unreal connection of Spirit and PrakÃti and its 
evolutes in consequence of a failure on the part of Spirit 
to realize his actual detachment and of a false semblance 
of intelligence in the mechanism of PrakÃti through 
reflection from the light of Spirit.
4. Liberation of Spirit from the unreal connection and 
bondage when, having seen the work of PrakÃti through 
1and through, he realizes his own absolute aloofness.
The Reals (tattvas) are 25 as follows: the unmanifested 
(avyakta, PrakÃti in its unevolved quiescence); and the 
manifested (vyakta) – 24-fold by reason of the distinction of the 
‘great principle’ (Mahat, Buddhi), ego (AhaÚkāra), the 5 pure 
principles (śabda, sparśa, rūpa, rasa, gandha), the 11 sense-
organs including mind, the 5 gross elements (ākāśa, vāyu, teja, 
jala, pÃthvī), and the Spirit of the form of intelligence.
SāÚkhya system are:
1. See Thomas, F.W. (1968), “The Flower-Spray of the Quodammodo 
Doctrine – Śrī MalliÈeõa Surī’s Syādvāda-Maôjarī”, p. 93-94.
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In the  system, it is the function of the intellect 
(buddhiv tti) that is regarded as or the specific cause 
of true knowledge. The self knows an object through a mental 
modification that corresponds to the impression produced in 
the sense-organ by the object in question. The object having 
impressed its form on the sense organ, the mind presents it to 
the self through a corresponding modification of itself. Hence 
the mental function is pramāõa or the source of our knowledge 
of the object.
I or Ego (AhaÚkāra), which is the ground of our personal 
identity, merely means further modification of the subtle 
Buddhi which itself is a modification of acetana PrakÃti.
PrakÃti is otherwise called avyakta or the unmanifest or 
Pradhāna or the primary basis of existence.
The intelligent PuruÈa is inactive by nature and hence is 
incapable of being the architect of his own destiny. Acetana – 
the unenlightened – PrakÃti has all activity and force in itself 
and is quite blind by nature. The PuruÈa is intelligent but inert 
and PrakÃti is all activity but blind. The union of the two – the 
1blind and the cripple – leads to living.
Human volition and consequent human conduct are said to 
be the effects of acetana PrakÃti; virtue and vice are alien to the 
PuruÈa. These are associated with the non-spiritual PrakÃti 
and hence these do not affect the soul and yet with a strange 
inconsistency it is the fate of PuruÈa to enjoy the fruits – 
pleasurable and painful – of the karmas directly and 
immediately due to the activity of PrakÃti. Why it is the fate of 
PuruÈa that he should vicariously suffer the consequences of 
an alien being in life is entirely unexplained. 
As per the SāÚkhya ontology, PuruÈa being ever free can 
SāÚkhya
Ã pramāõa 
1. See Prof. A. Chakravarti (2008), “Ācārya Kundakunda’s 
Samayasāra”, Introduction, p. 106.
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1. See Upadhye A.N. (1935), “Śrī Kundakundācārya’s Pravacanasāra – 
A Pro-canonical Text of the Jainas”, Introduction, p. XLVIII.
never be bound; it is the that is bound and liberated. 
The question can be raised, if there is no bondage why talk of 
liberation; and if there is no real connection between PuruÈa 
and PrakÃti, how the false conception of such connection can 
rise? It is these points such as PrakÃti does everything and 
PuruÈa is neutral without doing anything, that are attacked. 
The Jaina position is that the soul or spirit is the agent of 
various bh va or psychic states whereby there is the influx of 
karmas leading to further bondage; when the karmas are 
destroyed, with their causes rooted out and the existing stock 
evaporated, the soul attains its natural purity constituted of 
1eternal bliss and omniscience.
PrakÃti 
ā
72
ĀptamīmāÚsā
If the effect (k rya) be considered as having eternal existence 
(sat), like the intelligent PuruÈa of the SāÚkhya philosophy, it 
cannot be a produced entity. And to imagine the process of 
transformation in an entity which cannot be produced goes 
against the doctrine of ‘eternal existence’.
ā
;fn lRloZFkk dk;± iqaoUuksRiÙkqegZfr A
ifj.kkeizDy`fIr'p fuR;RoSdkUrckf/uh AA39AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
mldh mRifÙk ugha gks ldrh gSA vkSj mRifÙk u ekudj dk;Z esa ifj.kke dh 
dYiuk djuk fuR;RoSdkUr dh ck/d gSA
;fn dk;Z dks loZFkk lr~ ekuk tk, rks pSrU; iq#"k ds leku 
When the effect (k rya) has eternal existence (sat), the idea of a 
produced entity is untenable:
ā
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O Lord ! Those who do not accept the superiority of your 
leadership and believe in absolute permanence of objects are 
incapable of explaining the phenomena of acts involving merit 
(pu ya) and demerit (p pa), of birth following death 
(pretyabhāva), of fruits of activities (phala), of bondage 
(bandha), and liberation (mokÈa).
õ ā
iq.;ikifØ;k u L;kr~ izsR;Hkko% iQya dqr% A
cU/eks{kkS p rs"kka u ;s"kka Roa ukfl uk;d% AA40AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
fuR;RoSdkUr&okfn;ksa ds er esa iq.;&iki dh fØ;k ugha curh gS] vkSj 
(fØ;k ds vHkko esa) izsR;Hkko (ijyksd&xeu)] lq[k&nq%[k&:i fØ;k dk 
iQy] cU/ rFkk eks{k Hkh ugha curs gSaA
gs Hkxou~ ! ftuds vki uk;d ugha gS] mu 
Phenomena involving merit (pu ya) and demerit (p pa) etc. 
cannot be explained in the doctrine of absolute permanence 
(nityatva-ekānta):
õ ā
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(On the other hand –) When viewed from the point of view of 
‘absolute momentariness’ (kÈaõika-ekānta) then also it is 
impossible to explain phenomena like birth following death 
(pretyabhāva). [Since the soul, according to this view, is 
characterized by momentariness, therefore, memory (smÃti) and 
recognition (pratyabhijðāna) etc. are not possible.] In the 
absence of the sources of knowledge, like recognition 
(pratyabhijðāna), the production of an effect (kārya) is not 
possible and consequently how can the fruit (phala) of that effect 
be imagined?
{kf.kdSdkUri{ks¿fi izsR;Hkkok|laHko% A
izR;fHkKk|HkkokUu dk;kZjEHk% dqr% iQye~ AA41AA
lkekU;kFkZ & (
}kjk izfrikfnr vfuR;Ro&:i ,dkUr) dk i{k fy;k tk, rks mlesa Hkh 
izsR;Hkkokfnd laHko ugha gSaA izR;fHkKkukfn tSls Kkuksa dk vHkko gksus ls dk;Z 
dk vkjEHk laHko ugha gS vkSj tc dk;Z dk vkjEHk gh ugha rc mldk iQy 
dSls laHko gks ldrk gS\
fuR;RoSdkUr esa nks"k dks tkudj) ;fn {kf.kdSdkUr (ckS¼ksa 
Fault in the doctrine of ‘absolute momentariness’ (k a ika-
ekānta):
È õ
The Buddhists hold the self to be merely a succession of 
moments of awareness; and not like a single thread running 
through a collection of pearl drops, one permeating them all. 
On their view the moment of cognition whereby the carrying 
out of good or carrying out of evil has been effected, has not, 
because it perishes without residue, the enjoyment of the fruit 
thereof; and that which has the enjoyment of the fruit was not 
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the doer of that deed. Thus on the part of the former moment of 
cognition there is ‘loss of deed’, because it does not experience 
the fruit of the deed done by itself, and on the part of the latter 
moment of cognition there is ‘enjoyment of a deed not done’, 
because of enjoyment of fruit of deed not done by itself, but by 
1another.
In regard to an object experienced by a prior awareness, a 
memory on the part of later awareness is not possible because 
they are other than it; like awareness on the part of another 
series. For a thing seen by one is not remembered by another; 
otherwise a thing seen by one person would be remembered by 
all. And, if there is no recollection, whence in the world comes 
the begetting of recognition? Recognition (pratyabhijðāna) 
arises from both recollection and (original) experience; it is the 
valid cognition that we get through the synthesis of pratyakÈa 
and smaraõa (memory). For the maintainers of momentary 
destruction, memory does not fit in.
1. See Thomas, F.W. (1968), “The Flower-Spray of the Quodammodo 
Doctrine – Śrī MalliÈeõa Surī’s Syādvāda-Maôjarī”, p. 119.
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If the effect (k rya) be considered absolutely non-existent (asat) 
then it can never be produced just as it is an impossibility to 
produce the ‘sky-flower’ (ākāśapuÈpa or gaganakusuma). If 
production of the non-existent (asat) be accepted, the rule of the 
availability of a substantial cause (upādāna kartā) for the 
accomplishment of an effect (kārya) cannot be applied with 
confidence.
ā
;|lRloZFkk dk;± rUektfu [kiq"ior~ A
eksiknkufu;keks¿HkwUek¿¿'okl% dk;ZtUefu AA42AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
mldh mRifÙk ugha gks ldrhA ;fn vlr~ dk Hkh mRikn ekuk tk, rks dk;Z 
dh mRifÙk esa miknku dkj.k dk dksbZ fu;e ughsa jgrk vkSj u gh dksbZ 
fo'okl cuk jg ldrk gSA
;fn dk;Z dks loZFkk vlr~ ekuk tk, rks vkdk'kiq"i dh rjg 
When the effect (k rya) is considered absolutely non-existent 
(asat), the idea of a produced entity is untenable:
ā
Kundakunda, following the tradition of Jaina metaphysics, 
speaks of two different causes, up d na k ra a and nimitta 
kāraõa – material cause and instrumental cause. For example, 
clay is the material out of which the jar is made. In this case the 
material out of which the thing is made is the upādāna kāraõa. 
For transforming the clay into the jar you require the 
operating agent, the potter, the potter’s wheel on which the 
clay is moulded, and the stick with which he turns the wheel 
and so on. All these come under the nimitta kāraõa or the 
instrumental cause. This distinction is considered very 
important in Jaina metaphysics. The upādāna kāraõa or the 
ā ā ā õ
7
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material cause must be identical with its effect. There can be 
no difference in nature and attributes between the material 
cause and its effect. From clay we can only obtain a mud-pot. 
1Out of gold you can only obtain a gold ornament.
The relation between the material cause and its effect is 
that wherever the cause is present the effect would be present, 
and wherever the effect would be present the cause must have 
been present. Again, negatively, if the cause is absent the effect 
must also be absent and conversely if the effect is absent the 
cause must also be absent.
1. See Prof. A. Chakravarti (2008), “Ācārya Kundakunda’s 
Samayasāra”, Introduction, p. 171.
Ācārya Samantabhadra’s Svayambhūstotra:
ckásrjksikf/lexzrs;a dk;sZ"kq rs æO;xr% LoHkko% A
uSokU;Fkk eks{kfof/'p iqalka rsukfHkoU|LRoe`f"kcqZ/kuke~ AA
(12-5-60)
ā
ā ā
Jain, Vijay K. (2015),
“Ācārya Samantabhadra’s Svayambhūstotra”, p. 83-84.
The accomplishment of a task (k rya – the making of a 
pitcher, for example) depends on the simultaneous 
availability of the internal (up d na – substantial) and the 
external (nimitta – auxiliary) causes; such is the nature of 
the substance (dravya)*. In no other way can liberation be 
achieved and, therefore, the learned men worship you, O 
Adept Sage!
*To give a familiar example, when a potter proceeds with the 
task (kārya) of making a pitcher out of clay, the potter is 
the external or instrumental cause (nimitta kartā) and 
the clay is the internal or substantial cause (upādāna 
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kartā). The task necessarily means the destruction of clay 
in its original form but the inherent qualities of clay still 
remain in the pitcher. There is the origination (utpāda) of 
the new form of clay, the disappearance (vyaya) of its old 
form, and still the existence (being or sat) of the 
substance itself continues (dhrauvya). In other words, 
existence is accompanied by origination (utpāda), 
disappearance (vyaya), and permanence (dhrauvya). As 
there is no destruction of the inherent nature of clay, it is 
lasting. Permanence is the existence of the past nature in 
the present. From a particular point of view, the 
indestructibility of the essential nature of the substance is 
determined as its permanence. Qualities reside 
permanently in the substance but the modes change. 
Modes like the pitcher are not permanently associated 
with clay but the qualities reside permanently. So, utpāda, 
vyaya and dhrauvya cannot be said to be non-existent like 
‘a flower in the sky’.
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In the doctrine of ‘absolute momentariness’ a 
logical connection (agreement in association – anvaya) between 
two entities cannot be established and, therefore, relationship of 
cause (kāraõa) and effect (kārya) – hetu-phala-bhāva etc. – is not 
possible. The cause remains utterly distinct from the effect as 
there is no commonality between entities belonging to different 
series of successive events (santāna). Moreover, (if each event is 
really momentary and perishes utterly, as the Buddhists assert) 
there is no existence of a ‘series’ apart from the individual 
elements that are believed to constitute the series.
(kÈaõika-ekānta) 
u gsrqiQyHkkokfnjU;HkkoknuUo;kr~ A
lUrkukUrjoUuSd% larkuLr}r% i`Fkd~ AA43AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
gsrqHkko o iQyHkko vkfn ugha cu ldrs gSa D;ksafd mu iwoksZÙkj&{k.kksa esa 
lUrkukUrj ds leku loZFkk i`Fkd~ (vU;Hkko) gksrk gSA lUrkfu;ksa ls i`Fkd~ 
dksbZ ,d lUrku Hkh ugha gksrk gSA
{kf.kdSdkUr esa loZFkk vUo; ds vHkko esa iwoksZÙkj&{k.kksa ds 
Relationship of cause (k ra a) and effect (k rya) is not possible 
in the doctrine of ‘absolute momentariness’ (kÈaõika-ekānta): 
ā õ ā
The Buddhists assert that a n
ideas (sant na), impressed each by the former, gives man the 
semblances which we regard in ordinary life as the outer world 
and the soul.
If each idea is really momentary, and perishes utterly, how 
can it affect the subsequent idea, contemporaneity of ideas 
being negated by the Buddhist theory?
ever-ceasing series of momentary 
ā
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(If each successive event is really momentary, and perishes 
utterly, as the Buddhists assert –) To use the word sant na or 
‘series’ – implying unity – for successive momentary events 
which have no unity among themselves can only be fictional  
(saÚvÃti) and, therefore, is the word not misleading? The real 
meaning of a word can never be called fictional and there cannot 
be an occasion for fiction unless the word has a real meaning.
ā
vU;s"ouU;'kCnks¿;a lao`fruZ e`"kk dFke~ A
eq[;kFkZ% lao`fruZ L;kn~ fouk eq[;kUu lao`fr% AA44AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
'kCn (lUrku) dk tks O;ogkj gS og lao`fr (dkYifud] vkSipkfjd) gS rks 
loZFkk lao`fr gksus ls og 'kCn feF;k D;ksa ugha gS\ ;fn 'kCn (lUrku) dks 
eq[; vFkZ ds :i esa ekuk tk, rks eq[; vFkZ loZFkk lao`fr&:i ugha gksrk gS 
vkSj eq[; vFkZ ds fcuk lao`fr ugha gksrh gSA
(ckS¼ksa }kjk ;fn dgk tk, &) i`Fkd~&i`Fkd~ {k.kksa esa vUkU; 
Using fiction without associated real meaning leads to deception:
According to the Buddhists concept of sant na (lit. 
child, meaning ‘series’ of successive events) no permanent 
parts exist in an entity which are carried forward as unchanged 
from one momentary mode to the next. Santāna, at any 
particular moment, is the material cause of the entity’s mode 
the next moment and not of any other object of same or 
different class.
ā offspring or 
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Verse 44
(The Buddhists argue –) Since it is not possible to give verbal 
1expression to the fourfold causal relations  (catu ko ivikalpa) 
that can exist between the characteristic and the entity, 
similarly we can also not describe whether a series of successive 
events (santāna) is one with its members or different from them 
(or both, or neither); it is indescribable. (See next verse.)
È Ç
prq"dksVs£odYiL; lokZUrs"kwDR;;ksxr% A
rÙokU;RoeokP;a psÙk;ks% lUrkur}rks% AA45AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
pkj izdkj dk fodYi (prq"dksfVfodYi) ugha gks ldrk gS] vr% mu 
lUrku vkSj lUrkuh dk Hkh rÙo&/eZ (,dRo&vHksn vkSj vU;Ro&Hksn) 
vokP; Bgjrk gSA (vxyh dkfjdk ns[ksaA)
(ckS¼ksa dh vksj ls ;fn dgk tk, &) lÙo vkfn lc /eks± esa 
The Buddhists argument that it is not possible to give verbal 
expression to the relation between a ‘series’ and its members:
1. (a) this characteristic belongs to this entity; (b) this characteristic 
does not belong to this entity; (c) this characteristic both belongs 
and does not belong to this entity; (d) this characteristic neither 
belongs nor does not belong to this entity.
The Buddhists say that there is one thing only, the cognition, 
but as the result of impressions left by previous cognition there 
appears the distinction of cognizer, cognized, and cognition, in 
place of the unity. Each idea is momentary, but it can and does 
impress its successor; there is no substantial reality like the 
soul but a never-ceasing series of momentary ideas, each 
impressed by the former, gives man the semblances which we 
regard in ordinary life as the outer world and the soul.
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(The reply is –) It cannot be said that the fourfold causal relation 
(catuÈkoÇivikalpa) is indescribable. (Firstly, just by uttering 
these words it somehow becomes describable, and secondly, 
cognition by others of the fourfold causal relation has been made 
possible through description only.) Moreover, an entity devoid of 
all characteristics will be a nonentity like the ‘sky-flower’ since 
it will neither have qualifying attributes (vi eÈaõa) nor the 
substance to be qualified (viśeÈya).
ś
voDrO;prq"dksfVfodYiks¿fi u dF;rke~ A
vlokZUreOkLrq L;knfo'ks";fo'ks"k.ke~ AA46AA
lkekU;kFkZ & rc rks (
izdkj ds fodYi) dks voDrO; Hkh ugha dguk pkfg, (loZFkk voDrO; 
dk i{k ysus ij ^ prq"dksfVfodYi voDrO; gS* ;g dguk Hkh ugha curk 
gS)A tks vlokZUr (loZ&/eZ jfgr) gS og voLrq (vkdk'k&iq"i ds leku) 
gS D;ksafd mlesa fo'ks";&fo'ks"k.k&Hkko ugha curk gSA
ckS¼ksa dks) prq"dksfVfodYi (oLrq esa lr~ vkfn pkj 
Fault in the Buddhist argument:
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Verse 46
Only a named (sa j ), existing entity (sat) can be subjected to 
negation (niÈedha) with regard to attributes  like the root-
substance. A nonentity (asat – a non existing substance) cannot 
be subjected to either affirmation (vidhi) or negation (niÈedha).
Ú ðī
1
æO;k|UrjHkkosu fu"ks/% lafKu% lr% A
vln~Hksnks u HkkoLrq LFkkua fof/fu"ks/;ks% AA47AA
lkekU;kFkZ & tks 
(ij&æO;] ij&{ks=k] ij&dky] ij&Hkko) dh vis{kk ls fu"ks/ fd;k tkrk 
gSA tks loZFkk vlr~ (vfo|eku) gS og fof/ vkSj fu"ks/ dk fo"k; gh ugha 
gksrk gSA
laKh lr~ (fo|eku) gksrk gS mlh dk ij&æO; vkfn 
Negation (ni edha), in regard to some attribute, can only be of an 
existing entity (sat) and not of a nonentity (asat): 
È
Ācārya Samantabhadra’s Svayambhūstotra:
lr% dFkf×pÙknlÙo'kfÙkQ% [ks ukfLr iq"ia r#"kq izfl¼e~ A
loZLoHkkoP;qreizek.ka LookfXOk#¼a ro n`f"Vrks¿U;r~ AA
(5-3-23)
The nature of reality (sat) involves two logical predications 
– one affirmative (asti) and the other negative (nāsti); like a 
flower exists in the tree and does not exist in the sky. If 
reality be accepted without any of these two predications 
(asti and nāsti), nothing can exist logically and will lose 
validity. O Lord Sumatinātha, the assertions of all others 
1. The attributes are (a) root-substance (dravya); (b) space of its 
existence (kÈetra); (c) time of its existence (kāla); and (d) its nature 
(bhāva).
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not following your doctrine are self-contradictory.
Jain, Vijay K. (2015),
“Ācārya Samantabhadra’s Svayambhūstotra”, p. 31-33.
Jaina logicians describe every fact of reality according to four 
different aspects: its substance (dravya), space of its existence 
(kÈetra), time of its existence (kāla), and its nature (bhāva). 
Every object admits of a fourfold affirmative predication 
(svacatuÈÇaya) with reference to its own substance 
(svadravya), own space (svakÈetra), own time (svakāla), and 
own nature (svabhāva). Simultaneously a fourfold negative 
predication is implied with reference to other substance 
(paradravya), other space (parakÈetra), other time (parakāla), 
and other nature (parabhāva). The substance of an object not 
only implies its svadravya but differentiates it from 
paradravya. It becomes logically necessary to locate a negation 
for every affirmation and vice-versa. We must not only perceive 
a thing but also perceive it as distinct from other things. 
Without this distinction there cannot be true and clear percep-
tion of an object. When the soul, on the availability of suitable 
means, admits of the fourfold affirmation with respect to 
svadravya, svakÈetra, svakāla, and svabhāva, it also admits of 
the fourfold negation with respect to paradravya, parakÈetra, 
parakāla, and parabhāva.
Excerpted from:
Jain, Vijay K. (2014), “Acārya Pujyapāda’s IÈÇopadeśa –
The Golden Discourse”, p. 6.
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Verse 47
(As posited by the Buddhists –) Something that is devoid of all 
characteristics is a nonentity (being not discernible through any 
method of knowledge – pram a) and being a nonentity that 
something is indescribable. (But we posit –) Only a real entity is 
called a nonentity (somehow, in some respect) when the process 
of reasoning (of attributing characteristics to it) is reversed.
āõ
voLRoufHkykI;a L;kr~ lokZUrS% ifjo£tre~ A
oLRosokoLrqrka ;kfr izfØ;k;k foi;Z;kr~ AA48AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
fo"k; ugha gksus ds dkj.k)] vkSj tks voLrq gS og gh (loZFkk) vufHkykI; 
(vokP;) gksrh gSA oLrq izfØ;k ds foi;Z; ls (foijhr gks tkus ij & 
ij&æO; vkfn dh vis{kk ls) voLrqrk dks izkIr gks tkrh gSA
tks loZ&/eks± ls jfgr gS og voLrq gS (fdlh Hkh izek.k dk 
Yes, a nonentity (asat) is indescribable, but only an entity (sat) 
becomes a nonentity (asat), in some respect, depending on the 
process of reasoning:
The empiricist Buddhist refuses to call a ‘series’ a real entity in 
the sense in which he calls the members of this series real 
entities but that he at the same time refuses to dismiss a 
‘series’ as an illusory appearance.
Ā īmāÚ ā
p. 51.
Shah, Nagin J. (1999), “Samantabhadra’s ptam s  – 
Critique of an Authority”, 
86
ĀptamīmāÚsā
If all characteristics of an entity are indescribable (as proclaimed 
by the Buddhists) then why make these a subject of articulation 
(in discourses, to corroborate and contradict viewpoints)? If it be 
accepted that this kind of articulation is fictional (saÚvÃti) – 
mere usage – then it is opposed to reality.
lokZUrk'psnoDrO;kLrs"kka ¯d opua iqu% A
lao`fr'psUe`"kSoS"kk ijekFkZfoi;Z;kr~ AA49AA
lkekU;kFkZ & (
loZ /eZ voDrO; gSa rks mudk dFku (/eZ&ns'kuk vkfn ds fy,) D;ksa 
fd;k tkrk gS\ ;fn mudk dFku lao`fr&:i (dsoy O;ogkj ds fy,) gS 
rks ijekFkZ ls foijhr gksus ds dkj.k og feF;k gh gSA
{kf.kdSdkUr&oknh ckS¼ksa ds vuqlkj) ;fn ;g dgk tk, fd 
If all characteristics of an entity are indescribable then do not 
make these a subject of articulation:
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Verse 49
To the question as to why reality is pronounced as 
‘indescribable’ the possible answers are (a) due to lack of 
strength, (b) due to its non-existence, and (c) due to lack of 
knowledge. The first and the third options cannot be accepted by 
the proponents of ‘indescribability’ (as this would mean 
inadequacy on their part). Then why pretend (and not concede 
that as per your assertion reality is ‘indescribable’ because it 
does not exist; it amounts to nihilism – s nyav da)? Speak 
clearly.
ū ā
v'kD;RoknokP;a fdeHkkokfRdecks/r% A
vk|UrksfDr};a u L;kr~ ¯d O;ktsuksP;rka LiQqVe~ AA50AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
D;ksa gS\ D;k v'kD; (dFku djus dh vleFkZrk) gksus ls vokP; gS] ;k 
vHkko (vfLrRo&foghu) gksus ls vokP; gS] ;k vki esa Kku u gksus ls 
vokP; gS\ igyk vkSj vUr ds fodYi rks curs ugha gSa (vki dks Lohdkj 
ughsa gks ldrs gSa)A ;fn vHkko gksus ls oLrq&rÙo vokP; gS rks cgkus cukus 
ls D;k ykHk\ Li"V dfg, fd oLrq&rÙo dk loZFkk vHkko gSA
(;fn {kf.kdSdkUr&oknh ckS¼ksa ls iwNk tk, &) rÙo vokP; 
The use of the term ‘indescribable’ by our rivals amounts to ‘non-
existence’ of reality:
8
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(The Buddhists’ assertion that the never-ceasing series of 
momentary ideas, each impressed by the former, gives man the 
semblances which we regard in ordinary life as the outer world 
and the soul, amounts to –) The mind that had not intended to 
injure, injures; the mind that had intended to injure, does not 
injure; and the mind that had neither intended to injure nor 
injured, suffers bondage. Moreover (since the existence of the 
last mentioned mind is also momentary), the mind that had 
suffered bondage does not get rid of bondage. (To whom, then, 
belongs liberation? The term liberation is a synonym for 
‘severance of bonds’ and liberation can take place only of the 
person who was bound, while on the contention of momentary 
extinction, one moment a person is bound, and the liberation 
belongs to another moment; there, therefore, results a negation 
of liberation.)
fgUkLR;ufHkla/kr` u fguLR;fHklaf/er~ A
cè;rs rn~};kisra fpÙka c¼a u eqP;rs AA51AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
ds fujUo; fouk'k dk fl¼kUr ekuk tk, &) ¯glk djus dk ftl fpÙk dk 
vfHkizk; ugha gS og ¯glk djrk gS] ftl fpÙk dk ¯glk djus dk vfHkizk; gS 
og ¯glk ugha djrk gSA ftl fpÙk us ¯glk djus dk dksbZ vfHkizk; ugha 
fd;k vkSj u ¯glk gh dh og fpÙk cU/u dks izkIr gksrk gSA vkSj ftl fpÙk 
dk cU/u gqvk mldh eqfDr ugha gksrh gS] fiQj eqfDr fdldh gksrh gS\
(;fn {kf.kdSdkUr&oknh ckS¼ksa ds {k.k&{k.k esa izR;sd inkFkZ 
Incongruence in the doctrine of ‘absolute momentariness’ 
(k a ika-ek nta):È õ ā
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Verse 51
(In view of your assertion that destruction takes place on its 
own, without any cause –) When there is no cause for destruction 
then the person alleged to have injured someone cannot be the 
cause of injury. In the same light, the eightfold path 
1(a gahetuka)  to liberation (mok a), in the form of 
destruction of the series of mental states, cannot be the cause of 
liberation (mokÈa).
ÈÇāô È
vgsrqdRokÂk'kL; ¯glkgsrquZ ¯gld% A
fpÙklUrfruk'k'p eks{kks uk"VkÄgsrqd% AA52AAõ
lkekU;kFkZ & 
Lo;a gksrk gS &) fouk'k ds vgsrqd gksus ls ¯glk djus okyk ¯gld ugha 
Bgjrk gSA blh izdkj fpÙk&lUrfr ds fouk'k&:i tks eks{k ekuk x;k gS og 
Hkh v"VkÄgsrqd ugha gks ldrk gSA (ckS¼&er esa eks{k dks fpÙk&lUrfr dk õ
uk'k&:i ekuk x;k gSA eks{k ds vkB vax Hkh o£.kr gSa & lE;Xn`f"V] lE;d~ 
ladYi] lE;d~ okp~] lE;d~ deZu~] lE;d~ vkthou] lE;d~ O;k;ke] 
lE;d~ Le`fr rFkk lE;d~ lekf/A)
({kf.kdSdkUr&oknh ckS¼ksa ds vuqlkj fouk'k fcuk dkj.k ds 
Fault in asserting that destruction takes place on its own, without 
any cause:
1. Noble Eightfold Path consists of a set of eight 
interconnected factors or conditions, that when developed together, 
lead to the cessation of suffering (dukkha): Right View (samyag 
dÃÈÇi), Right Intention (samyag saÚkalpa), Right Speech (
vāc), Right Action (samyag karman), Right Livelihood (samyag 
ājīvana), Right Effort (samyag vyāyāma), Right Mindfulness 
(samyag smÃti), and Right Concentration (samyag samādhi).
Buddha’s 
samyag 
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The Buddhists say that a
Consciousness alone is the established truth. All the three 
worlds are the result of discrimination or thought-relations. 
No external object exists in reality. All that is, is consciousness. 
Liberation (mok a) is origination of a cognition purified from 
the inundation of the forms of objects which have passed away 
1upon the annihilation of all suffusions (vāsanā) . And that 
does not fit since simply from the absence of the cause, the 
attainment of liberation (mokÈa) is unaccountable.
ll, except consciousness, is unreal. 
È
2
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Verse 52
1. ‘vāsanā’, which in common language signifies imparting of a scent, 
is much discussed in Buddhist writings; it denotes a factor in a 
thought due to prior experience or activity, a bias.
2. See Thomas, F.W. (1968), “The Flower-Spray of the Quodammodo 
Doctrine – Śrī MalliÈeõa Surī’s Syādvāda-Maôjarī”, p. 120.
If a cause is required to bring into existence a dissimilar effect 
(that is, an effect that is different from the preceding moment) 
then that cause should be responsible for both – bringing into 
existence of a new effect and destruction of the effect that 
existed at the preceding moment. Therefore, for entities that are 
internally connected, the cause of both effects, destruction and 
origination, is one and the same.
fo:idk;kZjEHkk; ;fn gsrqlekxe% A
vkJf;H;keuU;ks¿lkofo'ks"kkn;qDror~ AA53AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
og fouk'k dk dkj.k ugha gS vfirq mlls dsoy foln`'k&dk;Z dh mRifÙk 
gksrh gS &) ;fn foln`'k inkFkZ dh mRifÙk ds fy, gsrq dk lekxe b"V 
fd;k tkrk gS rks og uk'k vkSj mRikn nksuksa dk dkj.k gksus ls mudk 
vkJ;Hkwr gS vkSj blfy, vius vkJ;h uk'k vkSj mRikn nksuksa dk;ks± ls 
vfHkUu gksxkA
(ckS¼&er ds vuqlkj ftldks fouk'k dk dkj.k dgk tkrk gS 
For entities that are internally connected, the cause of 
destruction and origination is one and the same:
The stroke of a hammer which is the cause of destruction of a 
jar is also the cause of origination of potsherd; the cause of two 
effects is the same. Wherever there is concomitance between 
effects, the cause must be the same; like mango-ness and tree-
ness are concomitant and coexist.
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The series (sant na) and lumps or aggregates (skandha) are 
considered fictional (saÚvÃti) – mere usage – and devoid of self-
existence. There can certainly be no origination, destruction and 
continuance of a fictional entity like the ‘horns of a hare’ 
(kharaviÈāõa).
ā
LdU/larr;'pSo lao`frRoknlaLÑrk% A
fLFkR;qRifÙkO;;kLrs"kka u L;q% [kjfo"kk.kor~ AA54AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
mRifÙk dks LdU/&lUrfr;ksa dh mRifÙk ekuk tk, &) LdU/ksa dh larfr;k¡ 
Hkh vkids er esa lao`fr&:i gksus ls vijekFkZHkwr (vdk;Z&:i) gSaa] rc 
muds fy, gsrq dk lekxe dSlk\ vr% tks ik¡p LdU/ (:i&LdU/] 
osnuk&LdU/] laKk&LdU/] laLdkj&LdU/] foKku&LdU/) crk, x, gSa os 
ijekFkZ&lr~ ugha gSa] muesa x/s ds lhax ([kjfo"kk.k) ds leku fLFkfr] 
mRifÙk vkSj O;; ugha cu ldrs gSaA
(;fn {kf.kdSdkUr&oknh ckS¼ksa ds er esa foln`'k&dk;Z dh 
For an entity devoid of self-existence, there cannot be origination, 
destruction and continuance:
In Buddhist phenomenology the aggregates (skandha) are the 
five functions or aspects that constitute the sentient being: 
a) form or matter (rūpa),
b) sensation or feeling (vedanā),
c) perception or cognition (saÚjðā),
d) mental formations or volitions (saÚskāra), and
e) consciousness or discernment (vijðāna).
The five aggregates are considered to be the substrata for 
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Verse 54
clinging and thus ‘contribute to the causal origination of 
future suffering’. Clinging to the five aggregates must be 
removed in order to achieve release from sa ra. Nothing 
among them is really “I” or “mine”.
In the technical language of Buddhism, the human 
knowledge is confined to the saÚvÃti-satya, i.e., to the 
phenomenal reality. It is unable to grasp the paramārthika-
satya, i.e., the noumenal reality. The empirical world is the 
phenomenal reality while the ultimate truth is the noumenal 
reality. The phenomenal reality is svabhāva-śūnya, i.e., devoid 
of self-existence.
Úsā
94
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Those who are hostile to the doctrine of conditional predications 
(sy dv da) can also not maintain that the two attributes – viz. 
absolute ‘being’ (nityatva) and absolute ‘non-being’ (anityatva) – 
describe but one and the same phenomenon (i.e., endorsing both 
one-sided, independent standpoints – ubhayaikānta), for such a 
position will be self-contradictory. And if they maintain that the 
phenomena are absolutely indescribable (avācyataikānta) then 
for them even to utter the words ‘the phenomenon is 
indescribable’ is not tenable as it is irrational.
ā ā
fojks/kUuksHk;SdkRE;a L;k}knU;k;fof}"kke~ A
vokP;rSdkUrs¿I;qfDrukZokP;fefr ;qT;rs AA55AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
mHk;SdkRE; (fuR;Ro vkSj vfuR;Ro nksuksa ,dkUr i{kksa dks ,d&:Ik ekuuk) 
ugha cu ldrk gSA ;fn (nksuksa ,dkUr i{kksa dh ekU;rk esa fojks/ vkus ds Hk; 
ls) vokP;rk (voDrO;rk) dk ,dkUr ekuk tk, rks og Hkh ugha curk gS] 
vokP; 'kCn dk iz;ksx djus ls Loopu fojks/ mifLFkr gksrk gSA
L;k}kn&U;k; ls }s"k j[kus okyksa ds ;gk¡ fojks/ vkus ds dkj.k 
Fault in accepting both, absolute ‘being’ (nityatva) and absolute 
‘non-being’ (anityatva), without mutual dependence:
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1Being subject to recognition (pratyabhij na) , the real has 
permanence from a particular point of view. Recognition of the 
real is not accidental since it is universally experienced without 
any hindrance. O Lord ! In your view the real also has 
momentariness since it exhibits change of state at different 
times. If the real be considered either absolutely permanent or 
ðā
fuR;a rRizR;fHkKkukÂkdLekÙknfofPNnk A
{kf.kda dkyHksnkÙks cq¼Ôlapjnks"kr% AA56AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
ds dkj.k rÙo dFkf×pr~ fuR; gSA izR;fHkKku dk ln~Hkko fcuk fdlh dkj.k 
ds ugha gksrk gS D;ksafd vfoPNsn:i ls og vuqHko esa vkrk gSA dky ds Hksn 
ls ifj.kke&Hksn gksus ls rÙo dFkf×pr~ {kf.kd Hkh gSA loZFkk fuR; vkSj 
loZFkk {kf.kd rÙo esa cqf¼ dk lapkj ugha gks ldrk gSA
gs Hkxou~ ! vkids vusdkUr er esa izR;fHkKku dk fo"k; gksus 
From different points of view both permanence (nityatva) and 
momentariness (anityatva) are universally experienced:
1. Recognition , in general, means knowing the thing 
as that which was known before. It consists in knowing not only 
that a thing is such and such but that it is the same thing that was 
seen before. Recognition (pratyabhijðāna) is the conscious reference 
of the past and a present cognition of the same object. I see a jar, 
recognize it as something that was perceived before, and say ‘this is 
the same jar that I saw’. 
Recognition (pratyabhijðāna) is the valid cognition that we get 
through the synthesis of the present cognition and remembrance 
(smÃti). Recognition (pratyabhijðāna) is not regarded as depending 
solely on a previous mental impression and, therefore, is exempt 
from the fatal defect of remembrance (smÃti).
(pratyabhijðāna)
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1Ācārya Umāsvāmi asserts in Tattvārthasūtra :
r‰kokO;;a fuR;a AA5&31AA
Permanence is indestructibility of the essential nature 
(quality) of the substance.
The assertion based on remembrance (sm ti), “This is only 
that,” is recognition (pratyabhijðāna). (This is the same thing I 
saw yesterday.) That does not occur accidentally. That which is 
the cause of such a statement is its intrinsic nature (tadbhāva). 
Tadbhāva is its existence, condition or mode. A thing is seen 
having the same nature with which it was seen formerly. So it is 
recognized in the form, “This is the same as that”. If it be 
considered that the old thing has completely disappeared and 
that an entirely new thing has come into existence then there 
can be no remembrance. And worldly relations based on it 
would be disturbed. Therefore, the indestructibility of the 
essential nature of a substance is determined as permanence. 
But it should be taken from one point of view. If it be 
permanent from all points of view, then there can be no change 
at all. And, in that case, transmigration as well as the way to 
salvation would become meaningless.
Ã
absolutely momentary, its cognition, remaining static always, 
will be meaningless.
1. See 
Pūjyapāda’s Sarvārthasiddhi”, p. 156-157.
Jain, S.A. (1960), “Reality : English Translation of Shri 
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O Lord ! In your doctrine, so far as the general characteristic 
(s m nya svabh va) of a substance is concerned it neither 
originates nor gets destroyed since existence (being or sat) is its 
differentia. However, so far as the particular characteristics 
(viśeÈa svabhāva) are concerned, the substance originates and 
gets destroyed. Thus, the existence (of a substance) is 
characterized by origination (utpāda), destruction (vyaya) and 
permanence (dhrauvya).
ā ā ā
u lkekU;kReuksnsfr u O;sfr O;DreUo;kr~ A
O;sR;qnsfr fo'ks"kkÙks lgSd=kksn;kfn lr~ AA57AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
mRiUu gksrh gS vkSj u u"V gksrh gSA ;g ckr Li"V gS D;ksafd lc i;kZ;ksa esa 
mldk vUo; ik;k tkrk gS (oLrq dk lkekU;&Lo:i mldh lc 
voLFkkvksa esa fLFkj jgrk gS)A rFkk fo'ks"k dh vis{kk ls oLrq u"V vkSj 
mRiUu gksrh gSA ;qxir~ (,d lkFk) ,d oLrq esa rhuksa (mRikn] O;;] /zkSO;) 
dk gksuk gh lr~ gSA
gs Hkxou~ ! vkids 'kklu esa oLrq lkekU; dh vis{kk ls u 
Existence is characterized by origination (utp da), destruction 
(vyaya) and permanence (dhrauvya):
ā
A substance is permanent from the point of view of general 
properties. From the point of view of its specific modes it is not 
permanent. Hence there is no contradiction. These two, the 
general and the particular, somehow, are different as well as 
identical. Thus these form the cause of worldly intercourse.
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ĀptamīmāÚsā
The destruction of the cause (a jar, for example) is the cause of 
the origination of the effect (the potsherd); both, destruction of 
the cause and origination of the effect, invariably go together. In 
some respect (the mode), the two – origination and destruction – 
are mutually different. However, due to the presence of the 
universal characters of ‘being’ (class – j ti, enumeration – 
saÚkhyā, etc.) the two – origination and destruction – can also be 
said to be not different from each other. If origination, 
destruction and permanence are not viewed as mutually 
depended, the ‘being’ (sat) will get reduced to a nonentity like 
the ‘sky-flower’.
ā
dk;ksZRikn% {k;ks gsrks£u;ekYy{k.kkr~ i`Fkd~ A
u rkS tkR;k|oLFkkuknuis{kk% [kiq"ior~ AA58AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
(mÙkjkdkj&:i) dk;Z dk mRikn gSA mRikn vkSj fouk'k y{k.k dh vis{kk 
ls dFkf×pr~ i`Fkd~&i`Fkd~ gSaA tkfr vkfn ds voLFkku ds dkj.k mRikn vkSj 
fouk'k esa dFkf×pr~ Hksn ugha Hkh gSA ijLij fujis{k mRikn] O;; vkSj /zkSO; 
vkdk'k&iq"i ds leku voLrq gSaA
,d gsrq dk fu;e gksus ls (miknku dkj.k dk) tks {k; gS ogh 
If origination, destruction and permanence are not viewed as 
mutually depended, the ‘being’ (sat) will get reduced to a non-
entity like the ‘sky-flower’:
Here we come to the main metaphysical tenet of Jainism to the 
effect that every real is a complex of origination (utp da), 
destruction (vyaya), and permanence (dhrauvya) besides of 
substance (dravya), mode (paryāya) and quality (guõa).
ā
9
Verse 58
From the point of view of modes, the three characteristics 
(origination, destruction and permanence) are mutually 
different from one another and are also different from the 
substance. From the point of view of substance, these three 
(origination, destruction and permanence) are not perceived 
separately from the substance. Hence these are not different.
Origination, destruction and permanence, mutually 
irrespective, become non-existent like the ‘sky-flower’. Mere 
origination does not exist because that is without stability and 
departure; mere destruction does not exist because that is 
without stability and origination; mere permanence does not 
exist because that is without destruction and origination – all 
1three, mutually irrespective, are like the ‘hair of a tortoise’ .
1. See Thomas, F.W. (1968), “The Flower-Spray of the Quodammodo 
Doctrine – Śrī MalliÈeõa Surī’s Syādvāda-Maôjarī”, p. 130.
10
ĀptamīmāÚsā
(When a diadem is produced out of a gold jar –) The one desirous 
of the gold jar gets to grief on its destruction; the one desirous of 
the gold diadem gets to happiness on its origination; and the one 
desirous of gold remains indifferent, as gold remains integral to 
both – the jar as well as the diadem. This also establishes the fact 
that different characters of existence (origination, destruction 
and permanence) are the causes of different responses.
?kVekSfylqo.kkZFkhZ uk'kksRiknfLFkfr"o;e~ A
'kksdizeksnekè;LF;a tuks ;kfr lgsrqde~ AA59AA
lkekU;kFkZ & (
esa&) lqo.kZ ds ?kV dk] lqo.kZ ds eqdqV dk vkSj dsoy lqo.kZ dk bPNqd 
euq"; Øe'k% lqo.kZ&?kV dk uk'k gksus ij 'kksd dks] lqo.kZ&eqdqV ds mRiUu 
gksus ij g"kZ dks] vkSj nksuksa gh voLFkkvksa esa lqo.kZ dh fLFkfr gksus ls 'kksd 
vkSj g"kZ ls jfgr ekè;LF;&Hkko dks izkIr gksrk gSA vkSj ;g lc lgsrqd gksrk 
gSA (fcuk gsrq ds mu ?kVkFkhZ] eqdqVkFkhZ rFkk lqo.kkZFkhZ ds 'kksdkfn dh fLFkfr 
ugha curh gSA)
lqo.kZ&?kV dks lqo.kZ&eqdqV esa ifjo£rr djus dh fLFkfr 
Three characters of existence – origination, destruction and 
permanence – explained through an example:
10
Verse 59
The one who has vowed to take only milk, does not take curd; the 
one who has vowed to take only curd, does not take milk, and the 
1one who has vowed not to take any cow-produce  (gorasa) does 
not take either. Thus existence (‘being’ or sat) has threefold 
character – origination (of the mode that is curd), destruction (of 
the mode that is milk), and permanence (of the substance that is 
cow-produce, present in curd as well as milk).
i;ksozrks u nè;fÙk u i;ksfÙk nf/ozr% A
vxksjlozrks uksHks rLekÙkÙoa =k;kRede~ AA60AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
ngh gh ysus dk ozr gS og nw/ ugha ihrk gS] vkSj ftldk xksjl ugha ysus dk 
ozr gS og nksuksa (nw/ rFkk ngh) ugha ysrk gSA bl izdkj ls oLrq&rÙo 
=k;kRed (mRikn] O;; rFkk /zkSO; :Ik) gSA
ftldk nw/ gh ysus dk ozr gS og ngh ugha [kkrk gS] ftldk 
Another example of the threefold character of existence:
1. The genus cow-produce (gorasa) is consumed in many forms like 
milk, curd, cheese, and buttermilk.
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ĀptamīmāÚsā
(As per the Nyāya-VaiśeÈika ontology –) 
the effect (k rya) and the cause (k ra a), the quality (gu a) and 
the possessor of that quality (guõī), and the generality 
(sāmānya) and its possessor (sāmānyavān), are absolutely 
different, then difficulties arise –
If one maintains that 
ā ā õ õ
dk;Zdkj.kukukRoa xq.kxq.;U;rkfi p A
lkekU;r}nU;Roa pSdkUrsu ;nh";rs AA61AA
lkekU;kFkZ & (
eas vkSj lkekU;&lkekU;oku~ esa loZFkk (,dkUr :Ik ls) Hksn ekuk tk, rks 
,slk ekuuk Bhd ugha gS &
uS;kf;d&oS'ksf"kd er esa &) ;fn dk;Z&dkj.k esa] xq.k&xq.kh 
The view that the effect (k rya) and the cause (k ra a) etc. are 
absolutely different:
ā ā õ
prqFkZ ifjPNsn
Section 4
In the 
substance (dravya), quality (guõa), action (karma), generality 
(sāmānya), uniqueness (viśeÈa), inherence (samavāya) and 
non-existence (abhāva). Substance (dravya) is that in which a 
quality or an action can exist but which in itself is different 
from both quality and action. Quality (guõa) differs from 
substance and action (karma) in the sense that it is an 
unmoving property. The action (karma), like quality, has no 
separate existence, it belongs to the substance. But while 
quality is a permanent feature of a substance, action is a 
Nyāya-VaiśeÈika system, seven categories of reality are 
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transient one. Generality (sāmānya) relates to abstract 
characteristic that is singular and eternal and yet pervades 
many. Like leadership is a single characteristic, but it resides in 
many individuals. Leadership is also eternal because it was 
already in existence before the first leader emerged and will 
continue to exist even if there were no more leaders. 
Uniqueness (viśeÈa) is that characteristic by virtue of which a 
thing is distinguished from all other things. Like space, time 
and soul, it is eternal. Everything in the world, existent or non-
existent, is accompanied by uniqueness. Generality and 
uniqueness are opposite concepts. Inherence (samavāya) is a 
permanent relation between two entities, one of whom inheres 
in the other. One of the entities depends for its existence on the 
other. Objects in an inherent relationship cannot be reversed 
as those that are related by nearness. Non-existence (abhāva) 
is that which is not found in any of the six positive categories, 
and yet according to the Nyāya-VaiśeÈika view non-existence 
exists, just as space and direction. To illustrate, to the question 
‘how does one know that there is no chair in the room?’, the 
answer is ‘by looking at the room’. Thus non-existence also 
exists.
The universalities and particularities are held to be eternal 
and have a distinct own-nature, but these are not credited with 
existence (sattā), which is confined to substances, qualities and 
actions.
The gist of the Jaina argument is that universality and 
particularity are involved in the nature of everything and not 
imposed from outside by virtue of a relation of ‘inherence’.
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ĀptamīmāÚsā
A single effect (in the aggregate – avayav ) cannot inhere in 
many causes (the constituent parts – avayava) since, as has been 
assumed, it is possessed of no parts. Or if it be assumed that the 
effect is possessed of parts then it no longer remains a single 
entity. Thus, there are difficulties in accepting the non-Jaina 
position regarding the way the effect inheres in its cause.
ī
,dL;kusdo`fÙkuZ HkkxkHkkokn~cgwfu ok A
HkkfxRok}k¿L; uSdRoa nks"kks o`ÙksjukgZrs AA62AA
lkekU;kFkZ & (;fn 
lkekU;&lkekU;oku~ esa loZFkk Hksn ekuk tk, rks&) ,d dh vusdksa esa o`fÙk 
ugha gks ldrh gS] D;ksafd mlds Hkkx (va'k) ugha gksrs gSaA vkSj ;fn ,d ds 
vusd Hkkx gSa] rks og ,dRo fLFkj ugha jgrk gSA bl izdkj ,d dh vusd esa 
lokZRed vFkok loZns'k o`fÙk ekuus ls vukgZr er esa vusd nks"k vkrs gSaA
oS'ksf"kd er ds vuqlkj dk;Z&dkj.k] xq.k&xq.kh vkSj 
Fault in accepting that there is inherence (samav ya) of a single 
effect in many causes:
ā
1The hold  that ‘attributes’, like the intelligence 
(caitanya) and the colour (r pa), and ‘bearers of attributes’, 
like the self (ātmā) and the pot (ghaÇa), are completely 
different, yet being connected by ‘inherence’ (samavāya) these 
attain the designations ‘attributes’ and ‘bearers of attributes’. 
Inherence weaves together; it is also styled ‘occurrence’ (vÃtti). 
Through that occurrence, the inherence connection, the 
VaiśeÈika 
ū
1. See 
L;k}kne×tjh] 
txnh'kpUnz tSu (MkW-) (1992)] JhefYy"ks.klwfjiz.khrk 
i`"B 43-
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Verse 62
designation ‘attributes’ and ‘bearer of attributes’ is approved.
However, there can be no relation of ‘attributes’ and 
‘bearer of attributes’ if the two are utterly different. If it be said 
that the relation between the two is through ‘inherence’ then 
we must be able to cognize the thing called ‘inherence’ and that 
is not possible. The connection between the ‘attributes’ and 
the ‘bearer of the attributes’ is to be adopted only as defined by 
‘non-separate existence’ and not something other, such as 
inherence etc.
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ĀptamīmāÚsā
If cause and effect are considered absolutely separate from one 
another, there should be separateness between these with 
respect to space and time, just as is seen between two external 
material substances (e.g., the pot and the tree – residing in 
separate substrata – yutasiddha). Then it will not be possible to 
explain the occurrence (vÃtti) of cause and effect in a material 
entity in same space (and time).
ns'kdkyfo'ks"ks¿fi L;kn~o`fÙk;qZrfl¼or~ A
lekuns'krk u L;kr~ ewrZdkj.kdk;Z;ks% AA63AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
i`Fkd~ gSa] rks ;qrfl¼ inkFkks± dh rjg (?kV&o`{k dh rjg) fHkUu ns'k vkSj 
fHkUu dky esa mudh o`fÙk (fLFkfr) ekuuh iM+sxhA bl dkj.k ls ew£rd 
dkj.k vkSj dk;Z esa tks lekuns'krk (,d&dky&ns'krk) ns[kh tkrh gS og 
ugha cu ldsxhA
;fn vo;o&vo;oh] dk;Z&dkj.k vkfn ,d nwljs ls loZFkk 
Fault in accepting absolute separateness between the aggregate 
(avayav ) and the constitutent parts (avayava):ī
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Verse 63
It might be said that there exists a relationship of substratum 
and superstratum between two entities (viz. the constituent 
parts and the aggregate – avayava and avayav ) through 
inherence (samavāya), and due to inherence the two cannot 
remain independent of each other even at different space and 
time. We respond that if inherence (samavāya) itself is 
independent of the two entities, how can it possibly create a 
relationship between them?
ī
vkJ;k¿¿Jf;HkkokUu LokrU=;a leokf;uke~ A
bR;;qDr% l lEcU/ks u ;qDr% leokf;fHk% AA64AA
lkekU;kFkZ & ;fn ;g dgk tk, fd 
(vo;o vkJ; gS vkSj vo;oh vkJ;h gS) gksus ds dkj.k Lora=krk ugha gS 
ftlls ns'k&dky dh vis{kk ls Hksn gksus ij Hkh o`fÙk curh gS] rks ,slk dguk 
Bhd ugha gSA D;ksafd tks Lo;a vlEc¼ gS (leok; vukfJr gksus ls 
vlEc¼ gh jgrk gS) og ,d vo;oh dk nwljs vo;oh ds lkFk lEcU/ 
dSls djk ldrk gS\
leokf;;ksa esa vkJ;&vkJ;h&Hkko 
Fault in accepting inherence as independent of the constituent 
parts (avayava) and the aggregate :(avayavī)
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ĀptamīmāÚsā
(As per the s –) Generality or universality (s m nya) 
and inherence (samavāya) both exist in their entirety (and 
inseparably) in their substratum (that is, the entity). Also, these 
two cannot exist independent of their substratum. If so, how can 
these persist in entities which are subject to destruction and 
origination?
VaiśeÈika ā ā
lkekU;a leok;'pk¿I;sdSd=k lekfIrr% A
vUrjs.kk¿¿J;a u L;kUuk'kksRikfn"kq dks fof/% AA65AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
gSaA vkSj vkJ; ds fcuk mudk ln~Hkko ugha gks ldrk gSA rc u"V vkSj 
mRiUu gksus okys vfuR; dk;ks± esa muds ln~Hkko dh fof/&O;oLFkk dSls cu 
ldrh gS\
lkekU; vkSj leok; vius&vius vkJ;ksa esa iw.kZ :Ik ls jgrs 
Relationship between generality (s m nya) and inherence 
(samavāya):
ā ā
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Verse 65
(As per the s –) The generality and the 
inherence (samav ya) are considered absolutely independent of 
each other. Also, these two have no relation whatsoever with 
their substratum, the entity (artha) – the object of knowledge. If 
so, all three – the generality (sāmānya), the inherence 
(samavāya), and the entity (artha) – become nonentities like the 
‘sky-flower’.
VaiśeÈika (sāmānya) 
ā
loZFkk¿ufHklEcU/% lkekU;leok;;ks% A
rkH;keFkksZ u lEc¼Lrkfu =khf.k [kiq"ior~ AA66AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
ijLij esa fdlh izdkj dk (la;ksxkfn&:i dk) lEcU/ ugha gS rc mu nksuksa 
ds lkFk nzO;] xq.k rFkk deZ&:i tks vFkZ gS mldk Hkh lEcU/ ugha curk gSA 
vr% lkekU;] leok; vkSj vFkZ ;s rhuksa gh ^ vkdk'kiq"i* ds leku voLrq 
Bgjrs gSaA
(oS'ksf"kd er ds vuqlkj &) tc lkekU; vkSj leok; dk 
If no relation whatsoever is accepted between generality 
(s m nya) and inherence (samav ya):ā ā ā
The universalities and particularities are held by the 
VaiśeÈikas to be eternal and having their own distinct nature, 
but they are not credited with existence (satt ), which is 
confined to the entity (artha) – substance (dravya), quality 
(guõa) and action (karma).
ā
10
ĀptamīmāÚsā
If it be maintained that the atoms (a u) are absolutely non-
distinct (oneness – ananyatva) then these should remain as such 
(non-distinct) even after their union to form molecules 
(skandha), creating thereby a substance. Under such a regime 
the four basic substances (bhūtacatuÈka of the Buddhists) – 
earth (pÃthvī), water (jala), fire (agni), and air (vāyu) – which are 
but the effects of the union of atoms, will turn out to be illusory.
õ
vUkU;rSdkUrs¿.kwuka la?kkrs¿fi foHkkxor~ A
vlagrRoa L;kn~Hkwrprq"da Hkzkafrjso lk AA67AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
vUkU;rk dk ,dkUr ekuk tk, rks LdU/&:i esa muds feyus ij Hkh foHkkx 
ds leku ijLij vlEc¼rk gh jgsxhA vkSj ,slk gksus ij ckS¼ksa ds }kjk ekU; 
tks Hkwrprq"d (ijek.kqvksa dk i`fFkoh] ty] vfXu vkSj ok;q ,sls pkj LdU/ksa 
ds :i esa dk;Z) gS og okLrfod u gksdj HkzkUr gh gksxkA
(ckS¼&er ds vuqlkj &) ;fn vUkU;rSdkUr esa ijek.kqvksa dh 
Fault in accepting atoms as absolutely non-distinct:
1
Verse 67
As the cause (k ra a) is established by the effect (k rya), 
therefore, when the effect (bhūtacatuÈka of the Buddhists) is 
illusory, the cause [the atoms (aõu) responsible for the formation 
of molecules (skandha)] must also be illusory. And with non-
existent character of both, the cause and the effect, the 
attributes of the effect like quality (guõa) and genus (jāti) will 
also become illusory (non-existent).
Note: The relation between the material cause and its effect is 
that wherever the cause is present the effect would be present, 
and wherever the effect would be present the cause must have 
been present. Again, negatively, if the cause is absent the effect 
must also be absent and conversely if the effect is absent the 
cause must also be absent.
ā õ ā
dk;ZHkzkUrsj.kqHkzkfUr% dk;ZfyÄa fg dkj.ke~ Aõ
mHk;kHkkorLrRLFka xq.ktkrhrjPp u AA68AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
gh Bgjsaxs D;ksafd dk;Z ds }kjk dkj.k dk Kku fd;k tkrk gS (vFkkZr~ dkj.k 
dk;ZfyÄd gksrk gS)A dk;Z vkSj dkj.k nksuksa ds vHkko ls muesa jgus okys õ
xq.k] tkfr] fØ;k&vkfn dk Hkh vHkko gks tk,xkA
Hkwrprq"d&:i dk;Z ds HkzkUr gksus ij rRdkj.k v.kq Hkh HkzkUr 
If the effect is illusory, the cause must also be illusory; the atoms 
(a u) then become illusory:õ
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ĀptamīmāÚsā
(As per the S khya view –) If the effect (k rya) and the cause 
(kāraõa) are considered absolutely one, then, as the two are 
declared to be inseparably connected (avinābhāvī), one of these 
is bound to be non-existent. (And, as a corollary, the other too 
becomes non-existent.) If it be said that the effect and the cause 
are actually one but are referred to as two by mere usage then 
also, being a product of imagination, both these remain 
misconceptions.
āÚ ā
,dRos¿U;rjkHkko% 'ks"kkHkkoks¿foukHkqo% A
f}Rola[;kfojks/'p lao`fr'psUe`"kSo lk AA69AA
lkekU;kFkZ & (lka[;erkuqlkj &) ;fn 
ekuk tk, rks muesa ls fdlh ,d dk vHkko gks tk,xkA vkSj ,d ds vHkko 
esa nwljs dk Hkh vHkko Bgjsxk D;ksafd mudk ijLij esa vfoukHkko lEcU/ gSA 
;fn f}Ro&la[;k dks lao`fr&:i & dfYir vFkok vkSipkfjd & ekuk tk, 
rks lao`fr ds feF;k gksus ls f}Rola[;k Hkh feF;k gh Bgjrh gSA
dk;Z vkSj dkj.k dks loZFkk ,d 
Fault in considering the effect (k rya) and the cause (k ra a) as 
absolutely one:
ā ā õ
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Verse 69
Those who are hostile to the doctrine of conditional predications 
(sy dv da) can also not maintain that the two attributes – viz. 
absolute separateness (anyatva) and absolute oneness 
(ananyatva) of cause (kāraõa) and effect (kārya) – describe but 
one and the same phenomenon (i.e., endorsing both one-sided, 
independent standpoints – ubhayaikānta), for such a position 
will be self-contradictory. And if they maintain that the 
phenomena are absolutely indescribable (avācyataikānta) then 
for them even to utter the words ‘the phenomenon is 
indescribable’ is not tenable as it is irrational.
ā ā
fojks/kUuksHk;SdkRE;a L;k}knU;k;fof}"kke~ A
vokP;rSdkUrs¿I;qfDrukZokP;fefr ;qT;rs AA70AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
dkj.k dh vU;rk vkSj vuU;rk nksuksa dk fujis{k vfLrRo ugha cu ldrk gS 
D;ksafd nksuksa ds loZFkk ,dkRE; ekuus esa fojks/&nks"k vkrk gSA vokP;rk 
(voDrO;rk) ,dkUr Hkh ugha cu ldrk gS D;kasfd vokP;rSdkUr esa ^ ;g 
vokP; gS* ,sls okD; dk iz;ksx djus ls og okP; gks tkrk gSA
tks L;k}kn&U;k; ls }s"k j[kus okys gSa muds ;gk¡ dk;Z vkSj 
Fault in accepting both, absolute separateness (anyatva) and 
absolute oneness (ananyatva) of cause (kāraõa) and effect 
(kārya), without mutual dependence:
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ĀptamīmāÚsā
The substance (dravya) and its mode (pary ya), somehow, 
exhibit oneness (with each other) as both these have logical 
continuance (avyatireka). The two also, somehow, exhibit 
separateness (from each other) as there is difference of effect 
(pariõāma and pariõāmī), of capacity (śaktimāna and 
śaktibhāva), of designation (saÚjðā), of number (saÚkhyā), of 
1self-attribute (svalakÈaõa), of utility (prayojana), and so on . 
The substance and its modes, thus, are neither absolutely one 
nor absolutely different; as established by the doctrine of non-
absolutism (anekāntavāda), these two, the substance and its 
modes, show oneness as well as separateness in some respects 
only.
ā
æO;i;kZ;;ksjSD;a Rk;ksjO;frjsdr% A
ifj.kkefo'ks"kkPp 'kfDrePNfDrHkkor% AA71AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
nksuksa esa vO;frjsd ik;k tkrk gSA nzO; vkSj i;kZ; dFkf×pr~ ,d nwljs ls 
ukuk&:i Hkh gSa] D;ksafd nzO; vkSj i;kZ; esa ifj.kke&ifj.kkeh dk Hksn gS] 
'kfDreku~ vkSj 'kfDrHkko dk Hksn gS] laKk (uke) dk Hksn gS] la[;k dk Hksn 
gS] Loy{k.k dk Hksn gS] vkSj iz;kstu vkfn dk Hksn gSA (vkfn 'kCn ls dky 
,oa izfrHkkl dk Hksn xzg.k fd;k x;k gSA)
nzO; vkSj i;kZ; esa dFkf×pr~ ,sD; (vHksn) gS] D;ksafd mu 
The doctrine of non-absolutism (anek ntav da) declares that the 
substance and its modes show oneness as well as separateness in 
some respects only:
ā ā
laKkla[;kfo'ks"kkPp Loy{k.kfo'ks"kr% A
iz;kstukfnHksnkPp rUukukRoa u loZFkk AA72AA
1. Time (k la) and appearance (pratibh sa) are also included.ā ā
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Verses 71 & 72
Ācārya Umāsvāmi’s Tattvārthasūtra:
xq.ki;Z;on~ æO;e~ AA5&38AA
That which has qualities and modes is a substance.
r‰ko% ifj.kke% AA5&42AA
The condition (change) of a substance is a mode.
That in which qualities and modes exist is a substance. 
What are qualities and what are modes? Those characteristics 
which exhibit association (anvaya) with the substance are 
qualities. Those characteristics which exhibit distinction or 
exclusion (vyatireka) – logical discontinuity, “when the pot is 
not, the clay is,” – are modes. A substance possesses both. That 
which makes distinction between one substance and another is 
called a quality, and the modification of a substance is called a 
mode. The substance (dravya) is inseparable (residing in same 
substratum – ayutasiddha) from its qualities, and permanent 
(nitya).
That which distinguishes one substance from all others is 
its distinctive quality. Only the presence of this quality makes 
it a substance. If such distinctive characteristics were not 
present, it would lead to intermixture or confusion of 
substances. For instance, souls are distinguished from matter 
by the presence of qualities such as knowledge. Matter is 
distinguished from souls by the presence of form (colour) etc. 
Without such distinguishing characteristics, there can be no 
distinction between souls and matter. Therefore, from the 
general point of view, knowledge etc. are qualities always 
associated with the soul, and form etc. are always associated 
with the matter. Their modifications, which are separable from 
particular points of view, are modes. For instance, in living 
beings, these are knowledge of pitcher, knowledge of cloth, 
anger, pride, etc., and in matter these are intense or mild odour, 
16
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colour, etc. The collection or aggregate of qualities and modes, 
which somehow is considered different from these, is called a 
substance. If the aggregate were completely (from all points of 
view) the same, it would negative both substance and qualities.
From the point of view of designation (saÚjðā) etc., 
qualities are different from the substance. Yet, from another 
point of view, qualities are not different from the substance as 
they partake of the nature of substance and are not found 
without substance. Whatever condition or form a substance, 
such as the medium of motion, takes that condition or form is 
called its modification (pariõāma). It is of two kinds, without a 
beginning and with a beginning. 
17
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The existence of the entity (dharm ) and its attribute (dharma) 
cannot be established if these are considered absolutely 
dependent (āpekÈika) on each other as neither can then hold its 
identity. (In case two objects are absolutely dependent on each 
other, both are bound to lose their individual identity.) If these, 
the entity and its attribute, be considered absolutely 
independent (anāpekÈika) of each other, then the general 
(sāmānya) and the particular (viśeÈa) attributes cannot be 
established. [Only an entity which has general (sāmānya – 
dravya) and particular (viśeÈa – paryāya) attributes can be the 
subject of knowledge. Dravya without its modification and 
modification without its dravya cannot be the subject of valid 
ī
;|kisf{kdflf¼% L;kUu };a O;ofr"Brs A
vukisf{kdfl¼kS p u lkekU;fo'ks"krk AA73AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
,d&nwljs dh vis{kk j[kus okyh) gksrh gS] rks vkis{; vkSj vkisf{kd nksuksa esa 
ls fdlh dh flf¼ ugha gks ldrh gSA vkSj flf¼ dks loZFkk vukisf{kd 
(,d&nwljs dh vis{kk u j[kus okyh) ekuus ij muesa lkekU;&fo'ks"k Hkko 
ugha cu ldrk gSA
;fn inkFkks± (/eZ o /ehZ vkfn) dh flf¼ vkisf{kd (loZFkk 
The entity (dharm ) and its attribute (dharma) are neither 
absolutely dependent (āpekÈika) nor absolutely independent 
(anāpekÈika):
ī
i×pe ifjPNsn
Section 5
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knowledge; only their combination can be the subject of 
knowledge.]
Ācārya Samantabhadra’s Svayambhūstotra:
;FkSd'k% dkjdeFkZfl¼;s leh{; 'ks"ka Lolgk;dkjde~ A
rFkSo lkekU;fo'ks"kekr`dk u;kLros"Vk xq.keq[;dYir% AA
(13-2-62)
Just as the two mutually supportive causes, the substantial 
cause (upādāna kartā) and the instrumental cause (nimitta 
kartā), result in the accomplishment of the desired 
objective, in the same way, your doctrine that postulates 
two kinds of attributes in a substance, general (sāmānya) 
and specific (viśeÈa), and ascertains its particular 
characteristic (naya) depending on what is kept as the 
primary consideration for the moment while keeping the 
other attributes in the background, not negating their 
existence in any way, accomplishes the desired objective.
Jain, Vijay K. (2015),
“Ācārya Samantabhadra’s Svayambhūstotra”, p. 87.
Ācārya Māõikyanandi’s ParīkÈāmukha:
lkekU;fo'ks"kkRek rnFkksZ fo"k;% AA4&1AA
Only an object which has both, the general (sāmānya – 
dravya) and the specific (viśeÈa – paryāya) attributes can be 
the subject of valid knowledge.
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Those who are hostile to the doctrine of conditional predications 
(sy dv da) can also not maintain that the two – viz. absolute 
dependence (āpekÈika) and absolute independence (anāpekÈika) 
of the entity and its attribute – describe but one and the same 
phenomenon (i.e., endorsing both one-sided, independent 
standpoints – ubhayaikānta), for such a position will be self-
contradictory. And if they maintain that the phenomena are 
absolutely indescribable (avācyataikānta) then for them even to 
utter the words ‘the phenomenon is indescribable’ is not tenable 
as it is irrational.
ā ā
Fault in accepting both absolute dependence and 
absolute independence (anāpekÈika) of the entity and its 
attribute, without any mutual relation:
(āpekÈika) 
fojks/kUuksHk;SdkRE;a L;k}knU;k;fof}"kke~ A
vokP;rSdkUrs¿I;qfDrukZokP;fefr ;qT;rs AA74AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
flf¼ vkSj vukisf{kd flf¼ nksuksa dk fujis{k vfLrRo ugha cu ldrk gS 
D;ksafd nksuksa ds loZFkk ,dkRE; ekuus esa fojks/&nks"k vkrk gSA vokP;rk 
(voDrO;rk) ,dkUr Hkh ugha cu ldrk gS D;kasfd vokP;rSdkUr esa ^ ;g 
vokP; gS* ,sls okD; dk iz;ksx djus ls og okP; gks tkrk gSA
tks L;k}kn&U;k; ls }s"k j[kus okys gSa muds ;gk¡ vkisf{kd 
12
Verse 74
The fact that there is invariable togetherness (avin bh va) 
between an entity (dharmī) and its attribute (dharma) is 
established on the basis of their relative existence. This fact, 
however, has no implication on their respective own-nature. 
Their respective own-nature is self-proven like the constituent 
parts of the agent of production (kāraka) [the doer (kartā), the 
activity (karma) etc.], and the agent of knowledge (jðāpaka) [the 
method of knowledge (pramāõa), and the object of knowledge 
(prameya)].
Note: The doer (kartā) does not rely on the activity (karma) for 
its own nature and the activity (karma) does not rely on the doer 
(kartā) for its own nature. Similarly, the method of knowledge 
(pramāõa) does not rely on the object of knowledge (prameya) for 
its own nature and the object of knowledge (prameya) does not 
rely on the method of knowledge (pramāõa) for its own nature. 
But empirically these are considered related to each other.
ā ā
There is invariable togetherness (avin bh va) between an entity 
(dharmī) and its attribute (dharma) but still each has its own-
nature:
ā ā
/eZ/E;ZfoukHkko% fl¼ÔR;U;ks¿U;oh{k;k A
u Lo:ia Lorks ásrr~ dkjdKkidkÄor~ AA75AAõ
lkekU;kFkZ & 
fl¼ gksrk gS] mudk Lo:i ughaA Lo:i rks dkjd vkSj Kkid ds vaxks dh 
rjg Lor% fl¼ gSA (dkjd ds nks vax drkZ vkSj deZ rFkk Kkid ds nks vax 
izek.k vkSj izes; ;s vius&vius Lo:i ds fo"k; esa nwljs vax dh vis{kk 
ugha j[krs gSaA O;ogkj ds fy, ikjLifjd vis{kk vko';d gS] Lo:i ds 
fy, ughaA)
/eZ vkSj /ehZ dk vfoukHkko lEcU/ gh ijLij dh vis{kk ls 
12
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The existence of the entity (dharm ) and its attribute 
(dharma), thus, can be described in seven ways: 1) somehow 
dependent (āpekÈika) , 2) somehow independent (anāpekÈika), 
3) somehow both (ubhaya) – dependent and independent, 4) 
somehow indescribable (avaktavya), 5) somehow dependent 
and indescribable (āpekÈika-avaktavya), 6) somehow 
independent and indescribable (anāpekÈika-avaktavya), and 7) 
somehow both dependent and independent and indescribable 
(ubhaya-avaktavya).
ī
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Verse 75

If it be maintained that Reality can only be established through 
the use of the middle term (hetu) then it will not be possible to 
establish anything with the help of the proven sources of 
knowledge – direct (pratyakÈa) sources of knowledge etc. [For, 
under such a regime, the use of the middle term (hetu), which 
necessarily requires, among other things, prior knowledge of the 
entity (dharmī), the reason (sādhana or liôga) and the general 
rule or illustration (udāharaõa), will not be possible.] If it be 
maintained that Reality can only be established through the 
authority of the scripture (āgama) then even contradictory 
doctrines (promulgated by different scriptures) will stand 
fl¼a ps¼srqr% lo± u izR;{kkfnrks xfr% A
fl¼a psnkxekr~ lo± fo#¼kFkZerkU;fi AA76AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
izR;{k vkfn ls inkFkks± dk Kku ugha cu ldsxkA (,slk ekuus ij gsrqewyd 
vuqeku&Kku Hkh ugha cu ldsxk D;ksafd vuqeku ds fy, /ehZ] lk/u vkSj 
mnkgj.k dk izR;{k Kku gksuk vko';d gSA) vkSj ;fn vkxe ls lc rÙoksa 
dh flf¼ gksrh gS] rks ijLij&fo#¼ vFkZ ds izfriknd erksa dh Hkh flf¼ gks 
tk,xhA
;fn gsrq ls gh (,dkUrr%) lc rÙoksa dh flf¼ gksrh gS] rks 
Fault in the two views that Reality can only be established 
through the use of the middle term (hetu), or through the 
authority of the scripture (āgama):
"k"B ifjPNsn
Section 6
125
established. (The knowledge thus obtained, without any 
scrutiny, will be unreliable and not necessarily true.)
In inference, the proposition (pratijðā) is the statement about 
the aspect to be proved of the major term (sādhya). The middle 
term (hetu) is the statement of reason (sādhana). The 
statement of a general rule supported by an example is called 
the udāharaõa.
126
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Those who are hostile to the doctrine of conditional predications 
(sy dv da) can also not maintain that the two attributes – viz. 
the use of the middle term (hetu) and the scriptural authority 
(āgama), to establish Reality – describe but one and the same 
phenomenon (i.e., endorsing both one-sided, independent 
standpoints – ubhayaikānta), for such a position will be self-
contradictory. And if they maintain that the phenomena are 
absolutely indescribable (avācyataikānta) then for them even to 
utter the words ‘the phenomenon is indescribable’ is not tenable 
as it is irrational.
ā ā
fojks/kUuksHk;SdkRE;a L;k}knU;k;fof}"kke~ A
vokP;rSdkUrs¿I;qfDrukZokP;fefr ;qT;rs AA77AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
vkSj vkxe&flf¼ nksuksa dk fujis{k vfLrRo ugha cu ldrk gS D;ksafd nksuksa 
ds loZFkk ,dkRE; ekuus esa fojks/&nks"k vkrk gSA vokP;rk (voDrO;rk) 
,dkUr Hkh ugha cu ldrk gS D;kasfd vokP;rSdkUr esa ^ ;g vokP; gS* ,sls 
okD; dk iz;ksx djus ls og okP; gks tkrk gSA
tks L;k}kn&U;k; ls }s"k j[kus okys gSa muds ;gk¡ gsrq&flf¼ 
Fault in accepting both, the use of the middle term (hetu) and the 
scriptural authority (āgama), to establish Reality, without mutual 
relation:
127
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When the promulgator of Reality is ‘not a true authority’ 
(an pta), whatever is established through the use of the 
authentic middle term (hetu) is called hetu-established; when 
the promulgator of Reality is ‘a true authority’ (āpta), whatever 
is established through his incontrovertible statement is called 
āpta-established.
ā
oDr;ZukIrs ;¼srks% lkè;a r¼srqlkf/re~ A
vkIrs oDrfj r}kD;kr~ lkè;ekxelkf/re~ AA78AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
gsrq&lkf/r (;qfDrfl¼) dgk tkrk gS vkSj oDrk ds vkIr gksus ij mlds 
opuksa ls tks fl¼ fd;k tkrk gS og vkxe&lkf/r ('kkL=kfl¼) dgk tkrk 
gSA (vkIr ;FkkFkZ oLrq&rÙo dk izfriknd ,oa vfolaoknd gSA)
oDrk ds vukIr gksus ij tks gsrq ls fl¼ fd;k tkrk gS og 
Reality can be established by both – the authentic middle term 
(hetu) and the true authority ( pta):ā
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If it be maintained (as the proponents of that 
there is existence only of internal ‘objects of knowledge’ (artha), 
i.e., of cognition arrived at through the subjective act of mind, 
then all inferences (anumāna) drawn by the intellect (buddhi), 
and verbal testimony of the scripture (āgama) would become 
sources of invalid knowledge (pramāõābhāsa). But how can 
there be invalid knowledge (pramāõābhāsa) without there being 
existence of valid knowledge (pramāõa)?
vijðānādvaita do) 
vUrjÄkFkZrSdkUrs cqf¼okD;a e`"kk¿f[kye~ Aõ
izek.kkHkklesokrLrr~ izek.kkn`rs dFke~ AA79AA
lkekU;kFkZ & (foKkuk}Sr erkoyfEc;ksa ds vuqlkj &) 
dk gh ln~Hkko gS] ,slk ,dkUr ekuus ij lc cqf¼&:i vuqeku vkSj 
okD;&:i vkxe feF;k gks tk;saxs vkSj feF;k gksus ls os izek.kkHkkl Bgjrs 
gSaA fdUrq izek.k dk vfLrRo Lohdkj fd;s fcuk izek.kkHkkl dk O;ogkj Hkh 
dSls gks ldrk gS\
dsoy vUrjax vFkZ 
Fault in the vi that cognition arrived at 
through the subjective act of mind is the only source of valid 
knowledge:
jðānādvaita’s assertion 
lIre ifjPNsn
Section 7
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(In the scheme of vijðānādvaita –) 
sādhya (statement of that which is to be proved, the major term) 
and the sādhana (statement of the reason, the middle term, 
hetu) one tries to prove that cognition alone is real, the process 
will not be a legitimate one; the statement of the sādhya, 
without considering any distinction whatsoever between the 
sādhya and sādhana, will suffer from what is known as the 
fallacy of the thesis (pratijðādoÈa) and the statement of the hetu, 
without accepting an inseparable connection with the major 
term, sādhya, from the fallacy of the reason (hetudoÈa).
If through the use of the 
lkè;lk/ufoKIrs;Zfn foKfIrek=krk A
u lkè;a u p gsrq'p izfrKkgsrqnks"kr% AA80AA
lkekU;kFkZ & ;fn 
foKku&ek=k gh ekuk tk, rks ,slk dgus ls izfrKknks"k (Loopu&fojks/) 
vkSj gsrqnks"k (vfl¼kfn nks"k) mifLFkr gksrs gSa & vkSj bl dkj.k u dksbZ 
lkè; cu ldrk gS vkSj u gsrqA
lkè; vkSj lk/u (gsrq) dh foKfIr (Kku) dks 
In the vijðānādvaita scheme, i
sādhya and the sādhana, cannot establish that cognition alone is 
real:
nference, through the use of the 
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If the absolutist view (of the bahiraôgārthaikānta) that all 
cognitions have real substrata in the external world alone 
(totally objective, with no subjective input) be maintained then 
each cognition becomes prima facie valid, with a total absence of 
a cause for fallacy in the source of valid knowledge (i.e. non-
existence of pramāõābhāsa). And, as a result, all propositions, 
even those holding contradictory positions, will remain 
validated.
cfgjÄkFkZrSdkUrs izek.kkHkklfuÉokr~ Aõ
losZ"kka dk;Zflf¼% L;kf}#¼kFkkZ¿fHk/kf;uke~ AA81AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
ekudj dsoy cfgjaxkFkZrk dks gh ekuuk)] ,slk ,dkUr ekuus ij izek.kkHkkl 
(la'k;kfn&:i feF;kKku) dk fuÉo (yksi) gks tkus ls fo#¼ vFkZ dk 
izfriknu djus okys lc yksxksa ds dk;Z dh flf¼ BgjsxhA
dsoy cfgjax vFkZ dk gh ln~Hkko gS (vUrjax&Kku dks u 
Fault in the bahira g rthaik nta that maintains the absolutist 
view that all cognitions have real substrata in the external world 
alone:
ô ā ā
13
Verse 81
Fault in accepting both, the all-subjective cognition of the 
internal reality and the all-objective cognition of the external 
reality, without mutual dependence:
Those who are hostile to the doctrine of conditional predications 
(sy dv da) can also not maintain that the two attributes – viz. 
the all-subjective cognition of the internal reality and the all-
objective cognition of the external reality – describe but one and 
the same phenomenon (i.e., endorsing both one-sided, 
independent standpoints – ubhayaikānta), for such a position 
will be self-contradictory. And if they maintain that the 
phenomena are absolutely indescribable (avācyataikānta) then 
for them even to utter the words ‘the phenomenon is 
indescribable’ is not tenable as it is irrational.
ā ā
fojks/kUuksHk;SdkRE;a L;k}knU;k;fof}"kke~ A
vokP;rSdkUrs¿I;qfDrukZokP;fefr ;qT;rs AA82AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
,dkUr vkSj cfgjax vFkZ ,dkUr nksuksa dk fujis{k vfLrRo ugha cu ldrk gS 
D;ksafd nksuksa ds loZFkk ,dkRE; ekuus esa fojks/&nks"k vkrk gSA vokP;rk 
(voDrO;rk) ,dkUr Hkh ugha cu ldrk gS D;kasfd vokP;rSdkUr esa ^ ;g 
vokP; gS* ,sls okD; dk iz;ksx djus ls og okP; gks tkrk gSA
tks L;k}kn&U;k; ls }s"k j[kus okys gSa muds ;gk¡ vUrjax vFkZ 
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O Lord ! You have asserted that when reality is ascertained 
through internal cognition that illumines the subjective 
1knowledge-object  (prameya) there is no scope for invalid 
knowledge (pramāõābhāsa), and when it is ascertained through 
external cognition that illumines the objective knowledge-object 
(prameya) there is the possibility of valid knowledge (pramāõa) 
as well as invalid knowledge (pramāõābhāsa).
Hkkoizes;k¿is{kk;ka izek.kkHkklfuÉo% A
cfg% izes;kis{kk;ka izek.ka rfUuHka p rs AA83AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
vis{kk ls dksbZ Hkh Kku loZFkk izek.kkHkkl ugha gSA vkSj cká&izes; 
(bfUnz;&Kku ds }kjk vFkZ dks ekuuk) dh vis{kk ls Kku izek.k vkSj 
izek.kkHkkl nksuksa gksrk gSA
gs Hkxou~ ! vkids er esa Hkko&izes; (Kku ds Lolaosnu) dh 
Both, internal- and external-cognition, can be sources of valid 
knowledge:
1. The conception of pram  or valid apprehension implies three 
necessary factors, namely the subject (pramātā), the object 
(prameya) and the method of knowledge (pramāõa).
ā
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The word ‘ soul), being a designation (sa j ), must have a 
corresponding external object (bāhyārtha) that it signifies; a 
word, being a designation, is always associated with a 
corresponding external object, just as the word ‘hetu’ – the 
middle term. (The word ‘hetu’ may have ‘smoke’ as the 
corresponding external object.) As the word ‘pramā’ (valid 
apprehension) has a corresponding object that signifies valid 
apprehension, similarly words like ‘māyā’ (deceit), signifying an 
illusory cognition, have corresponding objects that signify 
illusory cognition.
jīva’ ( Ú ðā
tho'kCn% lckákFkZ% laKkRok¼srq'kCnor~ A
ek;kfnHkzkfUrlaKk'p ek;k|S% LoS% izeksfDror~ AA84AA
lkekU;kFkZ & ^
uke:i gksrk gS og cká vFkZ ds fcuk ugha gksrk gS tSls ^ gsrq* 'kCnA (/we 
'kCn tc ^gsrq* dh rjg iz;qDr gksrk gS rc og ^/qvk¡* cká inkFkZ ds 
vfLrRo ds fcuk ugha gksrk gSA) ftl izdkj ^ izek* 'kCn dk cká vFkZ ik;k 
tkrk gS] mlh izdkj ^ ek;k* vkfn HkzkfUr dh laKk,¡ Hkh vius HkzkfUr :i vFkZ 
ls lfgr gksrh gSaA
tho* 'kCn laKk gksus ls cká vFkZ lfgr gS_ tks 'kCn laKk ;k 
The word 'soul' must have a corresponding external object 
(b hy rtha):ā ā
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The three kinds of designations  – a piece of cognition 
(buddhi), a word , and an object (artha) – concurrently 
signify three corresponding comprehensions – a piece of 
cognition (buddhi), a word (śabda), and an object (artha), 
respectively.  And the three kinds of comprehensions reflect 
equally the corresponding designations. (For example, the word 
‘jīva’ – when the designation is jīva-buddhi, it reflects the 
cognition of ‘jīva’; when the designation is jīva-śabda, it reflects 
the word ‘jīva’; and when the designation is jīva-artha, it reflects 
the object that is ‘jīva’.)
(saÚjðā)
(śabda)
cqf¼'kCnkFkZlaKkLrkfLrÏks cq¼Ôkfnokfpdk% A
rqY;k cq¼Ôkfncks/k'p =k;LrRizfrfcEcdk% AA85AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
cqf¼] 'kCn vkSj vFkZ dh leku :Ik ls okpd gSaA vkSj mu laKkvksa ds 
izfrfcEc&Lo:i cqf¼ vkfn dk cks/ Hkh leku :i ls gksrk gSA
cqf¼&laKk] 'kCn&laKk vkSj vFkZ&laKk ;s rhu laKk,¡ Øe'k% 
These three, a piece of cognition (buddhi), a word ( abda), and an 
object (artha), signify three corresponding comprehensions:
ś
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Verse 85
The speaker with a particular piece of cognition , 
the hearer (śrotā) receiving the auditory perception in the form 
of the sentence (vākya), and the subject (pramātā) in whom valid 
knowledge (pramā) inheres as an attribute, are distinctly 
established. In case the method of knowledge (pramāõa) is 
fallacious, the corresponding external objects (bāhyārtha) – in 
the form of internal and external cognition – too will be 
fallacious.
(vaktā) (bodha)
oDr`Jksr`izekr`.kka cks/okD;izek% i`Fkd~ A`
HkzkUrkoso izekHkzkUrkS ckák¿FkkSZ rkn`'ksrjkS AA86AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
dkj.k) gksrk gS] Jksrk (vfHk/s;&ifjKku ds fy,) ftl okD; dks lqurk gS] 
vkSj izekrk dks tks izek (vfHk/s;&fo"k; esa ;ksX;&v;ksX; vFkok 
lR;&vlR; dk fu.kZ;) gksrk gS & ;s rhuksa i`Fkd~&i`Fkd~ O;ofLFkr gSaA (bl 
izdkj foKkuk}Srrk ckf/r Bgjrh gSA) izek.k ds HkzkUr gksus ij vUrKsZ; vkSj 
cfgKsZ; :i ckákFkks± dk foospu Hkh HkzkUr gh BgjsxkA
oÙkQk dk tks (vfHk/s;&fo"k;d) cks/ (okD; dh izo`fÙk esa 
The speaker (vakt ) having the piece of cognition (bodha), the 
hearer (śrotā) hearing the sentence (vākya), and the subject 
(prāmatā) having the knowledge (pramā), are distinct:
ā
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The piece of cognition (buddhi) and the word can be 
sources of valid knowledge (pramāõa) only when the external 
objects (bāhyārtha) corresponding to these exist; not when there 
is absence of the corresponding external objects. Truth is 
established on the existence of the corresponding external 
objects (of the piece of cognition and the word), and untruth 
when the external objects are absent.
(śabda) 
cqf¼'kCnizek.kRoa ckákFksZ Lkfr uklfr A
lR;ku`rO;oLFkSoa ;qT;rs¿FkkZIR;ukfIr"kq AA87AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
vFkZ ds vHkko esa ughaA cká vFkZ dh izkfIr gksus ij lR; dh O;oLFkk vkSj 
cká vFkZ dh izkfIr u gksus ij vLkR; dh O;oLFkk dh tkrh gSA
cqf¼ vkSj 'kCn esa izek.krk cká vFkZ ds gksus ij gksrh gS] cká 
The validity of the knowledge depends on whether there is 
agreement or disagreement with the corresponding external 
object (bahy rtha):ā
Two kinds of sources of valid knowledge  can be 
thought of: one, used for self through the piece of cognition 
(buddhi), and two, used for others through the word ( abda). 
These two can be considered authentic only when there is 
existence of the corresponding external objects (bahyārtha). 
The existence of the corresponding external objects 
(bahyārtha) establishes the authenticity of the speaker (vaktā), 
the hearer (śrotā), and the subject (pramātā) and also of the 
piece of cognition (bodha), the uttered sentence (vākya), and 
the valid knowledge (pramā). The corresponding external 
object (bahyārtha) of the word ‘jīva’ (soul) is thus established. 
(pramāõa)
ś
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Verse 87
The validity of the knowledge depends on whether there is 
agreement or disagreement with the corresponding external 
object (b hy rtha); when there is agreement, the knowledge is 
valid; in case of disagreement, the knowledge is invalid.
ā ā
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If the accomplishment of objects (artha) is due only to fate 
(daiva), then how could human-effort (pauruÈa) be responsible 
for the creation of fate? If it be assumed that fate is responsible 
for the creation of fate, then there is no possibility of attainment 
of liberation (mokÈa), and all human-effort to attain liberation 
(mokÈa) will be futile.
nSoknsokFkZflf¼'psíSoa ikS#"kr% dFke~ A
nSor'psnfueksZ{k% ikS#"ka fu"iQya Hkosr~ AA88AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
gS rks ikS#"k ls nSo dh flf¼ dSls dgh tk ldssxh\ vkSj nSo ls gh nSo dh 
flf¼ ekuus ij dHkh Hkh eks{k ugha gksxkA eks{k ds vHkko esa eks{k izkfIr ds 
fy, iq#"kkFkZ djuk fu"iQy gh gksxkA
;fn nSo ls gh lc vFkZ (iz;kstu&:i dk;Z) dh flf¼ gksrh 
Fault in accepting that the accomplishment of objects is due only 
to fate:
v"Ve ifjPNsn
Section 8
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If the accomplishment of objects (artha) is due only to human-
effort (pauruÈa) then how could fate (daiva) be responsible for 
the creation of human-effort? If it be assumed that only human-
effort is responsible for the creation of human-effort, then all 
human-effort for the accomplishment of objects should always 
be successful.
ikS#"kknso flf¼'psr~ ikS#"ka nSor% dFke~ A
ikS#"kkPpsneks?ka L;kr~ loZizkf.k"kq ikS#"ke~ AA89AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
,dkUr ekuk tk, rks ikS#"k&:i dk;Z dh flf¼ dSls gksrh gS\ ;fn mldh 
nSo ls flf¼ gksrh gS rks ,slk ekuus ij mÙkQ ,dkUr dk fojks/ gksrk gSA vkSj 
;fn ikS#"k ls gh ikS#"k dh flf¼ ekuh tk, rks lc izkf.k;ksa dk ikS#"k veks?k 
(fu"iQy u gksuk) Bgjsxk (tks izR;{k ds fo#¼ gS)A
;fn ikS#"k ls gh lc vFkZ (iz;kstu&:i dk;Z) dh flf¼ dk 
Fault in accepting that the accomplishment of objects is due only 
to human-effort:
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Fault in accepting both, the accomplishment of objects is due only 
to fate and that it is due only to human-effort, without mutual 
relation:
Those who are hostile to the doctrine of conditional predications 
(sy dv da) can also not maintain that the two attributes – viz. 
the accomplishment of objects is due only to fate (daiva) and the 
accomplishment of objects is due only to human-effort (pauruÈa) 
– describe but one and the same phenomenon (i.e., endorsing 
both one-sided, independent standpoints – ubhayaikānta), for 
such a position will be self-contradictory. And if they maintain 
that the phenomena are absolutely indescribable 
(avācyataikānta) then for them even to utter the words ‘the 
phenomenon is indescribable’ is not tenable as it is irrational.
ā ā
fojks/kUuksHk;SdkRE;a L;k}knU;k;fof}"kke~ A
vokP;rSdkUrs¿I;qfDrukZokP;fefr ;qT;rs AA90AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
ikS#"k nksuksa ,dkUrksa dk fujis{k vfLrRo ugha cu ldrk gS D;ksafd nksuksa ds 
loZFkk ,dkRE; ekuus esa fojks/&nks"k vkrk gSA vokP;rk (voDrO;rk) 
,dkUr Hkh ugha cu ldrk gS D;kasfd vokP;rSdkUr esa ^ ;g vokP; gS* ,sls 
okD; dk iz;ksx djus ls og okP; gks tkrk gSA
tks L;k}kn&U;k; ls }s"k j[kus okys gSa muds ;gk¡ nSo vkSj 
14
Verse 90
Both fate and human-effort are jointly responsible for desirable 
and undesirable effects:
The desirable and undesirable effects (k rya) that one begets 
without premeditation should be understood due primarily to 
one’s fate (daiva). (In incidences of such effects human-effort 
(pauruÈa) occupies the secondary role and fate (daiva) the 
primary role.) The desirable and undesirable effects (kārya) that 
one begets in consequence of premeditation should be 
understood due primarily to one’s human-effort (pauruÈa). (In 
incidences of such effects fate (daiva) occupies the secondary 
role and human-effort (pauruÈa) the primary role.)
ā
vcqf¼iwokZis{kk;kfe"Vkfu"Va LonSor% A
cqf¼iwoZO;is{kk;kfe"Vkfu"Va LoikS#"kkr~ AA91AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
fdlh dks vcqf¼iwoZd (cqf¼&O;kikj dh vis{kk ds fcuk) gksrh gS mls 
Lo&nSo&Ñr le>uk pkfg;sA tks b"V vkSj vfu"V vFkZ dh izkfIr cqf¼iwoZd 
(cqf¼&O;kikj dh vis{kk j[kdj) gksrh gS mls Lo&ikS#"k&Ñr le>uk 
pkfg;sA
tks b"V (vuqdwy) vkSj vfu"V (izfrdwy) vFkZ dh izkfIr 
Fate (daiva) – It is invisible (ad a). The word implies one’s 
inherent capability (yogyatā) and the fruition of karmas from 
previous life (pūrva-karma).
Human-effort (pauruÈa) – It is visible (dÃÈÇa). The word 
implies one’s efforts in this life.
Both, fate (daiva) and human-effort (pauruÈa), are respon-
sible for the accomplishment of the object (artha).
ÃÈÇ
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If it be maintained that causing pain to others must necessarily 
result into bondage of demerit (p pa) and that causing pleasure 
to others must necessarily result into bondage of merit (puõya) 
then, being the instrumental cause of pain and pleasure to 
others, inanimate objects (like thorn and poison, milk and 
1sweet-food) and persons free from passions  (like passionless 
saints of high order) must also suffer bondage (of karmas 
involving merit and demerit).
ā
ikia /qzoa ijs nq%[kkr~ iq.;a p lq[krks ;fn A
vpsrukd"kk;kS p cè;s;krka fufeÙkr% AA92AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
vkSj ij dks lq[k nsus ls fuf'pr :i ls iq.; dk cU/ gksuk ekuk tk, rks ij 
ds nq%[k vkSj lq[k esa fufeÙk gksus ds dkj.k vpsru inkFkZ (d.Vdkfnd vkSj 
nqXèkkfnd) vkSj d"kk; jfgr tho (ohrjkx) dks Hkh iki vkSj iq.; dk cU/ 
gksrs jguk pkfg;sA
;fn ij dks nq%[k nsus ls fuf'pr :i ls iki dk cU/ gksuk 
Fault in accepting that causing pain and pleasure to others must 
necessarily result into demerit and merit:
uoe ifjPNsn
Section 9
1. Major passions (ka ya) are four – anger (krodha), pride (m na), 
deceitfulness (māyā), and greed (lobha).
Èā ā
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Fault in accepting that causing pain and pleasure to oneself must 
necessarily result into merit and demerit:
If it be maintained that causing pain to oneself must necessarily 
result into bondage of merit (puõya) and that causing pleasure to 
oneself must necessarily result into bondage of demerit (pāpa) 
then, being the instrumental cause of pain and pleasure to 
oneself, those free from all attachment (vītarāga), and learned 
ascetics must also suffer bondage (of karmas involving merit and 
demerit).
iq.;a /qzoa Lorks nq%[kkr~ ikia p lq[krks ;fn A
ohrjkxks eqfu£o}kaLrkH;ka ;q×T;kfUufeÙkr% AA93AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
gS vkSj vius dks lq[k nsus ls iki dk cU/ fuf'pr :i ls gksrk gS rks ohrjkx 
(d"kk;&jfgr) vkSj fo}ku~ eqfutuksa dks Hkh (iq.; vkSj iki&:i) 
deZ&cU/ gksuk pkfg;s D;ksafd os Hkh vius lq[k vkSj nq%[k dh mRifÙk ds 
fufeÙk&dkj.k gksrs gSaA
;fn vius dks nq%[k nsus ls iq.; dk cU/ fuf'pr :i ls gksrk 
14
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Ācārya Umāsvāmi’s Tattvārthasūtra:
'kqHk% iq.;L;k'kqHk% ikiL; AA6&3AA
Virtuous activity is the cause of merit (puõya) and wicked 
activity is the cause of demerit (pāpa).
Ācārya Pujyapada’s Sarvārthasiddhi
What is good and what is evil? Killing, stealing, copulation, 
etc. are wicked activities of the body. Falsehood, harsh and 
uncivil language are wicked speech-activities. Thoughts of 
violence, envy, calumny, etc. are wicked thought-activities. The 
opposites of these are good. How can activity be good or 
wicked? That activity which is performed with good intentions 
is good. And that which is performed with evil intentions is 
wicked. But the distinction is not based on the activities being 
1the causes of auspicious and inauspicious karmas . In that 
case, there would be no good activities at all, as good activities 
also are admitted to be the cause of bondage of knowledge-
2obscuring karmas etc. (by the Jainas) . That, which purifies 
the soul or by which the soul is purified, is merit (puõya), 
namely that which produces happy feeling etc. That which 
protects or keeps the soul away from good is demerit (pāpa), 
namely that which produces unhappy feeling etc.
Jain, S.A. (1960), “Reality : English Translation of
Shri Pūjyapāda’s Sarvārthasiddhi”, p. 168-169.
Ācārya Kundakunda’s Paðcāstikāya-Sāra
jkxks tLl ilRFkks v.kqdaiklaflnks ; ifj.kkeks A
fpÙks .kfRFk dyqLla iq..ka thoLl vklofn AA (135)
Whenever Jīva has desires high and noble, thoughts based 
on love and sympathy and in whose mind there are no evil 
impulses towards the same, the Karmic matter that causes 
merit flows in as conditioned by the above mentioned 
springs of righteousness.
1. 
activities in themselves. And the consequences are largely 
determined by the intentions underlying any activity.
2. From the real point of view, it is no doubt true that all activities are 
undesirable as every kind of activity is the cause of influx and 
bondage. But from the empirical point of view there is difference. 
Merit leads to pleasure and demerit to pain.
From the Jaina standpoint, intentions are all-important and not 
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Verse 93
frflna cqHkqfD[kna ok nqfgna nV~Bw.k tks nq nqfgne.kks A
ifMoTtfn ra fdo;k rLlslk gksfn v.kqdaik AA (137)
If anyone moved at the sight of the thirsty, the hungry and 
the miserable, offers relief to them, out of pity, then such 
behavior of that person is love or charity.
dksèkks o tnk ek.kks ek;k yksHkks o fpÙkeklsTt A
thoLl dq.kfn [kksga dyqlks fÙk ; ra cqèkk osafr AA (138)
Whenever anger, pride, deceit and covetousness, appear in 
the mind of a Jīva, they create disturbing emotion, interfer-
ing with calmness of thought. This emotional agitation of 
thought is called impure thought by the wise.
pfj;k iekncgqyk dkyqLla yksynk ; fol;slq A
ijifjrkoioknks ikoLl ; vkloa dq.kfn AA (139)
Inordinate taste for worldly things, impure emotions, 
hankering for and indulging in sensual pleasures, causing 
anguish to fellow beings, and slandering them openly or 
covertly; these constitute the spring of evil.
l..kkvks ; frysLlk bafn;olnk ; vÙk#íkf.k· A
.kk.ka p nqIimÙka eksgks ikoIink gksafr AA (140)
The different animal instincts, the different soul-soiling 
emotions, the tempting senses, suffering and wrath, 
undesirable thoughts and corruption of the faculties of 
perception and will; these constitute the spring of evil.
Chakravarti Nayanar, A.,
“Ācārya Kundakunda’s Paðcāstikāya-Sāra”, p. 112-115.
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* ikBkUrj % vê#ð íkf.k
Fault in accepting both, causing pain and pleasure to others and 
to oneself must necessarily result into bondage of karmas, 
without mutual dependence:
Those who are hostile to the doctrine of conditional predications 
(sy dv da) can also not maintain that the two attributes – viz. 
causing pain and pleasure to others and causing pain and 
pleasure to oneself must necessarily result into bondage of 
karmas – describe but one and the same phenomenon (i.e., 
endorsing both one-sided, independent standpoints – 
ubhayaikānta), for such a position will be self-contradictory. And 
if they maintain that the phenomena are absolutely 
indescribable (avācyataikānta) then for them even to utter the 
words ‘the phenomenon is indescribable’ is not tenable as it is 
irrational.
ā ā
fojks/kUuksHk;SdkRE;a L;k}knU;k;fof}"kke~ A
vokP;rSdkUrs¿I;qfDrukZokP;fefr ;qT;rs AA94AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
ij&nq%[k&lq[k vkSj Lo&nq%[k&lq[k tfur iki vkSj iq.; lEcU/h nksuksa 
,dkUrksa dk fujis{k vfLrRo ugha cu ldrk gS D;ksafd nksuksa ds loZFkk 
,dkRE; ekuus esa fojks/&nks"k vkrk gSA vokP;rk (voDrO;rk) ,dkUr Hkh 
ugha cu ldrk gS D;kasfd vokP;rSdkUr esa ^ ;g vokP; gS* ,sls okD; dk 
iz;ksx djus ls og okP; gks tkrk gSA
tks L;k}kn&U;k; ls }s"k j[kus okys gSa muds ;gk¡ 
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Verse 94
Auspicious or inauspicious kinds of dispositions cause the influx 
of meritorious or demeritorious karmas:
When pleasure and pain in oneself and in others are due to the 
1limbs (a ga) of the auspicious kind of disposition (vi uddhi) , 
these are causes of the influx of meritorious karmas (puõya). 
When pleasure and pain in oneself and in others are due to the 
2limbs of the inauspicious kind of disposition (saÚkleśa) , these 
are causes of the influx of demeritorious karmas (pāpa). O Lord ! 
In your view, if pleasure and pain in oneself and in others are not 
due to the auspicious or inauspicious kinds of dispositions then 
there cannot be influx of meritorious or demeritorious karmas; 
these do not yield any fruit.
ô ś
fo'kqf¼laDys'kkÄa psr~ LoijLFka lq[kklq[ke~ Aõ
iq.;ikikÏokS ;qDrkS u psn~O;FkZLrokgZr% AA95AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
iq.; dk vkÏo gksrk gS vkSj ;fn laDys'k dk vax gS rks iki dk vkÏo gksrk 
gSA gs Hkxou~ ! vkids er esa ;fn Lo&ijLFk lq[k vkSj nq%[k fo'kqf¼ vkSj 
laDys'k ds dkj.k ugha gSa rks iq.; vkSj iki dk vkÏo O;FkZ gS] vFkkZr~ mudk 
dksbZ iQy ugha gksrk gSA
;fn Lo&ij esa gksus okyk lq[k&nq%[k fo'kqf¼ dk vax gS rks 
1. auspicious kind of disposition (vi uddhi) – due to virtuous 
(dharmya) and pure (śukla) kinds of concentration. There are three 
limbs (aôga) of the auspicious kind of disposition – its cause 
(kāraõa), its effect (kārya), and its own-nature (svabhāva).
2. inauspicious kind of disposition (saÚkleśa) – due to sorrowful (ārta) 
and cruel (raudra) kinds of concentration. This also has three limbs 
– its cause (kāraõa), its effect (kārya), and its own-nature 
(svabhāva).
ś
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If ignorance (aj na) be considered an assured cause of bondage 
(bandha) then since there are infinite knowables (jðeya), no one 
can become an Omniscient (kevalin) [i.e., the one who has 
attained omniscience (kevalajðāna)]. If it be maintained that 
liberation (mokÈa) results from even slight-knowledge 
(alpajðāna) then, because of the persistent presence of acute 
ignorance, the cause of bondage will persist (and, as such, 
attainment of liberation cannot be imagined).
ðā
vKkukPpsn~/qzoks cU/ks Ks;k¿uUR;kUu dsoyh A
KkuLrksdkf}eks{k'psnKkukn~cgqrks¿U;Fkk AA96AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
dksbZ Hkh dsoyh ugha gks ldrk gSA vkSj ;fn vYiKku ls eks{k dh izkfIr ekuh 
tk, rks vKku ds cgqr gksus ds dkj.k cU/ dk izlax lnk cuk jgsxk vkSj 
blfy, eks{k dk gksuk ughsa cu ldsxkA
;fn vKku ls cU/ fu;e ls gksrk gS rks Ks;ksa ds vuUr gksus ls 
Fault in views that ignorance is the cause of bondage and that 
liberation is possible with slight-knowledge:
n'ke ifjPNsn
Section 10
The S khya view that only through the realization of his 
independence from the environment including his own psycho-
physical mechanism, Puru a attains perfect knowledge, is the 
point of contention in this verse. According to the SāÚkhya 
view, with his discriminative knowledge Puruśa is able to 
āÚ
ś
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perceive that the activities are all due to Prak ti while he 
himself remains in unruffled peace. PrakÃti, which continues 
to spin round on account of its own impulse, can no more 
influence the liberated Puruśa because he has attained 
freedom on account of his discriminative knowledge.
Ã
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Fault in accepting that ignorance is an assured cause of bondage 
and even slight-knowledge is the cause of liberation, without 
mutual relation:
Those who are hostile to the doctrine of conditional predications 
(sy dv da) can also not maintain that the two attributes – viz. 
ignorance (ajðāna) is an assured cause of bondage (bandha) and 
even slight-knowledge (alpajðāna) is the cause of liberation 
(mokÈa) – describe but one and the same phenomenon (i.e., 
endorsing both one-sided, independent standpoints – 
ubhayaikānta), for such a position will be self-contradictory. And 
if they maintain that the phenomena are absolutely 
indescribable (avācyataikānta) then for them even to utter the 
words ‘the phenomenon is indescribable’ is not tenable as it is 
irrational.
ā ā
fojks/kUuksHk;SdkRE;a L;k}knU;k;fof}"kke~ A
vokP;rSdkUrs¿I;qfDrukZokP;fefr ;qT;rs AA97AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
cU/ vkSj vYiKku ls eks{k nksuksa ,dkUrksa dk fujis{k vfLrRo ugha cu ldrk 
gS D;ksafd nksuksa ds loZFkk ,dkRE; ekuus esa fojks/&nks"k vkrk gSA vokP;rk 
(voDrO;rk) ,dkUr Hkh ugha cu ldrk gS D;kasfd vokP;rSdkUr esa ^ ;g 
vokP; gS* ,sls okD; dk iz;ksx djus ls og okP; gks tkrk gSA
tks L;k}kn&U;k; ls }s"k j[kus okys gSa muds ;gk¡ vKku ls 
15
Verse 97
The real causes of bondage and liberation:
Bondage (bandha) is caused due to ignorance 
accompanied by delusion (moha), and bondage is not caused due 
to ignorance (ajðāna) not accompanied by delusion (moha). In 
the same way, liberation (mokÈa) is caused due to slight-
knowledge (alpajðāna) not accompanied by delusion (moha), 
and liberation (mokÈa) is not caused due to slight-knowledge 
(alpajðāna) accompanied by delusion (moha).
(ajðāna) 
vKkukUeksfguks cU/ks ukKkuk}hreksgr% A
KkuLrksdkPp eks{k% L;kneksgkUeksfguks¿U;Fkk AA98AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
cU/ ugha gksrk gSA blh izdkj eksg&jfgr vYi&Kku ls eks{k gksrk gS] fdUrq 
eksg&lfgr vYi&Kku ls eks{k ugha gksrk gSA
eksg&lfgr vKku ls cU/ gksrk gS vkSj eksg&jfgr vKku ls 
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Dispositions, like attachment or desire, originate according to the 
type of karmic bondage:
The origination of dispositions, like attachment or desire, is 
variegated (vicitra) according to the type of karmic bondage 
(karmabandha), and this karmic bondage originates from its 
own appropriate causes. The souls subject to karmic bondage are 
of two types – those possessing spiritual purity (śuddhi) [and 
destined to attain liberation (mokÈa) – bhavya jīva], and those 
possessing spiritual impurity (aśuddhi) [and destined not to 
attain liberation (mokÈa) – abhavya jīva].
dkekfnizHkof'p=k% deZcU/kuq:ir% A
rPp deZ LogsrqH;ks thokLrs 'kq¼Ô'kqf¼r% AA99AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
og deZcU/ ds vuqlkj gksrh gS rFkk deZcU/ vius dkj.kksa ds vuq:i gksrk 
gSA ftUgsa deZcU/ gksrk gS os tho 'kqf¼ vkSj v'kqf¼ ds Hksn ls nks izdkj ds 
(HkO; vkSj vHkO;) gksrs gSaA
bPNk vkfn Hkkolalkj&:i dk;ks± dh mRifÙk fofp=k gS vkSj 
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Verse 99
The manifestation of purity in a soul has a beginning while the 
manifestation of impurity is beginningless:
These, purity and impurity (a , are two kinds of 
power akin to the cookability (pākya) or the non-cookability 
(apākya) of a cereal (viz. beans like uÃada and mūôga). The 
manifestation of purity (in a soul) has a beginning while the 
manifestation of impurity is beginningless. And, being (the 
soul’s) own-nature (svabhāva), it is not open to logical argument 
(tarka).
(śuddhi) śuddhi)
'kq¼Ô'kq¼h iqu% 'kDrh rs ikD;kikD;'kfDror~ A
lk|uknh r;ksO;ZDrh LoHkkoks¿rdZxkspj% AA100AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
dh v;ksX;rk & fdlh&fdlh ew¡x ;k mM+n dks fdruk Hkh idk;k tk, og 
idrk ugha gS) dh rjg 'kqf¼ vkSj v'kqf¼ ;s nks 'kfDr;k¡ gSaA 'kqf¼ dh O;fÙkQ 
lkfn vkSj v'kqf¼ dh O;fÙkQ vukfn gSA ;g oLrq&LoHkko gS tks rdZ dk 
fo"k; ugha gksrk gSA
ikD;&'kfDr (idus dh ;ksX;rk) vkSj vikD;&'kfDr (idus 
The capacities (purity and impurity) of two kinds of souls are 
compared with those of beans; some of these become soft and 
edible on being stewed and others remain hard even after being 
stewed for a long time. It is not possible to know beforehand 
whether a particular bean is edible or non-edible. On being 
boiled some beans, as per their nature, will become soft; the 
others, as per their nature, will remain hard as before. In the 
same manner, it is not possible to know beforehand whether a 
person has the capacity to attain liberation (mok a) or not. È
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Austerities (tapas) and observance of vows (vrata) are like 
heating our souls up. On performance of such laudable efforts, 
some will acquire true knowledge and attain liberation, but 
others will not be able to get rid of worldly sufferings and are 
destined to stay forever in the cycle of rebirths (saÚsāra). The 
attainment of purity in a soul has a beginning but impurity is 
beginningless.
In this verse Ācārya Samantabhadra makes an important 
point: purity or impurity of souls is their inherent nature 
(svabhāva) and, therefore, not open to logical argument 
(tarka). We cannot know through indirect knowledge of the 
senses if a person has the capacity to attain liberation (mokÈa); 
only the Omniscient can know this.
15
Verse 100
That by which substances (souls and non-souls) are rightly 
known, or knowledge alone, is pram a:āõ
O Lord ! As per your teaching, that by which substances (souls 
and non-souls) are rightly known, or knowledge alone, is 
pramāõ ( the method of knowledge). āõ is of two 
kinds: first, direct (pratyakÈa) – omniscience (kevalajðāna) – 
which knows the whole range of objects of knowledge 
simultaneously, without gradation (akramabhāvī), and second, 
indirect (parokÈa), which knows the objects of knowledge 
partially and in succession (kramabhāvī). Knowledge in 
succession features the doctrine of conditional predications – 
syādvāda, and ascertainment, without contradiction, of one 
particular state or mode of the object, called naya.
a lit. Pram a 
rÙoKkua izek.ka rs ;qxiRloZHkklue~ A
ØeHkkfo p ;TKkua L;k}knu;laLÑre~ AA101AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
rÙoKku nks izdkj dk gS & vØeHkkoh vkSj ØeHkkohA tks Kku ,d lkFk 
(;qxir~) lEiw.kZ inkFkks± dks tkurk gS] ,slk izR;{k dsoyKku vØeHkkoh gSA 
tks Kku (efrKku vkfn) Øe ls inkFkks± dks tkurk gS og ØeHkkoh gSA 
ØeHkkoh Kku L;k}kn vkSj u; nksuksa ls laLÑr gksrk gSA
gs Hkxou~~ ! vkids er esa rÙoKku dks izek.k dgk x;k gSA 
The ordinary human being cannot rise above the limitations of 
his senses; his apprehension of reality is partial and it is valid 
only from a particular viewpoint. This leads to the nayav da of 
the Jainas. When ordinary human knowledge is partial, a new 
method of stating our approach to the complex reality had to be 
devised, and that is syādvāda, the doctrine of conditional 
ā
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predications. Thus the doctrine is the direct result of the 
strong awareness of the complexity of the object of knowledge 
and the limitations of human apprehension and expression.
Pram a is the comprehensive view; naya is the partial 
view.
Ācārya Kundakunda’s Pravacanasāra:
tkna l;a leÙka .kk.ke.karRFkfoRFkMa foeya A
jfg;a rq vksXxgkfn¯g lqga fr ,xafr;a Hkf.k;a AA1&59AA
That self-born, perfect and pure knowledge which spreads 
over infinite things and which is free from the stages of 
perception such as apprehension and speculation is called 
1the real happiness .
Upadhye, A.N. (1935),
“Śrī Kundakundācārya’s Pravacanasāra”, p. 76.
While the self-born, direct knowledge (or omniscience) is 
utterly pure and free from stages, the sensory knowledge 
(matijðāna) has four stages as mentioned in the following 
sūtra.
Ācārya Umāsvāmi’s Tattvārthasūtra:
voxzgsgk¿ok;/kj.kk% AA1&15AA
(The four divisions of sensory knowledge are) apprehen-
sion (sensation), speculation, perceptual judgement, and 
retention.
Jain, S.A. (1960), “Reality : English Translation of
Shri Pūjyapāda’s Sarvārthasiddhi”, p. 23.
āõ
1. Ignorance, the result of knowledge-obscuring karmas, is misery in 
this world. Real happiness consists in destroying the karmas and 
attaining omniscience, the very nature of the self.
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Fruits of the two kinds of pram a:āõ
The fruit of the first kind of – direct  or 
omniscience (kevalajðāna) – is equanimity (upekÈā). The fruit of 
the other kinds of pramāõa – indirect (parokÈa) – is discernment, 
i.e., acceptance (grahaõa) or rejection (tyāga); besides, of course, 
equanimity, as stated above. Destruction of ignorance (ajðāna) 
about the self, however, is the actual fruit of all methods of 
knowledge (pramāõa).
pramāõa (pratyakÈa)
mis{kkiQyek|L; 'ks"kL;k¿¿nkugku/h% A
iwokZ ok¿Kkuuk'kks ok loZL;kL; Loxkspjs AA102AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
iQy mis{kk gSA 'ks"k tks ØeHkkoh&Hkklu:i izek.k (eR;kfn Kku&lewg) gS 
mldk ijaijk iQy vknku (xzg.k) vkSj gku (R;kx) dh cqf¼ gSA vFkok 
iwoZ esa dgh xbZ mis{kk Hkh mldk iQy gSA okLro esa vius fo"k; esa vKku 
dk uk'k gksuk gh lc izek.k&:i Kkuksa dk iQy gSA
izFke tks ;qxiRloZHkklu:i izek.k (dsoyKku) gS] mldk 
Ācārya Umāsvāmi’s Tattvārthasūtra 
kinds of knowledge constitute the two types of pramā a:
rRizek.ks AA1&10AA
These (five kinds of knowledge) are the two types of 
pramāõa (valid knowledge).
As regard the fruit of pramāõa, there is satisfaction in the 
attainment of knowledge. The soul, whose knowledge-nature 
is clouded by the foreign matter of karmas, finds satisfaction in 
determining the nature of substances with the help of the 
asserts that the five 
õ
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senses. That is spoken of as the fruit of knowledge (or of 
pramāõa). Or the attainment of equanimity (upekÈā) and the 
destruction of ignorance (ajðāna) may be considered the fruit. 
Equanimity is freedom from attachment and aversion. Also, on 
the destruction of darkness, that is ignorance, the self attains 
the power of discrimination between what needs to be accepted 
and rejected.
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The word ‘sy t’ is used to assert a particular attribute of the 
object of knowledge and explicatory of the manifold points of 
view (anekānta):
ā
O Lord ! The word ‘sy t’, used in conjunction with the object of 
knowledge (artha), imparts to your sentences a definitive 
meaning explicatory of the manifold points of view (anekānta) 
and corroborates a particular attribute of the object. The word 
1‘syāt’ is a nipāta  – a particle, an indeclinable – acknowledged by 
the Omniscients (kevalins) as well as the all-knowing Masters of 
Scripture (śrutakevalins); it qualifies the meaning of the 
sentence concerned.
ā
okD;s"ousdkUr|ksrh xE;a izfr fo'ks"k.ke~ A
L;kfUuikrks¿FkZ;ksfxRokÙko dsofyukefi AA103AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
(tSls ^L;knfLr ?kV%* esa) gksus ds dkj.k vusdkUr dk |ksrd gksrk gSA 
dsofy;ksa vkSj Jqrdsofy;ksa ds Hkh okD;ksa esa iz;qDr ^L;kr~* 'kCn fuikr 
(vO;;) gS vkSj xE;&cksè; (foof{kr vFkZ) dk fo'ks"k.k (cks/d& 
lwpd) gksrk gSA
gs Hkxou~ ! ^ L;kr~* 'kCn vFkZ (Ks; inkFkZ) ds lkFk lEc¼ 
1. An avyaya is a preposition, an indeclinable word or particle; a kind 
of compound. Nipāta words are parts of avyaya used to 
communicate the meaning. The word ‘syāt’ is used in relation to a 
particular meaning, not in terms of doubt, possibility or vacillation 
(maybe, perhaps).
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Sy dv da is the doctrine of conditional predications, renouncing 
the absolutist view:
ā ā
Discarding the absolutist (ek nta) point of view and observing 
the practice of using the word ‘kathaôcit’ – ‘from a certain 
viewpoint’, or ‘in a respect’, or ‘under a certain condition’ – is 
what is known as syādvāda – the doctrine of conditional 
predications. It embraces the seven limbs (saptabhaôga) of 
assertion, the one-sided but relative method of comprehension 
(naya), and also the acceptance and rejection of the assertion.
ā
L;k}kn% loZFkSdkUrR;kxkr~ ¯do`Ùkfpf}f/% A
lIrHkaxu;kis{kks gs;kns;fo'ks"kd% AA104AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
L;k}kn gSA (blfy, dFkf×pr~ vkfn 'kCn L;k}kn ds i;kZ;okph gSaA) 
L;k}kn lIrHkaxksa vkSj u;ksa dh vis{kk dks fy, jgrk gS rFkk gs; vkSj mikns; 
dk fo'ks"kd (Hksnd) gksrk gSA
loZFkk ,dkUr dk R;kx djds dFkf×pr~ fo/ku djus dk uke 
The particle ‘syāt’ in a sentence qualifies the acceptance or 
rejection of the proposition or predication expressed by the 
sentence. It refers to a ‘point of view’ or ‘in a particular 
context’ or ‘in a particular sense’. The ‘vāda’ presents a theory 
of logic and metaphysics. Syādvāda means a theory of 
predication of reality from different points of view, in different 
contexts or from different universes of discourse. Syādvāda is 
the expression of the pictures of reality obtained from different 
points of view in definite and determinate logical predications. 
Syādvāda promotes catholic outlook of many-sided approach 
to the problem of knowledge of reality. It is anti-dogmatic and it 
16
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presents a synoptic picture of reality from different points of 
view. Sy dv da expresses a protest against one-sided, narrow, 
dogmatic and fanatical approach to the problems of reality. It 
affirms that there are different facets of reality and these have 
to be understood from various points of view by the 
predications of affirmation, negation and indescribability.
Anekānta is the basic understanding of the complexity of 
reality and the necessity of looking at it from different points of 
view. Syādvāda is the expression of the anekāntavāda in logical 
and predicational form. In this sense, anekāntavāda is the 
foundational principle and syādvāda is the logical expression 
1of the foundational principle.
In the presentation of the nature of an object in its infinite 
aspects we have to adopt the sevenfold predicational form 
(saptabhaôgī) which includes the positive and the negative 
predications without contradicting each other. The nature of 
the object can be considered from seven points of view and 
their predications would be sevenfold. Everything can be 
presented through sevenfold predications. These predications 
have been worked out on the basis of permutations of the 
fundamental threefold predications of affirmation, negation 
and indescribability. A limb (bhaôga) refers to the partial 
presentation or a particular form of expression. Saptabhaôgī is 
the sum total of the seven limbs of logical expression. It is the 
expression of the psychological basis in nayavāda.
ā ā
1. See 
Philosophy”, p. 240.
Shastri, Devendra Muni (1983), “A Source-book in Jaina 
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The doctrine of conditional predications (sy dv da) and 
omniscience (kevalajðāna) are both illuminators of reality:
ā ā
Sy dv da, the doctrine of conditional predications, and 
kevalajðāna, omniscience, are both illuminators of the 
substances of reality. The difference between the two is that 
while kevalajðāna illumines directly, syādvāda illumines 
indirectly. Anything which is not illuminated or expressed by the 
two is not a substance of reality and hence a non-substance 
(avastu).
ā ā
L;k}kndsoyKkus loZrÙoizdk'kus A
Hksn% lk{kknlk{kkPp áoLRoU;rea Hkosr~ AA105AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
izdk'kd gSaA nksuksa ds izdk'ku esa lk{kkr~ (izR;{k) vkSj vlk{kkr~ (ijks{k) dk 
Hksn gSA tks oLrq bu nksuksa Kkuksa esa fdlh Hkh Kku dk fo"k; ugha gksrh gS og 
voLrq gSA
L;k}kn vkSj dsoyKku nksuksa lEiw.kZ rÙoksa (thokfn) ds 
Syādvāda and kevalajðāna are the foundational facts of 
knowledge. The difference between the two is that 
kevalajðāna is the complete and all-emracing knowledge of 
reality while syādvāda is the conditional predication of the 
individual propositions of the knowledge obtained in 
kevalajðāna. Kevalajðāna is the direct experience and 
syādvāda is its indirect expression.
163
Verse 105
A naya gives expression to a particular aspect of an object, 
comprehended fully by sy dv da:ā ā
A naya gives expression to a particular aspect (like ‘nityatva’) of 
an object, comprehended fully by syādvāda, through the use of 
homogeneous (sādharmya) or heterogenous (vaidharmya) 
example (drÈÇānta) to establish, without contradiction, 
inseparable connection (vyāpti) between the major term 
(sādhya) and the middle term (hetu). (Thus, naya is designated 
here as a virtual synonym of hetu, beside its usual designation as 
a relative, one-sided comprehension.)
l/eZ.kSo lkè;L; lk/E;kZnfojks/r% A
L;k}knizfoHkDrkFkZfo'ks"kO;Û“dks u;% AA106AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
n`"VkUr ds lkFk oS/E;Z }kjk fcuk fdlh fojks/ ds tks L;k}kn&:i ijekxe 
ds fo"k;Hkwr vFkZ&fo'ks"k (^fuR;Ro* vkfn) dk O;×td gksrk gS] og u; 
dgykrk gSA
lkè; dk lk/E;Z n`"VkUr ds lkFk lk/E;Z }kjk vkSj oS/E;Z 
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A substance (dravya) is an inseparable consolidation of 
attributes:
A substance (dravya) is an inseparable consolidation of 
attributes expressed through all one-sided, but relative, 
comprehensions (naya) and their subdivisions (upanaya), 
pertaining to the three times (the past, the present, and the 
future). It is one (with respect to the dravyārthika naya) and 
many (with respect to the paryāyārthika naya).
u;ksiu;SdkUrkuka f=kdkykuka leqPp;% A
vfoHkzkM~HkkolEcU/ks æO;esdeusd/k AA107AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
fo"k;Hkwr (,dkUr fo"k;ksa dk) vusd /eks± ds rknkRE; lEcU/ dks izkIr 
leqnk; dk uke æO; gSA og æO; ,d Hkh gS vkSj vusd Hkh gSA
rhuksa dkyksa dks fo"k; djus okys u;ksa vkSj miu;ksa ds 
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The conglomeration of inter-dependent and relative assertions 
reveals the true nature of an object:
If it be said that the conglomeration of unseemly propositions 
[purported to be made by independent, one-sided points of view 
(naya) in isolation (of reality)] is bound to be false, our reply is 
that this is not correct. In your scheme, O Lord, only those one-
sided points of view (naya) which make absolute and non-
relative assertions are false; assertions which are inter-
dependent and relative, in fact, each reveal an aspect of truth, 
and their conglomeration, therefore, reveals the true nature of 
an object.
feF;klewgks feF;k psUu feF;SdkUrrkfLr u% A
fujis{kk u;k feF;k lkis{kk oLrq rs¿FkZÑr~ AA108AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
ekuus ij mudk leqnk;&:i nzO; Hkh feF;k gh ekuuk pkfg;sA ;g Bhd 
ugha gS D;ksafd L;k}kfn;ksa ds ;gk¡ feF;SdkUrrk ugha gS] dsoy fujis{k u; gh 
feF;k gksrs gSaA gs Hkxou~ ! vkids er esa u; ijLij lkis{k gSa vkSj blfy, 
muds fo"k; vFkZfØ;kdkjh gksrs gSa (vkSj blfy, muds lewg ds oLrqiuk 
lq?kfVr gS)A
dksbZ dg ldrk gS fd fuR;Ro vkfn ,dkUr /eks± dks feF;k 
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A sentence asserts, either positively or negatively, a particular 
characteristic of the multifarious nature of an entity:
In the doctrine of non-absolutism (anek ntav da), a sentence 
asserts, either positively (vidhi) or negatively (niÈedha), a 
particular characteristic of the multifarious nature of an entity. 
Irrespective of whether the sentence asserts the characteristic 
positively or negatively, both such (seemingly contradictory) 
characteristics are present in it. Without the acceptance of this 
feature (i.e., if only the positive or the negative characteristic is 
assumed to be present in the entity), the entity is bound to 
become a nonentity (avastu).
ā ā
fu;E;rs¿FkksZ okD;su fof/uk okj.ksu ok A
rFkk¿U;Fkk p lks¿o';efo'ks";RoeU;Fkk AA109AA
lkekU;kFkZ & (oLrq&rÙo ds 
dSls fu;fer fd;k tkrk gS mldk lek/ku &) vusdkUrkRed oLrq&rÙo 
dk fof/&okD; vFkok fu"ks/&okD; ds }kjk fu;eu gksrk gSA vusdkUrkRed 
gksus ls oLrq&rÙo fof/&:i Hkh gS vkSj fu"ks/&:i Hkh gSA ;fn ,slk u ekuk 
tk, rks dsoy fof/&okD; vFkok dsoy fu"ks/&okD; ls tks ,dkUr&:i 
fo'ks"; (oLrq&rÙo) gS og voLrq gh gSA
vusdkUrkRed gksrs gq, Hkh mls okD; }kjk 
The basic thesis in Jainism is the non-one-sided (anek nta) 
nature of reality. A thing is supposed to have infinite-fold 
characteristics or properties. It becomes imperative, therefore, 
to apply all kinds of predicates, including seemingly 
contradictory ones, to describe its singular aspect depending 
on one’s point of view. To illustrate, an entity has an aspect that 
ā
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is unchanging – this is its ‘sat’ aspect or ‘svabh va’ aspect or its 
‘substance’ aspect. The reality seems to be unchanging when 
we consider its ‘substantial’ aspect but it seems to be ever-
changing when we consider its qualities and modes. 
Anekāntavāda synthesizes the two aspects and builds them 
into a coherent whole.
All standpoints (naya) are right in their own respective 
spheres but if they are taken to be refutations, each of the 
other, they are wrong. A man who knows the ‘non-one-sided’ 
nature of reality never says that a particular view is absolutely 
wrong. A naya deals only with the particular point of view of 
the speaker and does not deny the remaining points of view, not 
under consideration at the moment.
ā
Ācārya Samantabhadra’s Svayambhūstotra:
foof{krks eq[; brh";rs¿U;ks xq.kks¿foo{kks u fujkRedLrs A
rFkkfjfe=kkuqHk;kfn'kfDr}Z;ko/s% dk;Zdja fg oLrq AA
(11-3-53)
Ś āô ā
The sevenfold mode of predications (saptabha gī) with its 
partly meant and partly non-meant affirmation (vidhi) and 
O Lord ! You had pronounced that the naya 
deals with a particular attribute that is under 
consideration – called the primary attribute – of a 
substance and it does not deny the existence of the 
remaining attributes – called the secondary attributes. A 
substance, thus, exhibits attributes like a friend, a foe, and 
neither a friend nor a foe; it incorporates duality of 
1attributes (and their combinations)  which truly explain 
its existence.
rey san tha 
ô
1. See 
Svayambhūstotra”, p. 72-75.
Jain, Vijay K. (2015), “Ācārya Samantabhadra’s 
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negation , qualified with the word ‘syāt’ (literally, in 
some respect; indicative of conditionality of predication) 
dispels any contradictions that can occur in thought. The 
student of metaphysics in Jainism is advised to mentally insert 
the word ‘syāt’ before every statement of fact that he comes 
across, to warn him that it has been made from one particular 
point of view, which he must ascertain.
(niÈedha)
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Ācārya AmÃtcandra’s PuruÈārthasiddhyupāya:
ijekxeL; chta fuf"k¼tkR;U/flU/qjfo/kue~ A
ldyu;foyflrkuka fojks/eFkua uekE;usdkUre~ AA 2 AA
I bow to Anekānta (the doctrine of manifold points of view – 
relative pluralism), the root of unmatched Jaina Scripture, 
that reconciles the partial viewpoints of men, born blind, 
about the elephant, and which removes all contradictions 
about the nature of substances by apprehending reality 
through multiplicity of viewpoints.
Ācārya AmÃtcandra has termed the doctrine of non-
absolutism (anekāntavāda) as the root of the Jaina Scripture. 
Without a clear understanding of this gem of Jainism, men of 
this world are like the blind men of the parable ; they insist on 
their partial knowledge being accepted for the whole truth.
1
1. See 
siddhyupāya – with Hindi and English Translation”, p. 3-4.
Jain, Vijay K. (2012), “Shri Amritchandra Suri’s PuruÈārtha-
The nature of reality can be predicated only through a sentence 
that incorporates both the affirmation and negation, depending 
on the point of view:
The nature of reality is such that it can be predicated only 
through a sentence that incorporates both the affirmation (‘that 
is’ – tat) and negation (‘that is not’ – atat), depending on the 
point of view. (In case a sentence predicates affirmation, 
affirmation is the primary theme and negation is present but as 
a secondary theme; in case a sentence predicates negation, 
negation is the primary theme and affirmation is present but as 
a secondary theme.) A predication that takes the absolutist view 
of either affirmation or negation is not true. And how can one 
describe the nature of reality through such a false sentence?
rnr}Lrq okxs"kk rnsosR;uq'kklrh A
u lR;k L;kUe`"kkokD;S% dFka rÙokFkZns'kuk AA110AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
oLrq dks loZFkk rr~&:i (lr~&fuR;kfn&:i) vFkok loZFkk vrr~&:i 
(vlr~&vfuR;kfn&:i) gh izfrikfnr djrk gS og lR; ugha gSA ,sls feF;k 
opuksa ds }kjk rÙokFkZ (rÙo&Lo:i) dk izfriknu dSls gks ldrk gS\
oLrq rr~ vkSj vrr~ (lr~ vkSj vlr~ vkfn) :i gSA tks okD; 
Ācārya Samantabhadra’s Svayambhūstotra:
rnso p L;kÂ rnso p L;kr~ rFkkizrhrsLro rRdFkf×pr~ A
UkkR;UreU;RoeuU;rk p fo/s£u"ks/L; p 'kwU;nks"kkr~ AA
(9-2-42)
O Lord Suvidhinātha ! Your description of reality 
postulates that, as established by experience, there is the 
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conditional affirmation of a substance, from a particular 
point of view, and also the conditional negation, from 
another point of view. The two views, existence and non-
existence, are not without any limitation; these views are 
neither totally inclusive nor totally exclusive to each other. 
Leaving out the limitation will lead to nihilistic delusion.
fuR;a rnsosnfefr izrhrsuZ fuR;eU;Rk~izfrifÙkfl¼s% A
Uk rf}#¼a cfgjUrjÄfufeÙkuSfefÙkd;ksxrLrs AAõ
(9-3-43)
When we reckon the existence of a substance we maintain 
that it is eternal and when we reckon the non-existence of 
that substance we maintain that it is perishable. O Lord 
Suvidhinātha ! You had declared that the two views that 
proclaim the same substance to be eternal as well as 
perishable are reconciled by the doctrine of material or 
internal cause (upādāna kartā) and the auxiliary or 
external cause (nimitta kartā) in the performance of any 
action.
Jain, Vijay K. (2015),
“Ācārya Samantabhadra’s Svayambhūstotra”, p. 59-60.
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A sentence while calling attention to its own general meaning 
simultaneously negates the other meanings:
It is the nature of a sentence that while calling attention to its 
own general meaning expressly conveyed by it, it also negates 
the meanings that may be conveyed by other (unspoken) 
sentences. (For example, the sentence, “Bring the jar,” not only 
conveys to the listener to bring the jar but also that a piece of 
cloth, a table, or a lamp, are not to be brought. Thus, while a 
sentence affirms its own meaning, it also simultaneously 
negates the other meanings.) If a sentence is thought of as 
capable only of expressing its own general meaning without 
negating what is not meant, the speech becomes a nonentity like 
the ‘sky-flower’ ( k apu pa).ā āś È
okd~LoHkkoks¿U;okxFkZizfr"ks/fujÄ~dq'k% A
vkg p LokFkZlkekU;a rkn`XokD;a [kiq"ior~ AA111AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
izfriknu djrk gqvk vU; okD;ksa ds vFkZ dk izfr"ks/ djus esa fujadq'k 
(Lora=k) gksrk gSA bl okD;&LoHkko ls fHkUu tks loZFkk vU;kiksgkRed 
(fu"ks/&:i) okD; gS og ^vkdk'kiq"i* ds lkeku voLrq gSA
okD; dk ;g LoHkko gS fd og vius vFkZ lkekU; dk 
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The use of the word ‘sy t’ acts like a stamp of truth that enables 
the listener to grasp the intended particular meaning of a 
sentence:
ā
If it be said  that a sentence expressing the universality 
(s m nya) aspect, in fact, denotes only the particularity (vi e a) 
aspect, this is not correct since the speech then becomes a 
nonentity. The use of the word ‘syāt’ acts like a stamp of truth 
that enables the listener to grasp the intended particular 
meaning. (An entity has both the universality (sāmānya) as well 
as the particularity (viśeÈa) aspects. When the expression makes 
the universality aspect as its subject, the particularity aspect 
becomes secondary and when the expression makes the 
particularity aspect as its subject, the universality aspect 
becomes secondary; this is doubtlessly achieved by using the 
word ‘syāt’ in the expression.) 
1
ā ā ś È
lkekU;okfXo'ks"ks psUu 'kCnkFkksZ e`"kk fg lkA
vfHkizsrfo'ks"kkIrs% L;kRdkj% lR;yk×Nu% AA112AA
lkekU;kFkZ & ;fn dgk tk, fd (
vU;kiksg&:i (ij ds vHkko&:i) fo'ks"k dk izfriknu djrs gSa] rks ,slk 
ekuuk Bhd ugha gS D;ksafd vU;kiksg 'kCn dk vFkZ fl¼ ugha gksrk gSA vr% 
vU;kiksg dk izfriknu djus okys opu feF;k gSaA vkSj vfHkizsr vFkZ fo'ks"k 
dh izkfIr gksus ls L;kRdkj (L;k}kn) lR; dk fpÉ gSA
^vfLr* vkfn) lkekU; okD; 
1. In the Buddhist concept of ‘any poha-v da’, the word is capable 
only of negating what is not meant, without affirming anything.
ā ā
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Verse 112
Affirmation, when not in conflict with negation, yields the 
desired result of describing truly an object of knowledge:
Affirmation, when not in conflict with negation, yields the 
desired result of describing truly an object of knowledge. Only 
when affirmation and negation are juxtaposed in mutually non-
conflicting situation, one is able to decide whether to accept or 
reject the assertion. This is how the doctrine of conditional 
predications (sy dv da) establishes the truth.ā ā
fo/s;ehfIlrkFkkZÄa izfr"ksè;kfojksf/ ;r~ Aõ 
rFkSok¿¿ns;gs;Rofefr L;k}knlafLFkfr% AA113AA
lkekU;kFkZ & 
dh flf¼ dk dkj.k gSA fo/s; dks izfr"ksè; dk vfojks/h gksus ds dkj.k gh 
oLrq vkns; vkSj gs; gSA bl izdkj ls L;k}kn dh (;qfDr'kkÐkfojks/ ds 
dkj.k) lE;d~ fLFkfr (flf¼) gksrh gSA
izfr"ksè; dk vfojks/h tks fo/s; gS og bZfIlr (vHkh"V) vFkZ 
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ĀptamīmāÚsā
The ‘ ptam m s ’ has been composed for the seekers of own 
well-being:
Ā ī āÚ ā
This treatise – Deep Reflection On The 
Omniscient Lord – has been composed for those who seek their 
well-being (i.e., realization of the Self) by enabling them to 
discern between the true and the false preaching.
‘ĀptamīmāÚsā’ 
brh;ekIrehekalk fofgrk fgrfePNrke~ A
lE;fXeF;ksins'kkFkZfo'ks"kizfriÙk;s AA114AA
lkekU;kFkZ & bl izdkj 
lE;d~&mins'k vkSj feF;k&mins'k ds vFkZ&fo'ks"k dh izfrifÙk 
(Hksn&foKku) ds fy, cukbZ x;h gSA
;g vkIrehekalk vius fgr dh pkg j[kus okyksa dks 
This concludes the (also known as 
the ‘Devāgamastotra’) composed by the supremely 
holy and stainless Ācārya Samantabhadra,
a glittering jewel among the authors of the sacred 
scripture, who reigned supreme as a poet,
a disputant, a preacher and an orator, and
whose expositions, based on the incontrovertible
doctrine of syādvāda, have torn apart
mountains of misconceptions.
With great devotion, I make obeisance humble
at the worshipful feet of Ācārya Samantabhadra.
‘ĀptamīmāÚsā’ 
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17
abhāva – non-existence 19, 20, 23, 
25, 26, 103, 104
abhāvaikānta – absolute non-
existence 25, 26
abhavya jīva – destined not to 
attain liberation 153
abheda – see advaita 
absolute separateness 55, 60
absolutist view 15, 16, 131, 161, 
170
Ācārya AmÃtcandra, Ācārya 
Amritchandra 48, 169
Ācārya Kundakunda, Ācārya 
Kundkund 9, 10, 31, 48, 71, 78, 
145, 146, 157
Ācārya Māõikyanandi 120
Ācārya Nemicandra, Ācārya 
Nemichandra 8
Ācārya Pūjyapāda 6, 85
Ācārya Samantabhadra 13-17, 78, 
84, 85, 120, 155, 168, 170, 171, 
175
Ācārya Umāsvāmi 97, 116, 144, 
157, 158
Ācārya Vidyānanda 11
acetana – inanimate 71
adhikaraõa – substratum 48-50
adÃÈÇa – invisible 142
advaita – ekatva, abheda, non-
dualism 47, 48, 51, 52, 54, 60, 
65
advaita-ekānta – absolute non-
dualism 47, 48, 51, 52, 60
Advaita-Vedānta 47
AÈÇasahasrī 11
affirmation 15, 19, 29, 30, 32, 34, 
40, 42, 60, 84, 85, 162, 168, 170, 
171, 174
āgama – scriptural authority 125, 
127, 129
agni – fire 111
AhaÚkāra – I-ness or Ego 69-71
ahetu – not a legitimate middle 
term, non-reason 39, 54
ajīva – non-soul 22, 33
ajðāna - ignorance 149, 151, 152
ākāśa – space 22, 70
akramabhāvī – without gradation 
156
alpajðāna – slight-knowledge 149, 
151, 152
anādi – without beginning 20, 23
ananta – without end 20, 23
ananta catuÈÇaya – four infinitudes 
5
ananta darśana – infinite 
perception 5
ananta jðāna – infinite knowledge 
5
ananta sukha – infinite bliss 5
ananta vīrya – infinite energy 5
ananyatva – oneness 111, 114
anāpekÈika - independent 119, 121, 
123
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anāpekÈika-avaktavya – somehow 
independent and indescribable 
123
anāpta – not a true authority 128
aneka, anekatva – many, manyness 
45
anekānta, anekāntavāda – non-
absolutism, many-sided view 28, 
40, 115, 160, 162, 167-169
aôga – limbs 148
antarāya – obstructive 6, 14
aõu – atom 111, 112
anumāna – inference 63, 129
anumeya – object of inference 10-
12
anupayoga – non-consciousness 33
anvaya – (agreement in) 
association 36, 38, 80, 116
anyāpoha-vāda – the Buddhist 
concept that the word is capable 
only of negating what is not 
meant, without affirming 
anything 173
anyatva – separateness 114
anyonyābhāva – reciprocal non-
existence 20-22, 24
apādāna – dislodgement 48-50
apākya – non-cookability 154
āpekÈika – dependent 119, 121, 123
āpekÈika-avaktavya – somehow 
dependent and indescribable 
123
apprehension 11, 133, 134, 156, 
157
apramāõa – not pramāõa 44
āpta – Omniscient, a true authority 
3, 128
āpta-established 128
arati – displeasure 4
Arhat – the World Teacher or ‘Jina’ 
4, 5, 11-14
ārta – sorrowful (concentration) 
148
artha – object (of knowledge) 19, 
42, 110, 129, 135, 139, 140, 142, 
160
artha-kriyā – performance of 
activity 42
asat – non-existing 27, 32-34, 42, 
57, 77, 84, 86
aÈÇāngahetuka – Buddha’s Noble 
Eightfold Path to liberation 90
astitva – existence 36, 38, 63
aśubha – wicked 16, 51
aśuddhi – spiritual impurity 153, 
154
asvarūpa – devoid of the form of its 
own 22, 24
atat – ‘that is not’ 170
atiśaya – miraculous happenings 5
attachment 4, 5, 8, 144, 153, 159
atyantābhāva – absolute non-
existence 21, 22, 24
avācyataikānta – absolutely 
indescribable 26, 60, 95, 114, 
121, 127, 132, 141, 147, 151
avagraha – apprehension 11
avaktavya – indescribable 27, 30, 
34, 35, 45, 123
āvaraõa – envelopment of the soul 
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by material karmas 8
avastu – non-object 42, 163, 167
avāya – judgement 11
avayava – constituent parts 105, 
107, 108
avayavī – aggregate 105, 107, 108
avidyā – ignorance 47, 51
avinābhāva – invariable 
togetherness 36-38, 45, 61, 122
avyakta – non-manifest 69-71
avyatireka – logical continuance 
115
ayutasiddha – residing in same 
substratum 116
bahiraôgārthaikānta – all 
cognitions have real substrata 
in the external world alone 
(totally objective, with no 
subjective input) 131
bāhyārtha – external object 134, 
136-138
bandha – bondage 51, 74, 149, 151-
153
beginningless 154, 155
bhaôga – limb 162
bhāva – existence, manifestation, 
nature 19, 25, 26, 30, 63, 84, 85 
bhāva nirjarā – subjective shedding 
of karmas 9
bhāvaikānta – absolute existence 
19, 26
bhāvakarma – dispositions of the 
soul 8
bhavya jīva – destined to attain 
liberation 153
bhaya – fear; ihaloka bhaya - fear 
relating to this life; paraloka 
bhaya - fear relating to the life 
beyond; maraõa bhaya – fear of 
death; vedanā bhaya – fear of 
pain and suffering; atrāõa 
bhaya – fear of being without 
protection; agupti bhaya – fear 
of divulgence of one’s deeds; 
ākasmika bhaya – fear of the 
unexpected 5
bheda – see pÃthaktva 
bhūtacatuÈka – the four basic 
substances as per the Buddhists 
– earth, water, fire, air 111, 112
bodha – cognition 25, 136, 137
bondage 17, 18, 51, 70, 72, 74, 89, 
143-145, 147, 149, 151-153 
Brahma 47, 48
Buddhi – reason, intellect, a piece 
of cognition 69-71, 129, 135, 137
Buddhist 56, 62, 75, 80-83, 86, 87, 
89, 91, 93, 111, 112, 173
buddhivÃtti – function of the 
intellect 71
cāmara – flywhisk 3, 6
catuÈkoÇivikalpa – fourfold causal 
relations 1 82, 83
celestial beings 4, 6, 13
Chakravarti Nayanar, A. 9, 146
Chakravarti, A. (Prof.) 71, 78
cintā – anxiety 5
Cit – intelligence 70
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consciousness 18, 21, 22, 32, 33, 50, 
91, 93
dÃÈÇānta – statement of a general 
rule supported by an example 
53
daiva – fate 139-142
darśanāvarõīya – perception-
obscuring 6, 14
demerit 51, 74, 143-145, 148
destruction 6, 8, 9, 13, 18, 20, 21, 
46, 48-50, 76, 79, 90, 92, 93, 98-
102, 109, 158, 159
Devāgamastotra 175
dhāraõā – retention 11
dharma (1) – medium of motion 22
dharma (2) – attribute 43, 119, 
122, 123
dharmī – the entity 13, 36, 37, 38, 
43, 45, 62, 119, 122, 123, 125
dharmya – virtuous 
(concentration) 148
dhrauvya – permanence 79, 98, 99
doÈa – imperfections 8
dravya – substance 22, 30-35, 39, 
42, 49, 59, 63, 67, 78, 84, 85, 99, 
103, 110, 115, 116, 119, 120, 165
dravya nirjarā – objective shedding 
of karmas 9
dravyakarma – material karmas 8
dravyārthika naya – general 
standpoint with dravya as the 
object 59, 165
DravyasaÉgraha 8, 9, 179
dÃÈÇa – visible 142
dvaita – dualism 54
dveÈa – aversion 5
Egoity – AhaÚkāra 70
eka, ekatva – one, oneness 45, 56, 
61, 63, 65
ekānta – absolutist, non-equivocal 
15, 17, 47, 48, 51, 52, 55, 60, 67, 
74, 75, 80, 89, 161
empirical (point of view) 48, 49, 94, 
122, 145, 178, 179
equanimity 158, 159 
factors-of-action 47-50
falsehood 14, 144
fate 139-142
fruit (of pramāõa) 67, 68, 158, 159
gaganakusuma or ākāśapuÈpa
– the ‘sky-flower’ 64, 77, 172
gandha – smell 70
ghātiyā karmas – deluding 
(mohanīya), knowledge-
obscuring (jðānāvarõīya), 
perception-obscuring 
(darśanāvarõīya), and 
obstructive (antarāya) 6, 9
gorasa – cow-produce 102
grahaõa – acceptance 159
guõa – quality 99, 103, 110, 112
guõī – possessor of quality 103
guru – preacher 3
hetu – the middle term 36-39, 52-
54, 61-63, 80, 90, 125-128, 130, 
180
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134, 164
hetudoÈa – fallacy of the reason 130
hetu-established 128
hetu-phala-bhāva – relationship of 
cause and effect 80
human-effort 139-142
IÈÇopadeśa 6, 85
īhā – speculation 11
ihaloka – this world 5, 51
impurity 153-155
indescribable 26, 27, 29, 31, 34, 35, 
45, 60, 82, 83, 86-88, 95, 114, 
121, 123, 127, 132, 141, 147, 151
inference 10, 12, 52, 63, 126, 129
inherence 103-106, 108-110
itaretarābhāva – see anyonyābhāva
Jain, Champat Rai 62
Jain, S.A. 97, 145, 157
Jain, Vijay K. 6, 9, 15, 17, 78, 85, 
120, 168, 169, 171
jala – water 70, 111
janma – (re)birth 4
jāti - class, genus 59, 99, 112
jðānāvarõīya – knowledge covering 
6, 14
jðāpaka – agent of knowledge 63, 
122
jðeya – knowable, object of 
knowledge 57, 149
jīva – soul 21, 22, 32, 33, 134, 135, 
137, 145, 153
jīva-artha – the object that is ‘jīva’ 
135
jīva-buddhi – the cognition of ‘jīva’ 
135
jīva-śabda – the word ‘jīva’ 135
jðāna – knowledge or cognition 5, 
57
judgement (perceptual) 11, 157
kāla – time 22, 30, 32, 63, 84, 85, 
115
kāraka – factors-of-action 47-50, 
63, 67, 69, 122
karaõa – instrument 48-50
kāraõa – cause 49, 69, 77, 80, 103, 
112-114, 148
karma – activity 16, 48-51, 103, 
110, 122
karmabandha – karmic bondage 
153
karmic matter 9, 145
kartā – doer 47-50, 58, 77-79, 120, 
122, 171
kārya – effect 69, 73, 75, 77, 78, 80, 
103, 112-114, 142, 148
kaÈāya – passions 143
kathaôcit – from a certain 
viewpoint 161
kÈaõika – transient 16, 56, 75, 80
kÈaõika-ekānta – absolute 
momentariness 75, 80
kÈetra – place 30, 32, 63, 84, 85
kÈudhā – hunger 4
kevalajðāna – infinite knowledge 5, 
12, 50, 149, 156, 158, 163, 
kevalin – Omniscient 149
kharaviÈaõa – the ‘horns of a hare’ 
64, 93
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kheda – regret 4
knowledge-obscuring 6, 8, 145, 157
kramabhāvī – in succession 156
kriyā – action 47, 48
krodha – anger 143
liberation 13, 17, 18, 51, 70, 72, 74, 
78, 89, 90, 91, 139, 149, 151-155
liôga – mark – see hetu 
liôgī – see sādhya 
lobha – greed 143
Lord Rama 10
Lord Śreyāôsanātha 168
Lord Sumatinātha 84
Lord Suvidhinātha 15, 170, 171
Lord Vimalanātha 16
mada – pride; jðāna mada – pride 
of knowledge; pūjā mada – 
pride of veneration; kula mada 
– pride of lineage; jāti mada – 
pride of caste; bala mada – 
pride of strength; Ãddhi mada – 
pride of accomplishments; tapa 
mada – pride of austerities; 
śarīra mada – pride of beauty 5
Mahat or Buddhi – the Great or 
Intellect 69, 70
MalliÈeõa Surī 17, 18, 70, 76, 91, 
100
māna – pride 143
maraõa – death 5
matijðāna – sensory knowledge 
157
māyā – illusion, deceit 47, 48, 134, 
143
merit 17, 18, 28, 51, 74, 143-145, 
148, 176
misery 157
mode 11, 12, 14, 27, 30, 34, 39, 40, 
46, 49, 59, 69, 79, 81, 97-100, 
102, 115-117, 156, 168
modification 9, 10, 18, 59, 67, 69, 
71, 116, 117, 119
moha – delusion 5, 152
mohanīya – deluding 6, 14
mokÈa – liberation 51, 74, 90, 91, 
139, 149, 151-155
Mount Meru 10
nāstitva – non-existence 36, 38, 39
naya – a particular state or mode of 
object; relative, one-sided 
comprehension 27, 28, 34, 40, 
43-46, 49, 58, 59, 120, 156, 157, 
161, 162, 164-166, 168
negation 15, 19, 29, 30, 32, 34, 40, 
42, 51, 84, 85, 89, 162, 169-171, 
174
niÈcaya ÈaÇkāraka – transcendental 
sixfold factors-of-action 49-50
nidrā – sleep 5
niÈedha – negative 42, 84, 167, 169
nigamana – conclusion 53
nimitta kartā (kāraõa) – auxiliary 
or external cause 49, 58, 77, 78, 
80, 120, 171
nipāta – a particle, an indeclinable, 
part of avyaya 160
nirjarā – shedding of karmas 9
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nitya, nityatva – permanent, 
permanence 16, 67, 74, 95, 96, 
116, 164
nityatva-ekānta – absolutely 
permanent 67, 74
nonentity 58, 83, 84, 86, 99, 167, 
172, 173
non-eternal 17, 18, 30, 33, 34, 41
non-existence 37-42, 54, 88, 103, 
104, 171, 
Nyāya-VaiśeÈika 103, 104
omniscience 9-15, 43, 50, 72, 149, 
156-158, 163
origination 17, 46, 48, 70, 79, 91-
94, 98-102, 109, 153
pÃthaktva-ekānta – absolute 
separateness 55, 60
pain 5, 17, 18, 71, 143-145, 147, 
148
pakÈa – minor term, locus or abode 
52, 53, 61-63
pakÈa-dharmatva – existence in 
relation to the minor term 62, 
63
pākya – cookability 154
Pańcāstikāya-Sāra 9, 31
pāpa – demerit 51, 74, 143-145, 148
parabhāva – other-being 32, 33, 85
paracatuÈÇaya – other-quaternion 
32
paradravya – other-substance 32, 
85
parakāla – other-time 32, 85
parakÈetra – other-place 32, 85
paraloka – abode after death, the 
other world 5, 16, 51
paramārthikasatya – the noumenal 
reality 94
ParīkÈāmukha 120
pariõāma – modification (paryaya) 
42, 115, 117
pariõāmī – the substance (dravya) 
in which modification takes 
place 115
parokÈa – indirect 14, 156, 158
particular 30, 42, 43, 67, 98, 116, 
119, 120, 156, 160, 161, 162, 
164, 167, 168, 171, 173, 
particularity 41, 104, 173
paryāya – form, mode 33, 35, 39, 
42, 59, 67, 99, 119, 120, 165
paryāyārthika naya – standpoint of 
modification 59, 165
passions 6, 8, 143, 176
pÃthaktva – separateness, diversity 
61, 63, 65
pÃthvī – earth 70, 111
pauruÈa – human-effort 139-142
perception 5, 6, 11, 13, 14, 85, 93, 
136, 146, 157
pleasure 17, 18, 143-148 
pradeśa – space-point 17
pradhvaÚsābhāva – posterior 
(emergent) non-existence 20, 23
prāgabhāva – prior (antecedent) 
non-existence 19, 20, 23
PrakÃti – nature 70-72, 150
pramā – valid knowledge or 
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General Index
apprehension 67, 68, 134, 136, 
137
pramāõa – source or method of 
valid knowledge 13, 25, 42-44, 
65, 67-69, 71, 86, 122, 129, 133, 
136, 137, 156-159 
pramāõābhāsa – invalid knowledge 
129, 131, 133
pramāõa-phala – fruit of valid 
source of knowledge 67, 68
pramātā – subject of knowledge 68, 
133, 136, 137
prameya – object of knowledge 10, 
12, 68, 122, 133
pramiti – correct notion 67, 68
pratibhāsa – appearance 47, 115
pratiÈedhya – negative 39
prātihārya – splendours 5, 6
pratijðā – proposition, thesis 52, 
53, 126
pratijðādoÈa – fallacy of the thesis 
130
pratyabhijðāna – recognition 75, 
76, 96, 97
pratyakÈa – direct (perception or 
knowledge) 12, 14, 15, 76, 125, 
156, 158
Pravacanasāra 10, 11, 48, 72, 157
prayojana – utility 115
pretyabhāva – birth following 
death, transmigration 56, 74, 75
pudgala – matter 22
puõya – merit 51, 74, 143-145, 148, 
176
purity 72, 153-155 
PuruÈa – Spirit 70-73
PuruÈārthasiddhyupāya 169
quality 32, 45, 59, 97, 99, 103, 110, 
112, 116
quodammodo (L.) – ‘in a way’, syāt 
18, 28, 70, 76, 91, 100
rasa – taste 70
rāga – attachment 5
Ratnakaraôçaka Śrāvakācāra 14
raudra – cruel (concentration) 148
Reals (tattvas) 70
rebirth 16, 155
remembrance 96, 97
retention 11, 157
roga – sickness 4
rūpa – form, colour 70, 93, 105
śabda – word 70, 135, 137
sādhana – see hetu 
sādharmya – presence-in-
homologue, homogeneousness 
36-38, 56, 164
sādhya – the major term 13, 36, 37, 
39, 52, 53, 61, 62, 126, 130, 164
sakaladeśa – comprehensive and 
absolute 44
śaktibhāva – the capacity (paryāya) 
115
śaktimāna – the abode of capacity 
(dravya) 115
sāmānya – general, generality 42, 
58, 67, 98, 103, 104, 109, 110, 
119, 120, 173
samavāya – inherence 103-105, 
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108-110
Samayasāra 71, 78
saÚsāra – cycle of rebirths 94, 155
samudāya – aggregate of qualities 
in a single object 56
santāna – series of successive 
events 56, 80-82, 93
sapakÈa – homogeneous example 
62, 63
sapakÈa-sattva – existence of 
connection in a homogeneous 
example 62, 63
saptabhaôgī – the seven-nuance 
system 27, 28, 32, 34, 40, 45, 
162, 168
saptabhaôga – the seven limbs 28, 
161
sarvajða – Omniscient 3, 10, 12
Sarvārthasiddhi 97, 144, 145, 157
sarvātmaka – pervading in 
everything, all-pervading 21, 24
sat – existing, being 27, 32-34, 42, 
57, 73, 79, 84, 86, 98, 99, 102, 
168
sat-cid-ānanda – ‘Existence-
Thought-Bliss’ 47
sattā – existence 104
saÚjðā – perception or cognition, 
designation 93, 115, 117, 134, 
135
saÚjðī – named, word-denoted-
entity 54, 84
SāÚkhya 69-71, 73, 113, 149
saÚkhyā – enumeration 99, 115
saÚkleśa – inauspicious kind of 
disposition 148
saÚpradāna – bestowal 48-50
saÚskāra – mental formations, 
volitions 93
saÚvÃti – fictional, mere usage 81, 
87, 93
saÚvÃti-satya – the phenomenal 
reality 94
scripture 3, 4, 6, 13, 14, 32, 51, 125, 
129, 160, 169, 175
sense-organs 69
Shah, Nagin J. 86
Shastri, Devendra Muni 162
skandha – lump or aggregate, 
molecule 93, 111, 112
sky-flower 43, 54, 64, 77, 83, 99, 
100, 110, 172
smaraõa – memory 75
smÃti – memory 75, 90, 96, 97
śoka – grief 4
sparśa – touch 70
speculation 11, 157
śrotā – the hearer 137
śrutakevalins – Masters of 
Scripture 160
stutya – worthy of adoration 3
śubha – virtuous 16, 51
śuddhi – spiritual purity 153, 154
śuddhopayoga – established in 
pure self 50
śukla – pure (concentration) 148
śūnya – null and void 33, 94
śunyavāda – nihilism 88
svabhāva – own-being, own-nature 
32, 85, 94, 98, 148, 154, 155
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svabhāva-śūnya – devoid of self-
existence 94
svacatuÈÇaya – own-quaternion 32, 
85
svadravya – own-substance 32, 85
svakāla – own-time 32, 85
svakÈetra – own-place 32, 85
svalakÈaõa – self-attribute 115
svayambhū – self-dependent 50
Svayambhūstotra 15-17, 78, 84, 85, 
120, 168, 170, 171, 181
sveda – perspiration 5
syād-asti – in a way it simply is 30
syād-avaktavya – in a way it is 
simply indescribable 30
syād-nāsti – in a way it simply is 
not 30
syādvāda – doctrine of conditional 
predications 17, 18, 26, 28, 60, 
70, 76, 91, 95, 100, 114, 121, 
127, 132, 141, 147, 151, 156, 
161-164, 174, 175
Syādvāda-Maôjarī 17, 18, 70, 76, 
91, 100
syāt – ‘in a way’ 28, 160, 161, 169, 
173
tadbhāva – intrinsic nature 97
tÃÈā – thirst 4
tapas – asceticism, austerities 9, 
155
tarka – logical argument 154-155
tat – ‘that is’ 170
Tattvārthasūtra 97, 116, 144, 157, 
158
teja – fire 70
Thomas, F.W. 18, 70, 76, 91, 100
transcendental (point of view) 48-
50, 178, 179
transmigration 97
tyāga – rejection 159
ubhaya – of both (attributes) 27, 
34, 37, 123
ubhaya-avaktavya – somehow both 
dependent and independent and 
indescribable 123
ubhayaikānta – endorsing both 
one-sided and independent 
standpoints 26, 95, 114, 121, 
127, 132, 141, 147, 151
udāharaõa – illustration 53, 125, 
126
universal 30, 63, 99, 
universality 41, 104, 109, 173
upacāra asadbhūta naya 49
upādāna kartā (kāraõa) – material 
or internal cause 49, 58, 77, 78, 
80, 120, 171
Upadhye, A.N. 11, 72, 157
upanaya – application of the rule; 
subdivision of naya 53, 165
upayoga – consciousness 32, 33
upekÈā – equanimity 158, 159
utpāda – origination 79, 98, 99
vāda – a theory of logic and 
metaphysics 161
vaidharmya – absence-in-
heterologue, heterogeneousness 
186
ĀptamīmāÚsā
36-38, 164
VaiśeÈikas 109, 110
vaktā – the speaker 137
vākya – the sentence 25, 136, 137
valid knowledge 14, 15, 25, 42, 65, 
67, 120, 129, 131, 133, 136, 137, 
158
vāsanā – suffusions 91
vastu-prapaôca – non-reality of the 
world of things 47
vÃtti – occurrence 105, 107
vāyu – air 70, 111
vedanā – sensation, feeling 93
vicitra – variegated 153
vidheya – affirmative 39
vidhi – affirmation 42, 84, 167, 168
vidyā – knowledge 51
vijðāna – consciousness or 
discernment 93
vijðānādvaita – cognition arrived 
at through the subjective act of 
mind is the only source of valid 
knowledge 129-130
vikaladeśa – partial and relative 44
vipakÈa – heterogeneous example 
62, 63
vipakÈa-vyāvÃtti – non-existence by 
contrariety in a heterogeneous 
example 62, 63
viśeÈa – particular, specific 42, 58, 
98. 103, 104, 119, 120, 173
viśeÈaõa – qualifying attribute 36-
39, 45, 83
viśeÈya – entity qualified 39, 83
vismaya – astonishment 4
viśuddhi – auspicious kind of 
disposition 148
vītarāga – free from all attachment 
144
vyakta – manifest 69, 70
vyāpti – logical or inseparable 
connection 36, 53, 164
vyatireka – distinction, exclusion 
36, 37, 116
vyavahāra ÈaÇkāraka – empirical 
sixfold factors-of-action 48-49
vyaya – disappearance 79, 98, 99
yutasiddha – residing in separate 
substrata 107
żarā – old-age 4
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187
General Index

dkfjdk dk izFke pj.k Verse No. Page
IND EX  OF  VERSES
dkfjdk vuqØef.kdk
vKkukPpsn~/qzoks cU/ks 96 149
vKkukUeksfguks cU/ks 98 152
v}Sra u fouk }Srkn~ 27 54
v}SrSdkUri{ks¿fi 24 47
vè;kRea cfgjI;s"k 2 4
vUkU;rSdkUrs¿.kwuka 67 111
vuis{ks i`FkDRoSD;s 33 61
vUrjÄkFkZrSdkUrs õ 79 129
vU;s"ouU;'kCnks¿;a 44 81
vcqf¼iwokZis{kk;k& 91 142
vHkkoSdkUri{ks¿fi 12 25
voDrO;prq"dksfV& 46 83
voLRoufHkykI;a L;kr~ 48 86
v'kD;RoknokP;a fde~ 50 88
vfLrRoa izfr"ksè;suk& 17 36
vgsrqdRokÂk'kL; 52 90
vkJ;k¿¿Jf;HkkokUu 64 108
brh;ekIrehekalk 114 175
mis{kkiQyek|L; 102 158
,dRos¿U;rjkHkko% 69 113
,dL;kusdo`fÙkuZ 62 105
,dkusdfodYiknk& 23 45
,oa fof/fu"ks/kH;ke~ 21 42
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
189
dkfjdk dk izFke pj.k Verse No. Page
dFkf×pr~ rs lnsos"Va 14 27
deZ}Sra iQy}Sra 25 51
dkekfnizHkof'p=k% 99 153
dk;Zdkj.kukukRoa 61 103
dk;ZHkzkUrsj.kqHkzkfUr% 68 112
dk;ZæO;eukfn L;kr~ 10 23
dk;ksZRikn% {k;ks gsrks& 58 99
dq'kykdq'kya deZ 8 16
Øek£ir};kn~ }Sra 16 34
{kf.kdSdkUri{ks¿fi 41 75
?kVekSfylqo.kkZFkhZ 59 101
prq"dksVs£odYiL; 45 82
tho'kCn% lckákFkZ% 84 134
rÙoKkua izek.ka rs 101 156
rnr}Lrq okxs"kk 110 170
rhFkZÑRle;kuka p 3 7
RoUerke`rckákuka 7 15
nsokxeuHkks;ku& 1 3
ns'kdkyfo'ks"ks¿fi 63 107
nSoknsokFkZflf¼'psn~ 88 139
nks"kkoj.k;ksgkZfu% 4 8
æO;i;kZ;;ksjSD;a 71 115
æO;k|UrjHkkosu 47 84
/eZ/E;ZfoukHkko% 75 122
/esZ /esZ¿U; ,okFkksZ 22 43
u;ksiu;SdkUrkuka 107 165
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
190
ĀptamīmāÚsā
dkfjdk dk izFke pj.k Verse No. Page
u lkekU;kReuksnsfr 57 98
u gsrqiQyHkkokfn& 43 80
ukfLrRoa izfr"ksè;suk& 18 38
fuR;RoSdkUri{ks¿fi 37 67
fuR;a rRizR;fHkKkukr~ 56 96
fu;E;rs¿FkksZ okD;su 109 167
i;ksozrks u nè;fÙk 60 102
ikia /qzoa ijs nq%[kkr~ 92 143
iq.;a /qzoa Lorks nq%[kkr~ 93 144
iq.;ikifØ;k u L;kr~ 40 74
i`FkDRoSdkUri{ks¿fi 28 55
ikS#"kknso flf¼'psr~ 89 140
izek.kdkjdSO;ZDra 38 69
izek.kxkspjkS lUrkS 36 65
cfgjÄkFkZrSdkUrs õ 81 131
cqf¼'kCnizek.kRoa 87 137
cqf¼'kCnkFkZlaKkLrk& 85 135
Hkkoizes;k¿is{kk;ka 83 133
HkkoSdkUrs inkFkkZuke~ 9 19
feF;klewgks feF;k psr~ 108 166
;fn lRloZFkk dk;± 39 73
;|lRloZFkk dk;± 42 77
;|kisf{kdflf¼% L;kr~ 73 119
oDr;ZukIrs ;¼srks% 78 128
oDr`Jksr`izekr`.kka` 86 136
okD;s"ousdkUr|ksrh 103 160
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
19
Index of Verses
dkfjdk dk izFke pj.k Verse No. Page
okd~LoHkkoks¿U;okxFkZ& 111 172
fo/s;izfr"ksè;kRek 19 39
fo/s;ehfIlrkFkkZÄaõ 113 174
fo:idk;kZjEHkk; 53 92
fojks/kUuksHk;SdkRE;a 13 26
32 60
55 95
70 114
74 121
77 127
82 132
90 141
94 147
97 151
foo{kk pkfoo{kk p 35 64
fo'kqf¼laDys'kkÄa psr~ õ 95 148
'kq¼Ô'kq¼h iqu% 'kDrh 100 154
'ks"kHkÄk'p usrO;k õ 20 40
laKkla[;kfo'ks"kkPp 72 115
l Roesokfl funksZ"kks 6 13
lRlkekU;kÙkq loSZD;a 34 63
lnkReuk p fHkUua psr~ 30 57
lnso lo± dks usPNsr~ 15 32
l/eZ.kSo lkè;L; 106 164
larku% leqnk;'p 29 56
loZFkk¿ufHklEcU/% 66 110
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
192
ĀptamīmāÚsā
¸
¸
¸
¸
¸
¸
¸
¸
¸
dkfjdk dk izFke pj.k Verse No. Page
lokZReda rnsda L;kr~ 11 24
lokZUrk'psnoDrO;k& 49 87
lkè;lk/ufoKIrs% 80 130
lkekU;okfXo'ks"ks psr~ 112 173
lkekU;a leok;'p 65 109
lkekU;kFkkZ fxjks¿U;s"kka 31 58
fl¼a ps¼srqr% lo± 76 125
lw{ekUrfjrnwjkFkkZ% 5 10
LdU/larr;'pSo 54 93
L;k}kndsoyKkus 105 163
L;k}kn% loZFkSdkUr& 104 161
fgUkLR;ufHkla/kr` 51 89
gsrksj}Srflf¼'psn~ 26 52
]]
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
193
Index of Verses
Other sacred Jaina texts
from Vikalp Printers:
ISBN 81-903639-2-1
Rs. 250/-
Tattv rths tra is invaluable for understanding life, and pursuit of happiness. 
The hardships and afflictions that we have to endure are of our own making. 
Our deeds, driven by passions, lead to sufferings and reproach in this world 
and the next. Virtuous activity alone, which is the cause of merit (puõya), 
leads to joyous feeling, auspicious life, charming and lustrous physique, and 
high status. Our ultimate goal is the attainment of the divine attributes, in 
fullness and perfection, of our souls. We can reach the goal only through the 
threefold path of right faith, right knowledge and right conduct (ratnatraya).
ā ū
Āchārya Um sv mi’s
Tattvārthsūtra
ā ā
WITH HINDI AND ENGLISH TRANSLATION
vkpk;ZJh mekLokeh fojfpr
rÙokFkZlw=k
Edited by:
Vijay K. Jain
Foreword by:
Āchārya 108 Vidyanand Muni
! Published: 2011
! Hard Bound
! Printed on Art Paper
! Pages: xii + 163
! Size: 16  ´22.5 cm
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As ch rya Vidyanand writes in the Foreword of Samayas ra, it is the 
ultimate conscious reality. The enlightened soul has infinite glory. It has the 
innate ability to demolish karmas, both auspicious as well as inauspicious, 
which constitute the cycle of births and deaths, and are obstacles in the path 
to liberation.
Samayasāra is an essential reading for anyone who wishes to lead a 
purposeful and contented life. It provides irrefutable and lasting solutions to 
all our problems, concerning worldly ways as well as spiritual curiosities and 
misgivings.
Ā ā ā
Āchārya Kundkund’s
Samayasāra
WITH HINDI AND ENGLISH TRANSLATION
ISBN 81-903639-3-X
Rs. 350/-
! Published: 2012
! Hard Bound
! Printed on Art Paper
! Pages: xvi + 208
! Size: 16  ´22.5 cm
English Translation, and Edited by:
Vijay K. Jain
Foreword by:
Āchārya 108 Vidyanand Muni
Jhenkpk;Z dqUndqUn fojfpr
le;lkj
195
Shri Amritchandra Suri’s  is a matchless Jaina text 
that deals with the conduct required of the householder ( r vaka). In no other 
text that deals with the conduct required of the householder we see the same 
treatment of complex issues such as the transcendental and the empirical 
points of view, cause and effect relationships, and injury and non-injury, 
maintaining throughout the spiritual slant. The basic tenet of Jainism – non-
injury or AhiÉsā – has been explained in detail in the book.
PuruÈārthasiddhyupāya
ś ā
WITH HINDI AND ENGLISH TRANSLATION
ISBN 81-903639-4-8
Rs. 350/-
! Published: 2012
! Hard Bound
! Printed on NS Maplitho Paper
! Pages: xvi + 191
! Size: 16  ´22.5 cm
Foreword by:
Āchārya 108 Vidyanand Muni
Shri Amritchandra Suri’s
PuruÈārthasiddhyupāya
Realization of the Pure Self
Jh ve`rpUælwjh fojfpr
iq#"kkFkZfl¼Ôqik;
English Translation, and Edited by:
Vijay K. Jain
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ISBN 81-903639-5-6
Rs. 450/-
Dravyasa graha is one of the finest classical Jaina texts, composed by His 
Holiness Ācārya Nemichandra (c. 10th century CE). It deals primarily with 
the Realities (tattvas) that contribute to world process. The conduct required 
for attaining the ultimate goal of liberation follows from the knowledge of 
these Realities. Both, the transcendental and the empirical points of view, 
have been considered while explaining the nature of substances, souls and 
non-souls. It will be of much use to scholars worldwide interested in pursuing 
the study of Jaina epistemology.
É
! Published: 2013
! Hard Bound
! Printed on NS Maplitho Paper
! Pages: xvi + 216
! Size: 16  ´22.5 cm
Foreword by:
Ācārya 108 Vidyanand Muni
With Authentic Explanatory Notes
Ācārya Nemichandra’s
DravyasaÉgraha
vkpk;Z usfepUæ fojfpr
æO;laxzg
English Translation, and Edited by:
Vijay K. Jain
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Rs. 450/-
! Published: 2014
! Hard Bound
! Printed on NS Maplitho Paper
! Pages: xvi + 152
! Size: 16  ´22.5 cm
Ācārya Pujyapada’s
IÈÇopadeśa –
The Golden Discourse
vkpk;Z iwT;ikn fojfpr
b"Vksins'k
Foreword by:
Ācārya 108 Vidyanand Muni
Vijay K. Jain
By:
ISBN 81-903639-6-4
His Holiness Ācārya Pujyapada, who graced this earth around 5th 
century CE, had crafted some valuable gems of Jaina doctrine, including 
Sarvāthasiddhi and IÈÇopadeśa. Concise but deep in import, IÈÇopadeśa 
unambiguously establishes the glory of the Self. It is an essential reading 
for the ascetic. The householder too who ventures to study it stands to 
benefit much as the work establishes the futility of worldly objects and 
pursuits, and strengthens right faith, the basis for all that is good and 
virtuous.
198
Rs. 500/-
! Published: 2015
! Hard Bound
! Printed on NS Maplitho Paper
! Pages: xxiv + 220
! Size: 16  ´22.5 cm
Divine Blessings:
Ācārya 108 Vidyanand Muni
Vijay K. Jain
By:
ISBN 81-903639-7-2
Ācārya Samantabhadra's Svayambhūstotra (2nd century CE) is a fine 
composition in Sanskrit dedicated to the adoration of the Twenty-four 
Tīrthaôkara, the Most Worshipful Supreme Beings. Through its 143 
verses Svayambhūstotra not only enriches reader’s devotion, knowledge, 
and conduct but also frees his mind from blind faith and superstitions. 
Rid of ignorance and established firmly in right faith, he experiences 
ineffable tranquility and equanimity.
The book has two useful Appendices. Appendix-1 attempts to familiarize 
the reader with the divisions of empirical time that are used extensively in 
Jaina cosmology. Appendix-2 provides a glimpse of life stories, adapted 
from authentic Jaina texts, of the Twenty-four Tīrthaôkara.
Ācārya Samantabhadra’s
Svayambhūstotra –
Adoration of
The Twenty-four Tīrthaôkara
vkpk;Z leUrHkæ fojfpr
Lo;EHkwLrks=k
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GUI D E T O T RANS L IT ERAT ION
Devan gar IAST
*
ā ī
v a
vk ā
b i
bZ ī
m u
mQ ū
, e
,s ai
vks o
vkS au
Í Ã
va É
v% Í
d ka
[k kha
x ga
?k gha
Ä ôa
p ca
N cha
t ja
> jha
×k ða
Devan gar IASTā ī
V Ça
B Çha
M ça
< çha
.k õa
r ta
Fk tha
n da
èk dha
u na
i pa
iQ pha
c ba
Hk bha
e ma
; ya
j ra
Devan gar IASTā ī
y la
o va
'k śa
"k Èa
l sa
*
IAST: International Alphabet of Sanskrit Transliteration
Æ Ò
g ha
{k kÈa
=k tra
K jða
J śra
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